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PREFACE
This study has grown out of a vague sense of unease which I
have about the kind of understanding which has gained wide popularity
among professional observers and analysts of our current "world" or
"global" issues. It is a kind of understanding which often presents
itself as non-political or a-political in character, and professes
to be only concerned with the scientific, factual aspects of these
issues. I would argue that such a position is untenable and, if held
to, can lead to a serious misunderstanding of the nature of these
Issues. The discussion and analysis of any of these issues must
deal with profound and contestable political issues which, thus far,
have received short shrift. This study attempts to give fuller con-
sideration to the political aspects of these issues at one level and
seeks to contribute to their more comprehensive understanding—
a
necessary step, I would suggest, to their ultimate resolution.
No intellectual endeavor is ever solely the product of one's own
individual efforts. This study is no exception and carries the influ-
ence of many whom I have come in contact with during my academic
career. I owe special thanks in this case to my committee, however,
especially to Howard Wiarda, who has provided an invaluable blend of
incentive, support, and critique to my current research. I am also
deeply indebted to Ken Dolbeare, whose influence I cannot adequately
v
1express in words, and Fred VanDerbeck, who has remained a unique and
constant source of intellectual stimulation.
I would also like to acknowledge the contributions of Phyllis,
Peter, and Katy, who showed what true friends are like during the
preparation of this manuscript.
Finally, I thank Elaine, without whom, quite simply, this work
would never have been done.
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ABSTRACT
Food, Energy, and Population: Are They "World" Problems?
An Analysis of Policy Responses In
Brazil, Tanzania, the United States, and Yugoslavia
February 1980
William T. Hill, B.A., Boston College
M.A., Notre Dame University, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Howard J. Wiarda
This study is a comparative analysis of the policy responses of
four developmentally diverse nations in the areas of food, energy,
and population— three issues which have gained wide popular currency
as "global" or "world" problems over the past decade. Tbis analysis
involves both a challenge to much of the standard opinion on these
issues, which promotes a "crisis" mentality and approach, and .an
investigation into some of the major underlying assumptions which the
popular crisis terminology implies. The major purpose of this study
is to assess the accuracy, relevance, and acceptance of the global
"crisis" perspective on these issues at the nation-state level
—
where comparatively little attention has been focused—and to judge
whether referring to these issues as "world" problems helps or
hinders our ability to adequately understand their source and nature.
The research method employed in this project is an application
of policy output analysis to a cross-national setting. An account of
•
vii
the current national and international policies of Brazil, Tanzania,
the United States, and Yugoslavia in the three is;sue areas under
consideration is presented with emphasis placed on an explication of
their publicly stated goals and contents, which are taken to represent
the primary manifestation of each government's understanding and
treatment of these issues. In addition, each policy is placed in
context with the other major policy programs of each government, to
indicate the level of priority which they receive and to reveal
whether their thrust is directed at the domestic or international
level.
Based upon a subsequent comparison and evaluation, the major
findings indicate that in these four cases national self-interest
remains the primary factor determining each state's response to these
so-called "global" issues. Therefore, based upon our observations
it is clear that these issues are being treated not unlike standard
international issues where parochial nation-state perceptions rule the
selection of the policy approach adopted. Thus, it is concluded that
the "global" perspective, which bases its appeal largely upon
ecological evidence, displays fundamental defects when applied within
the context of the political realities of the contemporary inter-
national system.
vlil
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CHAPTER I
THE WORLD CRISES: SOME UNASKED QUESTIONS
Introduction
An era of world crises, it appears, is upon us. It seems that
wherever one looks— in the mass media, scholarly journals, or even in
our everyday contact with others—the topic of our "global" problems
has become an area of growing concern. Currently, most of the discus-
sions, explanations, interpretations, and prescriptions being proposed
are focused on the triad of the world's energy, food, and population
situations
.
When one examines the standard opinions expressed on these topics
it is apparent that most often the authors are preoccupied in their
analyses with three overriding interests—albeit with a widely varying
degree of concern for each. A primary goal is to convince the audi-
ence of the severity of the situation and to illustrate in as stark
a manner as possible that the problem does exhibit the necessary
attributes to merit the "crisis" label.
1
To lend support to the
validity of this first argument a second interest is to provide a
convincing account of how and why the situation has reached its
present precarious state. This part of the explanation is usually
accompanied by the presentation of any number of graphs and growth
curves (the "hard" data supplied endlessly by those numerous agencies
whose sole function appears to be to gather it) in the apparent belief
1
2that it is more believable to us if we see energy consumption and pop-
ulation going up, as well as be told that it is so. Finally, these
analyses usually conclude with the requisite projection of the future
which, more often than not, is said to look worse unless significant
changes occur. This is then followed by the almost obligatory pro-
posal of various plans to alleviate or eliminate the "crisis",
accompanied by an enumeration of the hard decisions necessary to
2
achieve these ends.
In comparison to those aspects just mentioned, relatively scant
attention has been devoted to a different category of questions which
move toward a more critical inquiry into and analysis of the actual
s_cone and impact of these so-called "world" problems and, of the
implications of adopting a global perspective on these issues. From
our perspective—which is grounded in a skeptical view of the bases
upon which these situations are judged (or presumed) to be of inter-
national and global proportions, impact, and consequences
—
questions
3
of a different character should also arise around these topics. One
of the leading questions, for example, involves whose perceptual
spectacles we don when we perceive a "world" food, population, or
energy crisis and how we. then proceed to define the parameters of such
"world" issues. Are we again dealing with a situation similar to that
which arose in developmental circles in the 1960s, when most defini-
tions of "development" were the product of well-worn ethnocentric
bias grounded in the Western industrial experience? Or, does this
triad of issues have characteristics which set them apart from stand-
ard international issues whose understanding is normally ruled by
3each nation's socio-economic and political system?
If we listen to some of the most prominent and influential food,
population, and energy experts it would appear that the latter is the
case. Consider, for example, Georg Borgstrom's characterization of
the food problem:
The widening hunger gap is an ominous feature of our days
and one which poses the greatest challenge mankind has
ever faced, overshadowing atom bombs, continental mis-
siles, microbial toxins and nerve gas.
or, in a similar vein, Paul Ehrlich's and Lester Brown's statements
on the status of the population issue. As long ago as the late 1960s
Ehrlich stated, "Overpopulation is new the dominant problem in all our
personal, national, and international planning.", and he concluded
that it constituted "... mankind's most pressing problem." Such a
position received equal support from Brown in a later work in which
he declared:
Eapidly accumulating evidence suggests that the threat to
man's future security and well-being are not so much the
traditional ones of international conflict and invasion
by a foreign power but, rather, emerging economic and
ecological instability. Continued population growth may
endanger man's future even more than nuclear war—sug-
gesting the need for a massive commitment of resources ,
to move the world away from its present demographic path.
These kind of statements have also been increasingly echoed by
groups and individuals who hold positions of world consequence. In
the late 1960s, for example, the long awaited Pearson Commission
report on future international development in referring to world popu-
lation said, "No other phenomenon casts a darker shadow over the
prospects for international development than the staggering growth
of population." More recently, Robert McNaraara, who has headed the
4World Bank for the last nine years, declared on the population issue
that, "Short of thermonuclear war itself, it [population] is the
gravest issue the world faces over the decades immediately ahead." 8
Such characterizations have also been more frequently applied to
the energy issue in recent years as well. In his initial address on
energy to the nation in 1977, President Carter declared, "With the
exception of preventing war, this is the greatest challenge our
country will face in our lifetime." The gravity of the issue pur-
portedly derives from its world consequences as well. The energy
issue has been increasingly tied to the onset of world recession and
(possibly) depression and, in the words of Richard N. Cooper, Under-
secretary of State for Economic Affairs, "... energy problems will
be a major consideration facing the world's economies in the coming
,,10years
.
The real problem, however, is what these observations leave out.
More attention needs to be focused on the assumptions—which seem most
often to go unarticulated and unexamined—that are tacitly made by
those who speak of these issues as having a global/international
order. Is the ecological reality of energy resource shortage, to
take one example, being applied to the international political
reality without sufficient reflection upon what is entailed in such
a transference? Or, put more bluntly, is the presentation of ecologi-
cally based arguments concerning energy resource shortage, food
scarcity, and overpopulation assumed to apply with equal force to
the political realm of national and international politics as well?
11
Whatever the case may be, more surely needs to be said about
5whether approaching these problems from a global perspective contrib-
utes to a better understanding of their source and nature, and thus
of the type of strategies necessary to effectively confront them.
Perhaps the global level perspective exhibits its own brand of myopia,
by oversimplifying their status as widely recognized "world problems",
and thus avoiding serious consideration of many important international
political factors—not the least of which is the continued pre-eminence
of the nation-state—which is necessary to an adequate understanding of
the situation.
It is to this category of questions which this study intends to
address itself. In the works cited thus far and in the large majority
of others in this area there is a large void created by a lack of
attention to what is_ being done by individual governments in their
everyday policy activities in the food, energy, and population area.
Instead, as we have attempted to indicate above, most attention is
devoted to analyses at the global level. Consequently, proposals
concerning what needs to be done are all too often directed at the
necessity for the "global community" to act and/or call for the crea-
tion of a "global conscience", with little explanation of what is
implied by invoking these concepts or how they could come into being.
Thus an air of political unreality and naivete usually surrounds these
proposed solutions and the biases and limitations of the macro-level
approach which produces them rarely comes under close critical
scrutiny, leaving largely unanswered the question of what the global
13
level of analysis leaves out .
This research endeavor tries to begin to fill a part of that
void. The primary focus of the analysis will be on the policy outputs
of the governments of four nations in the food, energy, and population
areas. By concentrating on the national policy level we hope to ex-
plore, in one manner, how accurate a picture the "world crisis"
perspective portrays of the status of these issues at the national
and, to some extent, the international level. In looking at the
policy behavior of individual governments this study will assess the
"crisis perspective" along a dimension which is different from that
usually employed by those who present argumentation for the
ecologically-based point of view. The emphasis here will be on the
evidence presented by the political rather than the ecological realm.
Thus it is an effort to determine if the degree and character of
political awareness found on the national level supports the view
that these issues are held to be of crucial importance.
We believe that an approach on this level is necessary because
too often the accounts of our "world crises" either tend to overwhelm
us with their pessimism—since much of what is proposed as remedies
involves a transcendence of standard nation-state identities and
boundaries—or attempt to anesthetize us to the seriousness of the
14
situation with their optimism. Either way, they leave little room
for persons to take effective action concerning these "global"
problems in their everyday lives, preferring, more often than not,
to leave the hard decisions for the future to the existing powers that
be In the current national and international power structure.''""'
Therefore, we believe that an investigation of policies at the
national level—among a diverse selection of nations— to determine if
7there is any degree of common recognition, understanding, and treat-
ment of these issues (or even if they are "issues")— is a viable and
valuable method for measuring the acceptance and relevance of the
"crisis" view in the international realm. It must be made clear,
however, that our intention is not so much to attempt to undercut the
validity of the ecological evidence which has been presented to sup-
port this view, but rather to challenge its unreflective and somewhat
promiscuous extension into the international political realm. The
ultimate goal is to try to clarify the utility which the global
perspective has when extended into the political realm and to assess
how widely its precepts have been accepted among the four selected
nation-states whose policies will be explored. All of this will be
done while keeping in mind what our results imply for our thought and
action, especially for those of us seeking to understand and affect
the situation in our everyday lives.
Method of Analysis
We have chosen to explore the questions which have just been
posed through a comparative analysis of the policy responses in these
issue areas in four ideologically and developmentally diverse nations.
The rationale for dealing with the food, population, and energy areas
will, perhaps, be more evident than that which underlies the choice
of the four particular nations, but it is necessary to add a few words
of explanation on each point.
In regard to the policy areas, anyone familiar with these issues
will realize that policies concerning food, energy and population
8are closely related and any serious attempt to investigate one
thoroughly would entail dealing with the others. The connection
between the food and population issues is rather obvious, with
stabilization of the latter being persistently advocated as a major
means of improving the critical state of the world's food supply
and demand. At the same time the connections between the food and
energy issues are quite crucial, and becoming more so, since the
most popular means advocated for increasing the world's food supply
are increasingly dependent on energy intensive methods of cultiva-
tion (i.e. fertilization and mechanization are the two most frequently
mentioned). Thus a country's policy stance on any one of these issues
is oft-times related to its position on the others. In addition, it
also so happens that the "crisis view" with which I am concerned is
most often associated with analyses of the world situation in these
. , . 16particular issue areas.
The reasons for the selection of the four particular nations
(Brazil, Tanzania, the United States, and Yugoslavia) whose policies
will be explored involve a more detailed explanation. Initially it
should be understood that there were no pretensions at being
"scientific" in the method of selecting these four particular nations.
We are not suggesting that they are adequate representatives of other
advanced industrial or Third World countries. Rather, they were
chosen for certain attributes they possess as nation-state systems
which were considered important in view of the purposes of this study.
Primarily this combination was chosen because, as a group, they
manifest striking socio-political and developmental differences,
9for it was intended that their diversities be a major consideration.
We believe that an investigation of a selection of nations
who exhibit significant differences in ideology, the structure of
their social and political institutions, and in the character of
their economic systems is frankly a better test of the acceptance and
relevance of the "crisis" interpretation which is being addressed,
than one which included countries broadly similar in these categories.
One could argue for example that the energy issue's relevancy is a
function of a state's industrial level: the more industrialized it
is, the greater is its energy consumption, thus the more important a
world energy shortage would become to it. Or, as it is more popularly
proposed, it could be argued that population growth is a function of
a nation's developmental level: the argument being that as economic
and social amenities are more widely dispersed population growth as
an issue tends to de-fuse itself."'"'' In the process of selecting
this group of nations we consciously sought to sidestep these kind
of arguments by covering as wide a spectrum as possible in the areas
of relevant socio-economic and developmental characteristics, and,
to so present these disparities as to be recognizable along any
proposed developmental scale.
When viewed from another angle a primary intention of these
choices was to achieve a wide variation among those characteristics
historically employed in comparative studies as tools crucial to the
determination of a nation's developmental status (e.g. gross national
product, level of industrialization, and extent of the agricultural
sector are three of the more popular of these -measures that come to
10
mind) and further, to pose the ideological and institutional differ-
ences as clearly as possible. In doing so we are accentuating those
"variables" which have traditionally been viewed as performing a major
role in explaining a government's policy stance and which could,
hypothetically, do likewise in those policy areas with which this
study is concerned."^
To summarize, our approach in choosing these four countries was
aimed at achieving diversity rather than homogeneity and was governed
by two underlying premises which we believe will give greater impact
to our findings. The first is that the above-mentioned factors, among
many, seem, based on past experience, to be the most likely to con-
tribute to and/or help explain the policy differences which might
be observed in the analysis; consequently, every effort has been made
to give them a priority role which will make their effects clearly
attributable, if such are observed. Secondly, we would suggest that
any position which maintains that these issues are of a "global"
magnitude unlike standard international issues would gain more
credibility if significant similarities in understanding and treat-
ment of these issues is revealed among a group of nations as funda-
mentally diverse as these. In fact it is most assuredly those dif-
ferences among nations which we have emphasized here that must be
transcended and/or accounted for if the "crises" view is to be judged
accurate in its depiction of the international awareness and level
of activity being undertaken in these issue areas.
The body of this study will be presented in two sections. The
first part will present a description of the most recent policies
11
implemented in the three selected areas by each respective nation.
Initially, each country is discussed separately. In these individual
treatments emphasis will be placed on an account of the goals and
contents of the current policies. It is expected that there will
be only peripheral concern with the "process" aspect of the policy's
formulation, reference being made to its role only when its influence
over the policy outcome is judged to be crucial to a full and accurate
assessment of its character. A determination of the dominant factors
and interests which affected the policy's conception is included as
19
well, when necessary to presenting an adequate analysis.
Attention is also given to placing each policy in perspective in
relation to the remainder of each government's other major policy con-
cerns, with specific reference (when necessary) to whether these
policies are given priority ever others (e.g. larger expenditures,
administrative effort, publicity, etc.), the presumption being that
these factors help to reflect the importance which is attached to any
particular policy. In the same context an effort is made to deter-
mine the primary orientation of the policy response cast in terms of
the national/international split, to determine if the policy repre-
sents a consciousness of the issue as being critical domestically,
internationally, or both.
By taking into account all of these factors our analysis seeks
to evaluate the overall character of each policy and judge it as a
response to supposed "world crisis" conditions. There are a number
of questions which will be addressed to present an adequate evaluation
in this regard. Among them are: does the policy, as nearly as can
12
be determined, appear to represent a national viewpoint and initiative,
as opposed to one which appears to take more cognizance of the pri-
orities of the global "crises" perspective? Is it a policy which
seems attuned only to national priorities, such as developmental
goals, and the expressed needs and goals of the government? Or, on
the other hand, does the policy seem to be more a response that
should be understood with reference to international contingencies
and pressures (e.g. to acquire or retain allies and aid—much like
the paper "land reforms" which were formulated in some Latin American
countries under the Alliance for Progress in the 1960s)
,
with, accord-
ingly, little relation to the national context? Finally, is the
national attitude and posture significantly different from the inter-
national position where, for instance, less energy and active commit-
ment may be required to advocate a position than domestically, where
policies need to be funded, administered, and produce results—and,
,, 20
therefore, may involve more serious political risks and challenges.
Such observed differences between the two spheres would appear to
have important implications for trying to understand how different
policy contexts affect the perceptions of these so-called "crisis"
issues
.
After a presentation of the policy materials through a case-
study of each nation our attention turns to a comparison and evalua-
tion of the findings. The key similarities which have been noted
among policies will be outlined and juxtaposed against the important
differences which have been observed. We will then weigh the
similarities and differences against each other and judge which
13
aspects have emerged as the most important to an assessment of the
status of the food, energy, and population situations as "world"
problems or crises. We will make some reference to whether our
investigation indicates that the traditional standard variables of
ideological, institutional, and socio-cultural differences constitute
the crucial factors in understanding each nations policy responses
to these issues, and what this then indicates about the accuracy and
acceptance of the world "crises" view in these four nation-states.
We will then finally turn to an interpretation of our findings
and an assessment of how well we have addressed our initial queries
concerning the world "crises" perspective. This will involve an
evaluation of what our observations have indicated about the strengths
and weaknesses of adopting a "global" perspective on these issues, as
well as a critical evaluation of the policy "output" approach which
is utilized in this study, and a proper recognition of the strengths
and limitations of the kind of data which it produces.
CHAPTER II
THE "ISSUES" OF FOOD, POPULATION AND ENERGY IN TANZANIA
Introduction
The United Republic of Tanzania has been an independent African
state since 1961 when British trusteeship was peacefully ended. The
country has been known as Tanzania since 1964 when a political union
was established between Tanganyika and the newly independent island
of Zanzibar, which is located off the coast of the mainland. Tanzania
has not been presented with serious problems of tribalism, nor has
the military exercised any significant political influence—as has
been the case in a number of neighboring African states. The govern-
mental structure has remained remarkably stable during the period of
independence.
Politically, the country considers itself to be a socialist,
democratic one-party state—which was formally established in 1965
—
with the party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) , being
seen as coterminal with the nation.
1
This political system has been
generally accepted and has functioned well with the periodic elec-
tions being notable for the significant turnover in office-holders
which has occurred at both the local and national level. A major
alteration in the government power structure was undertaken in 1972
when a policy of de-centralization was implemented to combat the
14
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increasing concentration of effective power at the higher levels.
The ultimate purpose was to further democratize the bottom-up parti-
cipation in the system by dispersing some control over developmental
projects and activities down to the regional, district, and village
levels
.
Hie country's bellwether has been Julius Nyerere who led the.
independence movement and has, with the exception of one year when
he voluntarily stepped down, been the President of the Republic since
1961. In his speeches and writings one finds the :most articulate
presentation of his country's developmental strategy, priorities,
3
and goals. His initiatives have been the central factor in determin-
ing the direction of Tanzania's developmental efforts.
During the period under consideration in this chapter Tanzania's
development policy has been oriented around the ideology of African
socialism and the principle of "self-reliance". The government has
attempted to follow an autonomous development policy which was ini-
tially premised on an explicit rejection of the Western capitalist
4
advanced industrial model as one unsuited to the African context.
The emphasis in development policy has been placed on social and
political development and the equalization of the basic material
conditions of the people, as opposed to any exclusive concern with
economic growth as the priority.
5
The ideology of African socialism,
which according to Nyerere has its roots in the traditional African
extended family structure, informs this effort and presents society
with its ultimate goals:-
By building on principles of the traditional extended
16
family system, with its emphasis on co-operation and
mutual respect and responsibility, a society will be
built in which all members have equal rights and equal
opportunities, where there is no exploitation of man
by man, and where all have a gradually increasing
level of material welfare before any individual lives
in luxury.
The role of the government in society's pursuit of these goals
is central. All important sectors of the economy are either in govern-
ment hands or are subject to majority control by the government. The
private sector is not relied upon to provide the main thrust in
productive investments for development. The government's guiding
principle in the economic sphere is to promote ". . . the development
of forms of economic activity which encourage collective and co-
operative efforts and avoid wide differences of wealth and income."^
While the ideology of African socialism has been employed to
provide the theoretical justification for Tanzania's developmental
path, the principle of "self-reliance"
—
premised on a clear recogni-
tion of Tanzania's position as a "less-developed" country in the world
system—has been used most often to guide her relations with foreign
states. The concept of "self-reliance" referred primarily to the
government's perception of the role which foreign aid and investment
was to play in the country's development.
We have firmly rejected the proposition that without
foreign aid we cannot develop. We should never depend
on overseas aid to the extent of bending our political, g
economic, and social policies in the hope of getting it.
The degree of "self-reliance" which the government has sought
and been able to sustain, however, has varied considerably. Their
determination to have a degree of control over external aid and
17
investment not normally granted cost them significant financial losses
in the 1960s, mostly in the area of private investments. But since
the early 1970s the economic problems of the country (discussed below)
have precipitated a major change in attitude toward foreign aid and
investment, whose role has greatly increased (see Table 1).
TABLE 1
GRANTS AND LOANS RECEIVED, 1970-1976
(millions of Tanzanian shillings)
Year
Foreign
Grants
External
Loans Year
Foreign
Grants
External
Loans
1970 0.4 121.5 1974 214.4 466.9
1971 0.1 269.7 1975 408.0 783.0
1972 37.8 347.4 1976 717.2 1250.6
1973 62.4 455.9
SOURCE: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1976 .
New York: 1977.
The government's present attitude toward foreign investment is
illustrated in a statement by the Minister of Natural Resources and
Tourism, which recently appeared in the Wall Street Journal. "The
only thing we insist on is retaining control. We want 51%, but how
you use your profit or what you do with it is your business. We've
got nothing against capitalist partners." Indeed the shift has
been dramatic. The current Five Year Development Plan (1977-1982)
proposes to receive 50% of its investment funding from external
sources and Tanzania has, according to one source, recently become
18
one of the world's largest per capita recipients of aid: receiving
$300 million in 1977, which constituted 80% of the government's non-
military development budget. 10 Thus in recent years the principle
of "self-reliance" has receded in importance and no longer represents
an accurate depiction of Tanzania's external relationships.
The following sections will present a general overview of the
food, population, and energy situations in Tanzania and will review
the important developments which have occurred in these areas over
roughly the last decade, when the development priorities just out-
lined informed much of the government's domestic policies. This
account will provide the historical background for an examination of
the current state of the government's policies in these areas and of
the major factors which have influenced their formulation and imple-
mentation. The primary purpose at this stage is to characterize the
government's "perception" of these issues by drawing upon the policy
responses as the primary representation of the government's under-
standing and treatment of these issues.
Food
An overview. In spite of its relative economic poverty, maintaining
an adequate supply of basic food crops was not a severe problem for
Tanzania prior to the late 1960s.
11
The state of the food situation
was reflected by a comment in a 1968 government publication which
proudly pointed out that Tanzania was the only country in Africa to
maintain a growth trend in food production higher than its population
growth rate during the 1955-1966 period. While this did not imply
19
that Tanzania was self-sufficient in providing the basic food crops for
its domestic consumption, it did indicate that dependence on food
imports and external food aid was net crucial to meeting the country's
food needs.
By the late 1960s, however, the food situation had begun to
seriously deteriorate and attention to the nation's "alarming increase"
in food imports became one of the government's chief concerns. The
onset of the 1970s, which brought significant changes in the world
food pricing and marketing system, saw Tanzania's food situation grow
markedly worse and food import costs became a serious financial drain
on the country. The "food problem" was now a major domestic issue and
self-sufficiency in the basic food crops emerged in government policy
pronouncements as a cornerstone of its development strategy.
In the last decade the performance of the food producing sector
of Tanzanian agriculture has been characterized by wide variations in
the yearly production levels of its staple crops. Domestic production
has persistently failed to meet a growing demand and, as a consequence,
the dependence on food imports to meet essential needs has increased
considerably (see Tables 2 and 3) . The poor performance of the food
sector in this period has had major ramifications for the country,
contributing to a steadily deteriorating balance of trade and a large
reduction in the country's foreign exchange reserves since 1967. Its
decline has led to increasing restrictions on the government's ability
to pursue its overall developmental goals.
Food policy in the 1960s . Self-sufficiency in the basic food crops for
TABLE 2
PRODUCTION OF MAJOR FOOD CROPS, 1967-1978
(thousand metric tons)
Year Maize Rice Wheat Total
1967 549 114 31 694
1968 664 136 44 844
1969 525 144 39 708
1970 767 184 71 1022
1971 730 Q/,OH 1 HAT1UU /
1972 881 171 98 1150
1973 603 204 78 885
1974 1446 293 46 1785
1975 825 150 46 1021
1976 897 172 58 1127
1977 968 194 71 1233
1978* 1000 260 65 1325
SOURCE: United Nations, Statistical
Yearbook for 1971, 1974, 1976, and 1978.
New York: 1972, 1975, 1977, and 1979.
*United Nations, Food and Agricultural
Organization estimate.
TABLE 3
IMPORTS OF MAJOR FOOD CROPS, 1967-1976
(thousand metric tons)
Year Maize Rice Wheat Total
1967 4 12 38 54
1968 8 15 36 59
1969 23 9 5 37
1970 4 2 6
1971 92 93 24 209
1972 79 62 21 161
1973 187 60 7 254
1974 247 71 106 424
1975 233 64 159 456
1976 73 9 16 98
SOURCES: For 1966-1970, Gabriel
Ruhumbika, ed. Towards Ujamaa . Dar es
Salaam: East African Literature Bureau,
1974, p. 93. For 1971 on, United Nations,
Trade Yearbook , annual. Rome: UNFAO;
and Bank of Tanzania. Economic Bulletin ,
July 1975.
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subsistance—maize, rice, and wheat—has purportedly been a goal of the
13Tanzanian government since independence. This general goal has
received prominent mention in all four of the development plans which
have been enacted since 1961. But while the goal of increased food
crop production has remained a constant, the strategy for achieving
this end has undergone significant modifications as the government's
understanding of the "food problem" has changed.
The policy toward the agricultural sector as a whole—which
represents approximately 40% of the Gross Domestic Product—has always
viewed increased production as a goal requiring a multi-faceted
approach which addresses political, economic, social, and technolog-
ical factors. The effort to improve the agricultural sector's per-
formance was not perceived simplistically as just a question of
applying the proper modern technology (e.g. tractors, fertilizer, and
hybrid seeds) in the appropriate amounts. Rather the first essential
step which the government proposed in this area, the "villagization"
program, involved a fundamental alteration in the living arrange-
ments of the vast majority of the rural population—a segment which
has constituted over ninety percent of the total population throughout
the period of independence.
The "villagization" policy was first proposed and explicated by
President Nyerere in his 1962 inaugural address:
... it is ridiculous to concentrate on agriculture if
we are not going to make any change in our old method
of cultivation and our old ways of living. If we want
to develop, we have no choice but to bring both our way
of living and our way of farming up to date.
The first and absolutely essential thing to do there-
fore if we want to be able to start using tractors for
23
cultivation, is to begin living in proper villages.
In a further elaboration of the policy Nyerere acknowledged the dif-
ficulties of implementing such a policy which, in effect, proposed
large scale social changes as only an initial necessary step in its
program for attaining the agricultural sector's productive potential:
Our agricultural methods have been part of a total
culture, and change in the tools we use, che introduc-
tion of irrigation, even the introduction of hybrid
seeds, affects such things as the interdependence of
the family, the tribal social security arrangements,
or inheritance practices.
Not surprisingly the program was noted more for its failures
than its successes in the following years, but the emphasis on
villagization as the main thrust in agricultural policy was sustained
under the first Five Year Plan when its goals were actually broadened.
Although long-maturing, the settlement schemes bring
about a relatively abrupt transition of the people
concerned to modern techniques with regard to land
use, land tenure and patterns of agricultural
production, and economic attitude. They will also
be relied upon in the future to relieve incipient
land hugger and population pressure in certain
areas
.
Increased agricultural production remained the primary goal of the
program, but the increased hopes expressed by the government fore-
shadowed a growing interest in the non-economic aspects of successful
villagization.
The first two Development Plans also sought more short-term
payoffs in increased production in the agricultural sector, partic-
ularly after the initial enthusiasm wore off and successful villagi-
zation was seen to be years away. The first three year Development
24
Plan (1961-1964), for example, concentrated almost exclusively on the
agricultural area when proposing the government's primary developmental
goals for the three year period. It hoped to achieve an improved
agricultural performance by encouraging small-scale farmers, who are
the backbone of Tanzania's agriculture, to significantly increase
their production and become more integrated into the cash economy.
This policy was largely continued under the First Five Year Plan
(1964-1969) which followed, although the proposed expenditures in
this area were reduced from 25% of the Three Year Plan's budget to
1 o
15% of the Five Year Plan's budget.
The agricultural sector did achieve production increases under
the first two Plans although there were serious problems in attaining
the proposed investment levels (i.e. only 75% of the proposed level
was met under the Three Year Plan) . The concentration on the small
farmer proved quite fruitful and their efforts were given most of the
credit for the improved agricultural performance. Whether this was
attributable to an effectively implemented government policy was,
however, the subject of much dispute—particularly as pertained to
the food crop sector of agriculture. It appeared that much of the
improvement had occurred in spite of the government's policies and
19
was due to factors beyond its control. Central among these, for
example, was the increasing world demand for some of Tanzania's major
export cash crops such as cotton and coffee.
Moreover, when one differentiated between the export crop and
food crop sectors of agriculture, it was becoming increasingly
25
evident that the bulk of production increases was occurring in the
export sector where large increases were achieved in the 1961-1967
period. 20 According to one perspective, this was seen to be sympto-
matic of a general trend in all of Africa at this time, where de-
clines in food crop production were being experienced while total
on
agricultural production steadily increased.
Tanzania was no exception to this trend and increased commer-
cialization of agriculture since independence had benefited the export
sector disproportionately. One indication could be seen in the late
1960s and early 1970s when, while food crops were experiencing
serious declines, the export sector was flourishing with total
22production levels approaching record highs.
In Tanzania's case this trend must be understood by reference to
her position in the world market system, for it has affected the
government's perception of its domestic situation and the formula-
tion of its policies to some extent. Within this context Tanzania's
recent agricultural history is, in part, a reflection of its inferior
position in the world market system where, as a so-called "less
developed" country, it must produce those products for which it has
a comparative advantage and for which there is world demand. This
imposes a set of limitations on its domestic policy options since
the export of cash crops is the primary means by which the country
acquires foreign exchange for its import and developmental needs
(for Tanzania, agricultural exports account for approximately 70% of
23
the value of exports annually).
The dilemmas of this situation have been recognized by the
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government which has, at various times, alluded to the inequities of
the world trade structure when explaining its agricultural difficul-
ties. An excerpt from the Second Five Year Plan is illustrative:
Continuation of such a structure of trade means noth-
ing less than the increasing exploitation of the people
of the developing world by the industrialized nations.
The
. . . result of this structure is that in the
rural areas all efforts are directed towards the
production of commodities for the overseas markets,
to the neglect of the expansion of the domestic
production of foodstuffs, which would more immedi^,
ately contribute to the well-being of Tanzanians.
While it has never assumed a determinate role, the international con-
text is a factor of some importance in a consideration of Tanzania's
food policy, as will be seen in our subsequent evaluation.
Of more immediate relevance is the effect which the trend toward
commercialization has had on the food producing sector of Tanzanian
agriculture. According to a number of studies, not only has the
export crop sector grown faster than the food sector in recent years,
it has expanded largely at the expense of the food sector and in-
creased the role which Tanzania's precarious ecological situation
25
plays in determining the country's food production capacity.
It is well known that climate has been the predominant factor
affecting Tanzania's agricultural production from year to year.
Annual rainfall amounts are unstable, indeterminant , and may fluc-
tuate widely from year to year. The average rainfall within the
country is 44 inches yearly (well over the 30 inches considered neces-
sary for stable crop production) , yet regional amounts may vary from
less than 30 inches to over 100 inches annually— in fact, only one-
half of the land area receives adequate rainfall every year.
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The rainfall periods also vary from region to region, compounding the
problem and producing serious problems of severe aridity and flooding
in different areas of the country during the year.
The impact of this problem is widespread and encompasses a major
portion of the land and people, as is pointed out in a study conducted
by two climatologists well acquainted with Tanzania's situation:
. . .
in the last 32 years over one-half of the population was
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affected by major shortages of rainfall." More importantly, they
argue that the increasing commercialization of Tanzania's agricul-
ture has enlarged the role which climate plays and enhanced its
potentially deleterious effects.
In line with observations from many other parts of the
world commercialization of agriculture, regional
specialization, centralized marketing, and an urban
demand independent of production have increased the
economic effects of drought losses and the resultant
loss of development effort. Thus a recent drought
occurrence in Tanzania, a minor one by its climatolog-
ical extent, required the import of 43,000 tons of
food grains in contrast with minimal imports in the
more serious drought of 1965.
Thus while the government's policy in the 1960s had met with
some success in increasing total agricultural productivity, the
results appeared to be mixed. To those who looked beyond the total
figures it was evident that the government's agricultural policy, by
failing to clearly distinguish between the needs of the export and
food crop sectors, was concealing the deteriorating performance of
the latter.
Food policy: 1969-1974 . The government's dissatisfaction with the
agricultural results and its growing concern over the country's food
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crop difficulties was signified when it proposed a new phase in agri-
cultural policy with the Arusha Declaration in 1967. The Declaration
announced a restructuring in the country's agricultural priorities and
redefined the government's developmental strategy with rural develop-
ment as its focus. The "villagization" program which had been seen
primarily as a pre-condition for the application of modern agricultural
methods and technology—which was to be financed largely from external
sources of aid—now acquired a more political character as the
"Ujamaa" village strategy. The social and political goals of the
program emerged on an equal footing with the economic goals, which
had until then been the imperative. The proposed changes in the
physical and social arrangements of the rural populace were recast as
initial stages in moving toward the ultimate goals of peasant self-
reliance and collective land exploitation at the village level—
a
state which was now to be achieved chiefly by dependence upon native
29
skills and capabilities. Although increased agricultural produc-
tion remained an important concern, there was now to be a greater
emphasis placed on the means by which this was achieved.
One of the most important objectives of Ujamaa is to
modernize agriculture, creating a framework in which
the advantages of large-scale production can be
reaped without the negative social consequences of
capitalist agriculture.
A most important aspect of this change in policy was the govern-
ment's acknowledgment that the food producing sector now required
specific attention separate from the export crop sector. The govern-
ment's own assessments of its agricultural policy under the First
29
Five Year Plan admitted that there were key failures in its policies
that required a different approach:
. . .
the crucial thing for us to realize is that the
increases in output were almost everywhere realized
without any change in our method of production.
. .
.
Our present attitude to food^s the result of ignorance,
indifference, and indolence.
The Arusha Declaration clearly established self-sufficiency in food
crops as a paramount goal of the government's development policy,
with the Ujamaa village program being proffered as the primary means
32by which this would be accomplished.
The proposals contained in the Second Five Year Plan, which
followed in 1969, illustrated the new preoccupation with the food
producing sector. An improvement in the performance of the food sec-
tor, as well as in the quality of the food produced, was set forth
as an independent priority under the Plan; in its words "... our
33
first aim is to provide sufficient and better food for everyone."
The need for increases in both food and cash crop production were
still considered essential, but expansion in food production and
domestic markets to improve its distribution was to take precedence
over any expansion in exportable crops (i.e. agriculture was to re-
ceive 23% of expenditures under the Plan and, for the first time,
4% of this was to be devoted exclusively to food crop development).
One of the more important projects instituted by the government
at this time was the creation of an Agricultural Working Party whose
function was to establish crop priorities (those that were to increase,
decrease, or remain at the same production levels) which were to be
followed during the five years under the Plan. This introduced a
30
government effort to gain greater control over the production levels of
all crops and produced a good deal of optimism concerning the food
situation, including the hopeful proposition of achieving an export-
able surplus of food crops during the life of the Plan.
Such hopes proved groundless, however, and by 1972 it was quite
clear that, in spite of the new directions presumably initiated by
Arusha and the Second Five Year Plan, the food situation in the
country had worsened (see Tables 2 and 3). Both the government and
its critics agreed that the situation had deteriorated but pinpoint-
ing the causes for the food sector's poor performance was the subject
of some dispute.
President Nyerere was the source of the most frank governmental
evaluation of its own policies. In 1972 he presented a report which
reviewed the country's agricultural performance since independence.
Although he granted that there was a general improvement, his observa-
tions concerning the food sector were painfully similar to the
remarks he had made three years earlier:
. . . it would be idle to pretend that we have done
anything like enough, or that we have really made
much progress in modernising our agriculture. Indeed
the situation is even worse as regards foodstuffs,
because our colonial governors used to concentrate
all their attention on cash crops and we have fol-
lowed their example by not bothering ab^ut the
methods used in the production of food.
According to Nyerere the overall production increases in the agri-
cultural sector were largely attributable to the great expansion in
the area under cultivation (by his estimate it had roughly tripled
between 1964-1970), they were not due to any effectively implemented
31
agricultural policy.
While the government's position appeared to suggest that, although
its intentions were good, there had been difficulties in implementing
the policy changes in the food area, other more harsh critiques ques-
tioned whether there had been any real attempt to change policy at
all. An extensive review of the government's agricultural policy by
a group of Tanzanian social scientists argued that the government had
always favored export crop expansion to the detriment of the food
sector, and saw little indication that the policy had substantively
35
changed since the Arusha Declaration.
In the area of export crops they noted that greater aid and
extension services (such as fertilizer and credit) continued to be
more readily available to farmers who grew export crops. Their prices
also remained higher giving a much better financial return than food
crops (i.e. although the government had raised the internal market
price of some food grains by 25-50% in the early 1970s, they still
remained only two-thirds of world market prices) . If further proof
was needed, it could be inferred from the fact that the large majority
of economically viable Ujamaa villages grew cash not food crops,
indicating that the support services for the latter were either not
available nor sufficient.
The food sector, they charged, was given only sporadic attention,
mostly in times of crisis. The ongoing activities of the government
agencies set up to deal with the food crop sector could be cited in
this regard, such as the performance of the National Agricultural
Products Board (NAPB) which took over marketing of food crops in 1964.
32
The NAPB had concerned itself primarily with the marketing aspects of
food crops leaving the production and pricing areas neglected which,
due to the higher export crop prices, tended to discourage food produc-
tion if cash crop growing was an alternative— as it often was. Thus,
while the marketable surpluses of food crops had increased under the
NAPB the demand for food imports had increased as well, effectively
36
nullifying much of its accomplishments. Their opinion of the Second
Five Year Plan's impact on the food producing sector was quite similar
to Cranford Pratt's judgment of the preceding Plan (see note number 19):
they concluded that there was a clear lack of programmatic follow-up
to any of the food priorities established in the Plan.
The inadequacies of the government's food policy were magnified
by developments in the country's food situation in the early 1970s,
particularly when changes in the world's food markets produced precip-
itous price increases in the food imports which Tanzania most depended
upon. The domestic situation was further exacerbated by a series of
droughts, beginning in 1971, which effected large areas of the country
and adversely effected all crop production.
The magnitude of the impact of food import price increases may be
seen in a comparison of their costs in 1973 and 1974. During this one
year period the costs of food imports tripled as a proportion of the
total import bill, reaching 18% of total import costs in 1974 and
1975 (see Table 4). The 1974 crop year was called a disaster in
Tanzania although production of some food crops had actually increased,
largely because the gap between domestic production and consumption
grew wider. This necessitated massive food imports which, according
33
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to government sources, threatened to exhaust Tanzania's foreign ex-
. 37 «change reserves. The continued dependence on food imports was
cited by the government as a major contributing factor to the steady
decline in the country's balance of trade in this period, culminating
in a financial situation so precarious the government was forced to
postpone implementation of the third Five Year Plan for three years.
Trie government responded to the deteriorating food situation
with a number of measures aimed specifically at improving the
agricultural sector's ability to avoid food shortages. The Iringa
Declaration in 1972 set the tone for the government's increased
commitment in this area. The Declaration admitted that agricultural
performance had declined since 1967 and strongly urged the greater
use of fertilizer, modern machinery, and better agronomic practices
as the primary means of improvement. More importantly, TANU itself
was now placed at the forefront of agricultural reform with its well
organized administrative machinery playing a central role in carrying
out agricultural education and transformation. An essential aspect of
the successful implementation of this new strategy was a speeding up
of the "Ujamaa" settlement scheme, announced at the 1973 Party
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Congress, by proposing to have all peasants in villages by 1976.
Other government measures also indicated a greater awareness of
the need for future planning in the food area which had not previously
been evident. There was to be an increased emphasis on the NAPB's
role as a storer of famine relief supplies when surpluses were
accumulated to prevent the drastic financial impact which fluctuating
food T:rop levels had produced in recent years. Higher prices to
35
producers of food crops were also now employed more frequently as di-
rect incentives to make food production a more financially attractive
39
alternative
.
Thus far the government's approach to the "food problem" had
placed increased production at the top of the list of priorities in
this area. But as the government's increased efforts failed to
produce significant improvements there was a considerable debate on
whether the principle source of Tanzania's food problem was being
attacked. According to one notable outside source, for example, dur-
ing the 1970-1975 period the whole Tanzanian agricultural sector
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experienced stagnation with production rising at less than 1% annually.
Surprisingly, the increases in the food sector were better than the
average, rising at 3.4% and continuing to grow faster than the 2.8%
population growth rate up until 1976. From this analysis it could be
suggested that the key to the problem is the food sector's inability
to keep up with growing demand, a demand which could be largely
attributable to the relatively high population growth rate.
The views expressed in more detailed analyses, however, tend to
attach much more importance to deficiencies in the government's
agricultural policies and their implementation, when explaining the
inadequate performance of the food sector in this period. The key
problem to most was the difficulties which the government was en-
countering in effectively implementing the Ujamaa settlement scheme.
The most serious was the outright peasant rejection of the "coopera-
tive farming" aspect of the program—which primarily effected the
production of food crops in the villages. The net result was to
36
exacerbate the food situation by creating a food dependence among
people who had in the past provided largely for their own basic food
needs
.
Another frequent criticism was aimed at the government's con-
tinued failure to adequately provide the support services needed to
make the settlements livable and economically viable. The outstand-
ing example in this area where promise and performance did not coincide
was in the government's program to provide the rural areas with one
of their most pressing needs: an adequate and regular water supply.
Between 1964 and 1971 only 800,000 people were provided with improved
water supplies, a rate recognized to be insufficient. The government's
reaction to criticism in this area was to announce in 1971, at the
height of a new series of droughts, a twenty year target by which
time "... all Tanzanians living in rural areas should be provided
with adequate and readily accessible, clean and wholesome water
throughout the year." This would require one million to be added
annually to those served (the annual rate now is 300,000), a goal
which apparently is beyond the government's technical and financial
capacity to achieve.
The government's explanation of the food sector's problems, on
the other hand, differs considerably in its emphasis. It has never
recognized any significant relationship between the population growth
rate and the food issue, nor does it acknowledge that there have been
any serious food production losses caused by the dislocations of the
Ujamaa program. The government's position has chosen to emphasize
37
the role which the "natural" climatic conditions have played in the food
sector's fluctuating performance and its inability to achieve sufficient
sustained growth. The vagaries of the weather—either the presence or
lack of adequate rainfall—were always the most prominent factor men-
tioned by the government spokesmen when offering explanations for
both production increases and declines during this period.
Drought conditions, for example, were the reason most often
cited by the authorities as the major cause of production declines,
43
with poor husbandry being a decidedly secondary source. The inter-
pretation of production increases was remarkably similar, as an
excerpt from a Bank of Tanzania report illustrates.
Favorable weather conditions, good crop husbandry, and
increased hectarage were the main factors behind the
increased output .... However it should be noted
that although there was a marked increase in domestic
food production, total^utput was still below total
domestic requirements.
No one could really argue with the proposition that the climate
had been an important contributing cause of the food "problem" in the
early 1970s. But its effects were difficult to assess, and the
government's tendency to attribute the fate of food production levels
to what was essentially an uncontrollable factor was interpreted as
an effort to deflect much of the criticisms which had been levelled
at its food policy and the Ujamaa program in this period.
Food policy: 1975 to the present . Since 1975 there have been signi-
ficant improvements in Tanzania's food situation, but there remains
considerable disagreement over how much the situation has really
38
improved as well as over how much of the improvement is due to effec-
tive government policies. There have also been two notable shifts in
the government's approach to the food problem which have involved a
broadening of its concern beyond a preoccupation with solely the
productive aspects of the issue and a greatly increased role for
external aid in the successful implementation of the country's cur-
rent food policy goals.
Trie 1976/1977 crop year saw production levels return to "normal"
in the government's words and one immediate result was a reduction
in the. food import category of 85% in the first three quarters of 1976
over their value in the same period of 1975. This was accomplished
primarily through a widespread increase in acreage planted to grains,
a development that was attributed by the government to the success of
a political campaign which encouraged all sectors of the population to
grow more food
.
The estate operators and the large-scale farmers in particular
were the focus of this effort. The government was now seeking more
immediate results and it was assumed that these farmers had the techno-
logical capacity to gain significant short-term production increases.
This attempt to increase the food production role of the large-scale
farmers initiated a distinct shift in the government's food policy
away from its primary concentration on the small-scale subsistance
farmer. The exploitation of the food production potential of the
more modernized sectors of agriculture is now being emphasized and
is being undertaken with the aid of extensive financing and coopera-
tion from external resources.
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The new strategy is, for example, an essential aspect of a plan
announced in 1977 to establish a four month strategic maize reserve
of 100,000 tons—a plan whose success is also heavily reliant on
4 6grain contributions from external sources. A National Grain Project
was also launched in 1977 which proposes to increase maize output by
195,000 tons by 1982. This project will be entirely financed by the
International Development Association of the World Bank and will
focus on the high-yielding maize growing regions of the country where,
it is presumed, "better husbandry" will produce the most fruitful
results
.
Some of the non-production related aspects of the food problem
are now becoming concerns of the government as well. Energy protein
deficiencies, estimated to affect 20-30% of children by a United
Nation's study, has been recognized as a serious problem and is
believed to be caused, in part, by the poor quality of processed food
imports. The government has advocated the wider use of native, home-
grown food products as a better quality substitute for these more
"convenient" processed foodstuffs, both as a way of improving nutri-
tion and of reducing the dependence on these more expensive food
48
imports
.
Food storage problems have also been discovered to be a major
cause of wastage, leading to the loss of some 20-30% of crops yearly.
The situation has also been made worse by the chronic transportation
shortages within the country which have prevented proper timely
collection of food crops. In response the government has embarked
upon a project to build and improve storage facilities, which again
AO
relies on external funding, in this case from the Danish government. 49
Amid this general flurry of activity in the food area the most
recent summary of the government's perspective on the food situation
was issued in the Third Five Year Plan (1977-1982), which was finally
implemented in July of last year. Its policy goals in the food area
reflect an optimism produced by a generally improving food situation;
most notable in that for the first time in a decade the agricultural
sector will not be the primary focus of the Plan. The Plan proposes
to drastically increase the growth rate of the Gross National Product
from its present 2.5% to 6% annually by concentrating on the industrial
sector which will receive 27% of proposed expenditure, to 15% for
• i 50agriculture
.
In regards to agriculture the Plan calls for increases in the pro-
duction of both food and cash crops and, off of recent favorable devel-
opments, goes so far as to project self-sufficiency in grain production
by 1985. The successful implementation of the Plan is crucially
dependent on external finance and cooperation with fully 50% of its
estimated $4-5 billion cost expected to be provided by sources
outside the country.
There is some question, however, whether the degree of optimism
concerning the food situation which is expressed in the Plan is fully
warranted. Few would deny that the situation has improved, but
significant variations in yearly food production levels still persist
and climate remains the pivotal factor in determining crop levels.
Further, it is possible to find significant discrepancies among the
government's own appraisals of recent trends in the food situation.
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If one looks at food grains
,
for example, it is evident that there has
been a significant reduction in these imports since 1975. Yet it -may
also be observed that in the first three quarters of 1977 there was
an 82% increase in the import category of food and foodstuffs over the
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same period in 1976. Thus it appears that the financial gains
accrued by the reduction in grain imports may be more than offset by
the continued dependence on the generally more expensive processed
foodstuffs
.
The observations of President Nyerere remain the most candid and
critical in this area and undercut much of the current hopeful expecta-
tions. His views were recently expressed in a report which reviewed
the progress made in agriculture since the Arusha Declaration. After
noting that total agricultural productivity had grown since 1967 he
issued a very critical evaluation of the food producing sector which
had not substantively changed from his previous assessments:
. . . not enough has been done, and sometimes the efforts
have been misapplied . . . the truth is that our agri-
cultural results have been very disappointing ... in
food production, for example, the increase in cojtput has
not kept pace with the increase in population.
Nyerere lamented the fact that "good weather" was most responsible for
recent production increases and was sharply critical of the ineffi-
ciencies of the food producing section, concluding "... our agri-
cultural productivity is too low to produce a surplus that can feed a
. .
.
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larger urban population and maintain strategic reserves.
In the most extensive critique of his government's food policy
to date Nyerere suggested three primary causes for the food sector's
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poor performance: 1) the government's failure to adjust price levels
for food products, 2) the inefficient transportation system, and most
importantly, 3) a real failure in lack of political leadership and
technical understanding at the village level, where the peasant far-
mer's interests and needs had largely been ignored.
This last point was one of the first clear indications from the
government that despite its settlement achievements (by 1977 almost
13 million people out of a population of around 16 million were in
villages) the Ujamaa program was not having the desired results on
the country's food production capabilities. In retrospect, it pre-
saged the forthcoming shift in emphasis to the large-scale, more
modernized sectors of agriculture as the primary means of increasing
food production quickly.
According to a number of current studies it appears that the
"communal production" phase of the Ujamaa village program, once pro-
claimed as a means to food self-sufficiency, is close to abandonment.^
This aspect of the program has clearly been a failure and has been
de-emphasized largely because of the resistance of the villages.
The contribution of the "cooperative farming" sector of the Ujamaa
villages to the national product, while difficult to measure, appears
by all accounts to be insignificant. In particular it has had no
effect on the supply of foodstuffs to the population, an area where
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it was supposed to have an important impact.
While this has been judged by many to be a considerable failure
as an aspect of the government's food policy the government, thus far,
A3
has resisted efforts to evaluate the program in this manner. Witness
the recent statement by a government representative in response to
these criticisms, "It is still too early to gauge the impact of
58villagisation on our food production or output." But as the settle-
ment phase of the program nears completion it will become increasingly
difficult to deflect such criticisms, and the question of whether the
government has abandoned what was once the most significant goal of
its rural agricultural policy will have to be faced.
Population
Population characteristics
. The most recent data available estimates
Tanzania's population to number about 16.5 million in mid 1977 with an
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annual growth rate of 2.5%. The population, as noted above, is
overwhelmingly rural although the urban sector has grown from 3.2% of
the population in 1957 to 7% in 1978. As a whole the populace exhibits
gross demographic characteristics which are common among those coun-
tries in the world generally identified as "less-developed". The
Birth rate is high, A3 per 1000: the death rate is high, 22 per 1000;
the infant mortality rate is high, 167 per 1000; and the life expect-
ancy is low, AA years. In reference to those gross demographic
measures it has been argued that the country is, in comparative terms,
underpopulated with a density of approximately 16 persons per square
kilometer—a figure which is below average for all of Africa and
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about one-half of the world average.
The two most striking aspects of Tanzania's population, which
44
are of considerable importance in understanding the government's policy
position in this area, are the age structure of the population and the
wide spatial variations in the major demographic characteristics which
may be observed within the country.
The age structure of the populace is skewed to the lower age
brackets and tbe situation appears to be getting worse. The propor-
tion of persons under the age of 15 years has grown from 42% of the
population in 1947 to 47% in 1977, presenting the country with an
expanding pool of individuals who are, for the most part, categorized
as economically unproductive and thus an increasing burden to be
supported by others.
The government's ability to deal with this problem is seriously
hindered by the highly unbalanced distribution of the population within
the country and the extreme variations in the important demographic
characteristics which occur from region to region. By most estimates
60% of the population occupies 25% of the land, largely settled
around the border areas of the country. Consequently, the regional
and district variations among the most basic demographic measures
can be wide and highly significant, calling into question the
validity of utilizing "national" figures as an accurate gauge for
- -
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any type of planning or policy.
After the 1967 Census, for example, the estimates of density in
some areas varied from only 2 to over 221 persons per square kilo-
meter. More important, perhaps, were the variations which could
be found in the primary variables effecting the growth rate. One
government sponsored study found that at the district level—the
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lowest level at which the results were evaluated—there were fluctua-
tions in the birthrate from 31 to 58 per 1000 and in the death rate
from 11 to 33 per 1000, producing a population growth rate which
ft "\fluctuated from 0.9 to 3.7% among the districts.
Population and the government response . The population situation has
presented Tanzania's government with some major obstacles to the
effective implementation of its developmental plans. The spatial
distribution of the population, for example, has been cited by the
government as a major impediment to the goals of improved agricul-
tural production, adequate and equitable provision of government ser-
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vices, and the creation of a viable internal market. But within
this context the issue of population growth has not emerged as a
prominent concern of the government, particularly in the guise of an
obstacle to the country's development.
In Tanzania, as in most of Africa, rapid population growth has
not been perceived to be a pressing issue requiring an articulated
policy response. When population has arisen as an issue, most atten-
tion has been devoted to the related problems of sterility and sub-
fecundity as more important national concerns.
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The debate in Tan-
zania has revolved around the question of the country's underpopulation
rather than its overpopulation in recent years. The relatively high
population growth rate and the large increases in population which
have accrued in the last two decades—total population has approxi-
mately doubled since 1955—have been but minor points of concern to
the government thus far.
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The government's efforts in the population area have been directed
at improving the living conditions of the populace by means other than
attempting to control its growth rate. This direction was initiated
under the First Five Year Plan when lower infant mortality and in-
creased life expectance were included among the "essential" goals of
development policy. Interestingly, the First Plan also contained
one of the few government efforts at controlling the distribution
of the population embodied in a proposal to resettle city dwellers
on rural lands to help alleviate growing unemployment and population
pressure in the cities. This endeavor has been at best sporadic since
then, however, and largely a failure, having met with considerable
resistance and widespread public disfavor.
^
This is as far as the government has ever ventured in trying to
control the growing population and its effects. The position on the
population growth rate as a separate issue is typified in a statement
by the Minister for Economic Affairs and Development Planning issued
after the results of the 1967 Census were known:
. . . commenting in 1968 on the census results which
showed that the population of the country had in-
creased by over 1/3 between 1957 and 1967 he stated
that Tanzania was underpopulated and had room for
millions more, though his government had not set
an 'ideal' optimum number.
The government's stance on population growth has changed very
little in the ensuing years. The most significant development has
been a growing awareness of the fallout effects of the country's
increasing population on general living conditions. The first sign
of such a change was indicated by President Nyerere's comments in
47
hi's preface to the Second Five Year Plan.
It is very good to increase our population because
our country is large and there is plenty of unused
land
. . . But it is obvious that just as the num-
ber of our children is increasing, so the burden
to adults—the workers— is also increasing
. . .
It is for this reason that it is important for
human beings to put emphasis on caring for
children and the ability to look after them
properly, rather than thinking only about the^g
number of children and ability to give birth.
The voicing of this concern has been followed in substantive
terms in this area by a government emphasis on family planning. But
a concept of family planning which specifically defines it as a health
care measure whose primary benefits will be to prevent infertility and
subfecundity and reduce the level of infant mortality. Control of the
population growth rate has clearly not been considered to be an aspect
of this program.
Indeed, until 1973 the implementation of this policy consisted
exclusively of allowing the privately organized and financed Family
Planning Association of Tanzania— founded in 1959—to use the facili-
ties of the government clinics and hospitals to provide mothers with
the opportunity to voluntarily receive information on child-spacing
and maternal care, as a health care measure for both mother and child.
This concept of family planning as an appropriate device for
dispensing effective health care practices among mother and child
has continued to form the core of the government's activities in
the population area in recent years. The government's commitment
increased significantly in 1973 when Family Planning was announced
to be a national policy which called for all government institutions
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to- help facilitate provision of these services to the population.
Family planning became fully integrated into a framework for the
improvement of the basic health services, particularly in the rural
areas where such services were sorely lacking. The current goal is
to provide Mother and Child Health Clinic (MCHC) services within 10
kilometers of 90% of the population by 1980.
The government's program in this area consists primarily of
constructing the physical facilities in the rural areas and providing
the medical staff, and its expenditures in this regard surpasses that
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of most African states in recent years. The family planning ser-
vices themselves are, however, still exclusively provided by the
private organizations who are dependent on external aid for their
funding
.
Although its commitment to a health-care oriented conception
of family planning has increased, the Tanzanian government continues
to view the country's population growth rate without great concern.
The government's posture on this issue specifically rejects the
proposition, which has wide currency among many population "experts"
and international agencies, that population growth is a primary
obstacle to the development of "less-developed" countries like them-
selves.
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The idea that excessive population growth is a key factor
in perpetuating a "less-developed" country's poverty is not one
which has gained many adherents among Tanzanians, as the comments
of one close observer of the situation points out.
Thus far, only a few Tanzanians believe that this situa-
tion holds true for their country. With large shifts
in population, and especially with more efficient
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agricultural methods, Tanzania can accommodate more
inhabitants than at present. 72
In fact recent action, or inaction, by the government in this
area could be interpreted as a direct challenge to this view. At
the World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974, for example,
Tanzania was among those states characterized as "not seriously
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concerned" about the population issue. Its perspective of the
"growth" issue is identified with the analysis advanced by some
African demographers who argue that there are good economic reasons
for higher population growth rates within Africa's demographic con-
text. Chief among these are the need for larger domestic markets to
reduce external economic dependence and the serious lack of manpower in
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certain areas which besets many African states, as it does Tanzania.
Based upon this analysis, population growth is seen as both an
opportunity and a challenge, not necessarily an impasse.
Thus does an observation on the government's position regarding
this aspect of the population issue in 1975 still largely reflect the
situation today:
The government has taken into consideration suchfactors
as resource base of the economy, low population density
of 14 persons per square kilometer in 1972 and just 7%
of its population in major towns by 1970, in deciding
not to adopt a population control policy. It is widely
believed that the economy could benefit from a higher
concentration of people in towns, as well as higher
population densities. 75
Tanzania, like most of Africa, has refused to view population as an
issue per se, preferring to take the approach that "the best pill is
development"
.
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Energy-
Energy conditions and the policy response . The energy situation in
Tanzania is, in many respects, quite unlike that characteristic of a
large portion of the rest of the world, although shortages of supply
and increased costs of energy have been important problems in the
country's recent energy history. The energy resources most important
to the everyday living conditions of the population are hydro-electric
power, which is the chief source of electricity, and wood, which is
the primary energy resource consumed to meet the basic energy needs
at the village level. The recent energy "crisis" in Tanzania has had
its principal manifestation for the vast majority of the population
in the growing fuelwood shortage, which has been produced by the
rapid, unregulated deforestation of the country's forestry resources
—
7 6
now recognized to be a serious problem in all of sub-Saharan Africa.
Secondarily, it has been felt in the inability of hydro-electric pow-
er to expand sufficiently to meet growing domestic energy demands
in the 1970s.
The important exception in Tanzania's energy situation, which
it has in common with the industrialized societies of the world, is
the crucial dependence of the country's industrial and transport sec-
tors on petroleum to provide for most all of their energy needs—oil
which must be entirely imported. Thus while the nature of Tanzania's
energy situation exhibits unique characteristics, one striking aspect
is the critical role which petroleum plays in one of the world's
most poorly developed economies and the constraints which this
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condition places on the government's ability to effectively deal with
the energy problem.
Recent developments
.
A key problem in Tanzania has been the failure
of the energy producing sector to grow adequately to meet essential
energy needs over the past decade. The growth in energy production
has lagged so far behind demand that, according to the Statistical
Yearbook of the United Nations, per capita consumption of energy
actually declined in Tanzania between 1970 and 1975 (see Table 5).
Much of the energy sector's poor performance is attributed to
the country's lack of any significant solid energy resources whose
exploitation is both technically feasible and economically rational
within the context of the nation's energy needs. Coal is the only
solid energy resource which the country possesses in quantity (it
is the only East African state with any exploitable coal)
,
yet its
deposits have not been developed to any extent and production has
virtually stagnated since 1968 (see Table 5). The nature of the
coal deposits are the primary cause: they are poorly located, dif-
ficult to extract, expensive to transport, and environmentally
hazardous—obstacles which are exceedingly difficult for a financially
straightened country like Tanzania to overcome. Consequently, coal is
not an important factor in Tanzania's current energy picture and,
based on the analysis of some government studies, will not be a
relevant energy resource, given curren technology, for a substan-
tial portion of the country's energy needs in the foreseeable
77
future.
TABLE 5
ENERGY PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION, 1967-1976
Coal* Hydroelectric? Per Capital
Year Production Production Consumption
1 Q671 ~ O / i 29 71
1968 J J 1
1969 3 34
1970 3 38 71
1971 3 38
1972 3 39 73
1973 2 44 95
1974 2 46
1975 1 n/a 70
1976 1 n/a 68
SOURCES: United Nations, Statistical and
Economic Information Bulletin for Africa
,
May
1977; and United Nations, Statistical Yearbook
for 1971, 1974, 1976, and 1978. New York:
United Nations.
*metric tons
@thousands of coal ton equivalents
//kilograms
53
Out of necessity (and circumstance, i.e. cheap oil) oil and, more
recently, hydropower have served as the major sources of energy for the
two most energy intensive sectors of the Tanzanian economy: manufac-
turing and transport. Oil has been of paramount importance to the
growth and expansion of these areas of the economy and any signifi-
cant alteration in its crucial role in the economy and society appears,
by all accounts, to be quite unlikely.
The importance of petroleum to Tanzania was extensively reviewed
in the early 1970s when the drastic world price increases severely
undermined the country's financial position. Between 1973 and 1974,
for example, the cost of petroleum imports as a proportion of the
cost of all imports jumped from 11% to 18%, and viewed as a percentage
of export receipts the increase was even greater, going from 13% to
35% in the same period (see Table 6) . Combined with the simultaneous
developments in the food situation discussed previously, these cost
increases presented major financial difficulties to the government.
They exacerbated a continuing deterioration in the balance of payments
and foreign exchange reserves and forced the government to seek
massive external financial assistance, including almost $100 million
from the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and development and a $14 million loan from the Arab-
African Oil Assistance Fund, just to keep its head above water.
The greatest economic impact of the oil situation was felt in
the manufacturing sector where growth stagnated and has still not
adequately recovered (i.e. in 1975 GNP rose at a record low 2.2%
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while industrial production fell by fully one-half!). Power
TABLE 6
PETROLEUM IMPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE
OF EXPORT RECEIPTS, 1971-1978
Year Cost*
Percentage of
Export Receipts
1971 215 11
1972 242 10
1973 338 13
1974 1004 35
1975 590 21
1976 789 19
1977 843 19
1978 1040 29
SOURCE: International Monetary
Fund , International Financial
Statistics . Volume XXXII, November
1979.
^millions of Tanzanian shillings
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and energy shortages have been cited by the government as the major
causes of the chronic underutilization of productive capacity in
79manufacturing which has obtained in recent years. The plight of
the industrial sector in general (i.e. between 1966-1974 its con-
tribution to the Gross Domestic Product grew inadequately—from 8%
to 10%) has been magnified by these developments and its expansion
is now the central focus of the current Five Year Plan.
The potential for significant cutbacks in petroleum usage or
the utilization of alternative fuels is, however, in the opinion of
government spokesmen severely limited and involves unacceptable costs,
The views of the Minister of Finance on cutbacks are typical:
. . . with only 6 to 8 percent of our fuel used for
pleasure driving and only about 12 to 14 percent for
passenger cars at all—we can save very little on
quantity used without crippling cuts in rural health,
agricultural extension, transport of staple foods,
manufacture of textiles and similar key outputs.
as are those of the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania on alternatives
to oil:
. . .
because of the past cheapness of mineral oil
and the lack of technically feasible substitutes for
use in the field of road and air transport we are
heavily dependent on oil for supplying our energy
requirements . . . Because well over half our use
is for road and air transport, alternative energy
developments are unlikely to reduce the proportion
of oil in imports.
Hydro-power is one energy resource which Tanzania has in rela-
tive abundance. It has only recently become the chief source of
the generation of electricity for both industrial and mass consump-
tion, supplanting thermal power which had accounted for 60% of the
electricity generated until 1975. The expansion of hydro-power
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generation has been slow to occur, although it has been a priority of
the government in recent years, largely because much of the funds
which would have been devoted to its exploitation have been diverted
to defraying the increased costs of food and petroleum imports.
More importantly, while hydro-power has become the dominant
mode of power production for mass consumption its availability and
appropriateness to the energy needs of the majority of the popula-
tion is severely circumscribed. Its availability is confined pri-
marily to the large towns and thus only to a small portion of the
population. This situation appears unlikely to fundamentally change
in the near future; according to the estimations of some, this type
of electricity—the mode generated by large scale plants—will remain
at best a marginal energy resource for most Tanzanians for some time
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to come.
On the other hand, fuelwood is and will remain the primary type
of energy consumed by Tanzanians, especially in the rural areas where,
interestingly, most energy consumption is "non-commercial" by
industrial nations' standards and, therefore, not conducive to
go
effective control. This has facilitated the rapid deforestation
of the woodlands which has now begun to produce serious fuelwood
shortages in some areas.
Energy: the policy response . The government's reaction to these
developments in the country's energy situation in the 1970s has been
slow in occurring and no definitive energy policy has emerged which
attempts to deal with multi-dimensional aspects of the problem.
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Prior to this recent period of difficulty the government's policy
in this area emphasized the development of the country's hydro-power
potential to produce electricity, presumably for mass consumption.
Under the first two Development Plans though, the implementation of
this program was constrained by the lack of necessary investment
capital and the absence of a sufficient economic demand to warrant
the expense and effort involved in mass power production.
The proposals of the Second Five Year Plan only slightly altered
the strategy in the energy area. Hydro-electric generation was again
to be emphasized but now was beginning to be seen as a less expensive
alternative to the then dominant mode of electrical generation,
thermal power, which was exclusively dependent on diesel fuel for
its functioning. Thermal was to become only a supplemental source of
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energy generation.
The developments in the world oil pricing and distribution sys-
tem in the early 1970s understandably produced much greater govern-
mental activity on the energy front, efforts which were generally
informed by an unarticulated long-term goal of energy "self-reliance".
The major part of the program consisted of an extensive mineral
prospecting venture, launched in 1973, which due to a lack of capital,
equipment, and expertise relied heavily on entering into joint
explorations with foreign corporations and governments. Subsequent
payoffs have been minimal thus far but have included the discovery
of gas deposits offshore, which are projected for future exploita-
tion with India's aid.
The government has also enlisted the aid of the Chinese to bette
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develop the country's coal resources, principally as an energy source
for basic industries such as iron and steel production which are
scheduled for future development as measures to increase Tanzania's
self-reliance in these essential materials.
The most important step toward energy self-sufficiency was
achieved with the completion of the massive Kidatu Dam hydro-electric
power project in 1975. This resulted in a considerable reduction in
oil imports by displacing thermal generators and has drastically
improved the reliability of the electricity supply which manufactur-
- . 85
xng relies on.
In the area of most immediate concern to the rural population
the government has only recently undertaken an organized effort to
deal with the deforestation problem. It has initiated a program
throughout the mainland to develop village-level afforestation
projects consisting of the creation of tree plantations. The hope
is that these will ultimately serve as the primary, regulated source
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of both firewood and construction materials for the villages.
The prospects for progress toward any degree of energy self-
sufficiency appear clearly to be a long-term proposition for Tanzania
and one which, as was seen in the food area, is dependent upon a
considerable amount of external aid and cooperation. Thus by most
assessments, the "energy program" which the government has instituted
will leave the current situation fundamentally unaltered until at
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least the late 1980s.
CHAPTER III
THE "ISSUES" OF ENERGY, POPULATION, AND FOOD IN BRAZIL
Introduction
During the period under consideration in this chapter the Federal
Republic of Brazil has been ruled by a military dominated regime which
seized power by coup d'etat in 1964. Since that time the government
has been presided over by a procession of army generals who have been
appointed (normally by their immediate predecessor) to the position
of President of the Republic."'"
In general the military has ruled by decree but there is a
Congress and—as is the wont of authoritarian regimes in Latin
America—the military has devoted a great deal of effort to filter-
ing its policies through the Congress and utilizing its "ratifica-
tion" as a means of attaching some modicum of popular legitimacy
to its rule. The Congress initiates little legislation on its own
however, and it has primarily served as a rubber stamp for bills
introduced by the executive. When the Congress has attempted to
exercise some independence in important matters the executive has
not hesitated to use its vast "emergency powers"—one of which is
the power to suspend Congress indefinitely— to effectively quash
2
these impulses and invoke laws by decree.
During the period under consideration in this chapter there
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were two major political parties who were allowed varying degrees of
participation in the political system. The dominant party was that
of the government, the Alliance for National Renovation (ARENA),
while the one opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement
(MDB), was allowed little access to effective power. But on the
occasions when the military has permitted "popular" elections for
local government and legislative positions the MDB successfully
gained a significant degree of electoral support. In 1974, for
example, the MDB ran primarily on the issue of income inequality
which had worsened significantly under the military despite a con-
3
siderable increase in the country's economic growth rate. More
recently, in the 1978 elections, the MDB again gained significant
support (approximately 58% of the votes cast) by calling for an end
to military rule and for free direct elections for all public
offices in its campaign.
Nevertheless, these expressions of public dissatisfaction with
some aspects of the military's rule were effectively diffused by a
series of electoral laws which minimized the MDB's impact and made
it difficult for the party to function as an effective opposition.
These measures combined to guarantee the pro-government ARENA a
majority in all organs of real political influence—a situation which
remained basically unchanged by the revocation of Institutional Act
No. 5. Thus the government was able to carry out its policies in
most areas—including the three under discussion here—without any
effective political opposition.
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According to the military the primary motivation for its take-
over in 1964 was the chaotic domestic economic situation (inflation
was estimated to be running at 90% that year) which in the military's
view was producing conditions that were a serious threat to the
national security requiring drastic action. Subsequently, the two
interconnected themes of economic development/modernization and
preservation of the national security have informed the military's
rule, with the one being a necessary condition of the other.
The developmental orientation which has emerged out of these
priorities is perhaps best characterized as a technocratic-military
alliance whose economic policies have been based upon a market-
oriented high consumption industrial model which has placed great
emphasis on the growth of the total economic product as the major
developmental priority upon which all other development is dependent.
Since 1964 the military government has viewed the accelerated growth
of the industrial sector as the leading edge in their strategy with
the agricultural sector assuming a subsidiary role in developmental
policy as a supplier of raw materials and foodstuffs which the
expanding industrial sector and consequent growing urban population
5
requires
.
In the Brazilian case the "state" has assumed an extensive role
in the economy, although private ownership of both property and the
means of production are still widespread. An excerpt from a 1975
Bank of Brazil report on the economy indicates the theoretical
rationale which has purportedly directed the state's role under the
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military
.
The Brazilian Constitution stresses the primary role
of private enterprise in the economy and provides
that the Government will intervene directly in a
given industry only for reasons of national security
or because that industry is not susceptible of effi-
cient development by private enterprise.
In practice the state in the Brazilian economy now consists of
a wide variety of public authorities at the federal, state, and local
levels, 7 plus enterprises and banks controlled by one of these govern-
mental levels; and various types of direct controls by both central
and local governments—all these are in addition to the traditional
government institutions concerned with monetary and fiscal policy.
State firms currently dominate in a number of strategic sectors of
the economy which will be under discussion in this chapter, including:
petroleum and gas where 83% of assets are government controlled,
mining with 63% of assets, electric power with 87% of assets, trans-
port with 84%, and communications with 100% of assets. The state's
role in the economy's key sectors has grown considerably under the
military and it is clear, with the simultaneous increase in foreign
capital's role, that it has been an expansion which has taken place
8
largely at the expense of Brazil s private sector.
Despite this large state presence in some sectors, however, it
is interesting to note that, in many cases, in its efforts to imple-
ment its policies the government's approach still relies heavily on
the market to achieve its goals, rather than on detailed planning
and control by government agencies. During its tenure in power the
military has generally utilized a combination of planning, infra-
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structure investments, government enterprises, and control and guidanct
of the private sector through stimulation of investments as its
primary tools in enacting policies. The particular mix of government
techniques which are employed depends to a significant degree upon
the policy area involved, as we will see in its contrasting approaches
to the food and energy situations.
Lastly, to provide some perspective to the following analysis
of the specific policy areas, it is useful to supply a brief summary
of the current economic situation in Brazil and to mention some of
the major issues now affecting the government's developmental
strategy.
Under the military Brazil's overall economic progress has been
substantial with the Gross National Product (GNP) more than tripling
since 1964. At the height of this era of expansion, 1968-1974, the
average annual growth rate of the GNP was between 10-11%, one of
the highest in the world. This growth reflected the success of the
government's industrial emphasis as the industrial sector led the
surge with an annual growth rate of 11.9%, followed by transport and
communication at 11.7%, and agriculture at 5.9%.
Much of this economic expansion was attributable to the govern-
ment's conscious effort to more fully integrate Brazil into the
international economy. In this area there were three major factors
which contributed to their success. These were the rapid expansion
and diversification of Brazil's exports, the substantial influx of
foreign investment which flowed into the economy—particularly into
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the leading growth industries, and the truly massive increase in the
role which foreign loans played in fueling this economic expansion.^
These developments have also had a negative effect too, however, and,
beginning with the onset of world recession in 197A, the serious fall-
out effects have been felt."^
In addition, despite its economic achievements, the military '
s
development strategy has not been able to overcome the traditional,
chronic Brazilian problems of inflation and the vast regional in-
equalities which obtain in the country. Inflation, for example, has
now returned to unacceptably high levels (on average 42% between
1976-1978) and been labeled a major constraint on growth by the
government. The fight against inflation is now a top priority of
the government as it has had a major impact on the deteriorating
living conditions of the majority of the population in recent years
(see the Food section below)
.
Regional inequalities, which have long plagued the country's
development, have not moderated under the military despite concerted
government efforts to integrate the economically depressed regions
(North, Northeast, and Central West) into the commercial economy.
In fact, some of the regional imbalances worsened during the 1960s
and do not appear to have improved significantly in the last decade
(see Table 7), and it is clear that the recent industrial emphasis
has exacerbated the unbalance among the industrial and agricultural
11
states
.
The following sections will present a general overview of the
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energy, population, and food situations in Brazil and will review the
important developments which have occurred in these areas over roughly
the last decade. This account will provide the essential background
for our examination of the current state of the government's policies
in these areas and of the major factors which have influenced their
formulation and implementation. Once again the primary purpose here
is to characterize the government's perception of these issues by
drawing upon the policy responses as the primary representation of
the government's understanding and treatment of these issues.
Energy
Background to the energy crisis, 1966-1973 . Given the developmental
strategy which has been followed by the military government, it is
not surprising that among the three issues to be discussed energy has
by far received the highest priority. The economic successes of the
industrially-oriented development policies have brought with them an
enormous increase in the country's consumption of primary energy
resources
—
particularly that of electrical energy and of petroleum
12
and its derivatives. Indeed, the increased consumption of energy
has been viewed as a positive and necessary aspect of the nation's
economic growth and, although the country has encountered serious
energy problems in the 1970s which have undermined the government's
development efforts, there are few signs that this perception has
changed. A recent government publication has reaffirmed the essential
role of energy in these words: "The expansion of industrial output
67
an'd the country's general economic activity is linked directly to the
13
expansion of electricity production."
In Brazil's case, as with many other more industrialized states
of the world, the recent events which have altered the structure of
the world's energy distribution system have increased the awareness of
the importance of native energy resources and, since the country lacks
certain key resources, have brought with them the problems of external
dependence, uncontrollable costs, and shortages. The policy response
has been at times a helter skelter effort aimed at the general goal
of assuring a plentiful secure energy supply for the foreseeable
future, concentrating largely on petroleum and electrical resources
which are essential to the continued expansion of the industrial and
14
transport sectors.
In terms of energy resources Brazil has found itself to be most
deficient in the two fossil fuels (coal and oil) which have histori-
cally been the basis of industrialization and this has accounted for
a large measure of the country's energy-related difficulties in the
1970s. Coal resources are, for example, relatively plentiful but are
of very poor quality and Brazil's coal industry has long been hin-
dered by inefficient operations and a poor transport system. Due to
its inferior quality (only 50% of the coal mined is eventually used
due to the processing which it must undergo) the coal is very low
in heating power and is thus unsuitable for use in key industries
such as iron and steel production—which has decidedly increased in
importance under the industrial thrust of the military. As a result,
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coal imports, which have always been a substantial portion of total con-
sumption, have become increasingly important; for in order to use
domestic coal in steel-making it must be mixed with higher quality
imports in a ratio of 35 to 65%. Traditionally, imports have accounted
for approximately 65% of the country's metallurgical coal needs, a
proportion which has continued to increase in recent years.
This lack of appropriate coal resources has also had serious
ramifications in other energy-related areas such as the increased
exploitation of the country's forests, as one study has concluded:
The general inadequacy of the available coal and other
mineral fuels,
. . . , has been largely responsible
for the heavy deforestation of the semi-deciduous
plateau woodlands—exploited for firewood and wood
for charcoal.
Brazil's iron and steel industry is noted for its extensive use of
charcoal in its blast furnaces as a substitute for coal. Tbe industry
accounts for approximately 75% of total charcoal consumption annually
and the increased steel production has driven charcoal usage up 12%
annually over the past decade. In some of the more heavily populated
areas of the south deforestation has become a significant problem
which some steel companies have met by initiating their own commer-
cial afforestation projects. Another more important development, how-
ever, has been the growth of commercial exploitation of the Amazon
forests in the North where, as yet, the ecological effects of this
exploitation remain largely unknown.
It is upon petroleum, however, that much of Brazil's recent
economic growth has depended and it remains the crucial energy
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resource in the country's foreseeable future. Oil has been most impor-
tant to the expansion of the two leading growth sectors of the past
decade, transport and industry, two sectors in which, according to
informed government opinion, its utilization is not subject to signi-
ficant modification and/or substitution. As Minister of Finance
Mario Henrique Simonsen remarked in a 1974 assessment of Brazil's
energy situation:
. . . our transport system was projected on the assump-
tion of superabundant and cheap oil with great emphasis
on highways rather than on railroads and shipping, and
also with the predominance of passenger c
^g
s as an
alternative to collective transportation.
Furthermore, he pointed out that petroleum was essential as a raw
material input for Brazil's burgeoning chemical industry and would
remain the only suitable fuel for certain industrial processes
requiring heat.
Unfortunately, however, Brazil's domestic oil resources have
never been sufficient to satisfy demand and in recent years the
situation has materially worsened. The industrial thrust has quickly
driven up oil consumption and, over the past decade, there has been
a persistently widening gap between domestic production and consump-
tion even though production has increased significantly in this
period
.
The petroleum industry has been one area where the government
has been long dominant, establishing its monopoly over all stages
of the industry except distribution in 1953 with the creation of
Petroleo Brasileiro, Sociedade Anonima (PETROBRAS, S.A.). PETROBRAS
1
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original purpose was to preserve domestic oil supplies, which were at
that time largely unknown and thought to be insignificant, for emer-
gency situations. After an initial decade of relative quiescence
PETROBRAS assumed a much more active posture as with the 1960s oil's
importance to the economy increased precipitously.
During the 1960s PETROBRAS had concentrated on exploration for
oil within Brazil and had achieved some production increases. But
the changed conditions had made its rate of improved production in-
adequate and in the late 1960s PETROBRAS became the vehicle for the
government's first serious initiatives in the energy area. This came
in the form of a government announcement which proposed that oil self-
sufficiency was to be achieved by 1980, primarily by extending the
oil exploration effort onto the continental shelf where the potential,
while basically unknown at that time, appeared high for significant
20
petroleum deposits.
The government committed itself to substantial expenditures on
oil exploration and PETROBRAS' exploratory drilling significantly
increased in the next few years. But domestic production increases
continued to fall-off and from 1970-1973 the level of production
virtually stagnated as new discoveries served only to replace the
rapid depletion of on-shore fields (see Table 8).
An additional government measure, which was interpreted by many
as an indication of its disappointment in the rate of new discoveries
and a lack of confidence in the country's potential resources, was
the creation of Petrobras Internacional , S.A. (BRASPETRO) as a wholly
owned subsidiary of PETROBRAS in 1970. This was an international
arm
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of PETROBRAS whose purpose was to enter into exploration contracts with
other countries to explore for oil outside of Brazil. While the offi-
cial public rationale for this move was again "conservation of Brazil's
oil" it was widely interpreted as a further indication of the govern-
ment's view that the oil situation had deteriorated to the point that
drastic action was in order. Indeed some have argued that even before
1973, when the wold oil prices skyrocketed, oil import costs had
become a major drain on Brazil's foreign exchange, a situation which
21
was to deteriorate much further in the next few years.
The state of the Brazilian electrical energy industry was most
promising in this period, in marked contrast to the oil situation.
One of the major reasons for this situation was the relative insig-
nificance of oil's use as a fuel for generating electricity; at 10%
Brazil had one of the lowest degrees of dependence on oil for generat-
ing electricity in the world. Hydropower was the primary source of
power generation accounting for approximately 80% of electricity
produced—with the rest coming from thermal generators. In addition,
the country possessed one of the world's highest hydroelectric poten-
tials and, despite the fact that per capita consumption of electricity
had doubled between 1962-1975 with installed capacity increasing by
four times in the same period, only about 10% of the country's hydro-
22
power potential was being exploited in 1975.
While in 1973 the electric power industry remained a mixture of
state and private enterprises, the rapid expansion of electrical genera-
ting capacity in this period primarily reflected the massive increase
in thfe state enterprises' share of the. power generation field (i.e.
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from 36% in 1961 to 80% by 1970). The policy of the government during
this period concentrated almost exclusively on the exploitation of the
country's hydro potential as the way to meet growing electrical demand,
and was carried out through Centrais Electricas Brasileiras, S.A.
(Electrobras) which was a state controlled holding company responsible
for the planning, financing, and coordinating of the government's
electric power programme.
If there was one problematic aspect of the electrical energy
sector at this time it was the highly unequal distribution of electric
power which was distorted toward the urban areas, reflecting the
overall development which was occurring. According to one account,
in 1971 the Southeast and South regions alone were responsible for
80% of electrical demand and a breakdown of consumption revealed that
industrial usage accounted for 52% of all electricity consumed. The
recent growth of the power industry had clearly been urban-oriented,
for outside of the heartland the most common methods of power genera-
tion remained small diesel powered generators and charcoal, where
forests were still abundant. The development of power resources
had lagged in the non-industrial regions like the Northeast where
23
power shortages were still a chronic problem. These serious dis-
tortions in Brazil's electrical energy system were to soon impose
significant restraints on the industry's urban-oriented development
of hydropower and thus set the stage for one of the major new
departures in the government's energy program in the mid 1970s.
The r-esponse to crises: energy policy 1974-1976. The unexpected
74
developments in the world's energy situation in these years had major
ramifications in Brazil and produced a flurry of government activities
in the energy area. The material effects were most evident in the oil
situation where the costs of Brazil's increasing dependence upon
imports were beginning to seriously undermine the government's develop-
mental goals. In this period the cost of petroleum imports rose
progressively from less than US$1 billion in 1973 to over $4 billion
in 1976, comprising 24% of the value of all imports in 1975 and 30%
of the total in 1976. Moreover, the domestic production of oil con-
tinued to decline as a proportion of total consumption, reaching a
level of less than 20% by 1976, while domestic production actually
declined in both 1975 and 1976 (see Table 8 and 9).
Even in the face of these difficulties, however, the government
refused to significantly alter its developmental strategy and the
energy policy which was forthcoming in these years was, in the govern-
ment's words, still based upon "A continued commitment to high growth
24
rates in an open economy." The general outlines of the national
energy policy which was formulated in response to these events were
contained in the Second National Development Plan (1975-1979) , issued
in late 1974. The Plan characterized the energy issue as one of "The
Major Themes of Today and Tomorrow" and indicated that the two prior-
ities of the new policies in this area were: 1) the progressive
reduction of energy imports—by developing substitutes for oil; and
2) the maximum possible use of what were described as non-conventional
25
sources of energy, the most important being coal and nuclear energy.
TABLE 9
THE COST OF PETROLEUM IMPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL IMPORT COSTS AND THE VALUE OF ALL EXPORTS
1968-1978
Cost
Year Petroleum
of*
Imports
Percentage of
Import Costs
Percentage of
Export Receipts
1968 0.27 13 14
1969 0.24 11 10
1970 0.29 10 10
1971 0.46 13 16
1972 0.57 12 14
1973 0.99 14 16
1974 3.23 23 41
1975 3.30 24 38
1976 4.08 30 40
1977 4.20 32 35
1978 4.60 31 36
SOURCES: Derived from data in United Nations, Yearbook
of International Trade Statistics, 1970 . New York: 1971,
for the years 1968-1970. For 1971-1978, source is Inter-
national Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
Volumes XXXI and XXXII, various issues. Washington, D.C.
:
Monthly Publication.
*amounts are in $US billions.
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The most surprising departure of the new policy program was in the
field of electrical energy where the government announced a long-range
commitment to a nuclear alternative. The basis for this shift in
emphasis to nuclear was a radical re-evaluation of the country's hydro-
power potential as compared to the assessments of just a few years
past. The distributive structure of the electrical system was a
crucial factor in the government's changed perception for, although
the possibility for the continued expansion of the hydro-system
appeared technically limitless, there were now economic considera-
tions which had assumed priority. A statement by the then President
of Nuclebras (the state holding company which dominated the nuclear
industry) indicates the rationale which informed the new strategy:
By 1980 our hydroelectric resources would be exhausted
in the Southeast and the Sao Francisco Valley. We will
still have at that time only the hydroelectric potential
of the Amazon ... a good deal of which is in the
region's north (far from markets). . . The fact is that
the installation of our nuclear reactors near the cen-
ters of consumption will enable the energy resources to
be used right there without costly and wasteful long
distance transmission.
Thus the new policy foresaw the short-term exhaustion of hydro-
power in the areas where demand was expected to increase most rapidly,
therefore the policy proposed a joint utilization of hydropower and
nuclear which saw the latter 's role progressively increasing (i.e.
it was envisioned that by 2010, 41% of the total energy supply would
be coming from nuclear plants)
.
The first step in the implementation of the nuclear alternative
occurred at about the same time that the Plan was issued with the
77
creation of Nuclebras whose purpose was, in the words of the Minister
of Mines and Energy, to ".
. . establish in the country a heavy
industry to make reactors and to encompass all states of the so-called
combustion cycle, to provide a growing electrical energy capacity." 27
This was surely a long-term goal, however, in a country with no nuclear
industry to speak of and the next major step in the government's pro-
posed quest for self-sufficiency in this area illustrated this point.
It came about when the government signed an agreement with West
Germany, extending over the next fifteen years, which involved the
exchange of West German nuclear technology for an assured supply of
uranium from Brazil—whose resources were then thought to be both
abundant and of a high quality. The primary benefits for Brazil in-
cluded the opportunity to purchase complete power plants from West
Germany with favorable provisions for the significant transfer of
nuclear technology, thereby allowing Brazil time to develop its own
native nuclear industry without the undue pressure of rising electric-
ity consumption. By the termination of the agreement it was expected
that about ten nuclear facilities would be producing power commercially
with another fifteen to be under construction, thus Brazil would be
well on its way to achieving a substantial nuclear capacility in the
. , • r . 28
electrical generation field.
Although nuclear got most of the attention, hydropower also re-
mained a central concern of the energy program over the short-term.
Hydropower had increased its share of total electrical generation
to nearly 90% by 1975 and under the Second Plan over twenty-five
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hydroelectric plants were to be either constructed or expanded. The
most important among these was the construction of the Itaipu power
station which was a joint project being undertaken with the government
of Paraguay. Upon its expected completion in 1983 Itaipu would be
the world's largest hydroelectric plant, nearly doubling Brazil's
total generating capacity of 1970. It was expected to play an
important role in meeting the growing electric demands of the
Southern regions while the nuclear capability was being developed.
Aside from the electrical energy field the other major concern
of the government's energy program was focused on the petroleum situa-
tion. The most emphasis in this area was given to increasing the
domestic production of oil while, at the same time, taking measures
to reduce the large increases in oil consumption (the first time this
subject had been seriously broached at this level) through both con-
servation and utilization of alternative fuels.
The increased exploration by PETROBRAS which had been initiated
with the proclamation of the "self-sufficiency" policy in 1969 had
begun to bear some fruit in these years, although the immediate effects
on the domestic oil situation had been minimal. In both 1973 and 1974
PETROBRAS announced that significant discoveries had been made on the
continental shelf which could, potentially, raise production by three
to five times within five years. Based on these preliminary findings
the government's estimates of the country's oil reserves increased
dramatically
.
These "findings" produced a spate of optomistic projections
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by government spokesmen which no longer questioned whether or not self-
sufficiency would be achieved but rather speculated on how soon this
goal would be realized. The comments of Minister of Mines and Energy
Ueki are typical of this trend. After initially predicting self-
sufficiency in the "medium term" in early 1976 he later firmed this
estimate up to the specific date of 1985—a projection which presumed
a doubling of domestic production by 1980, and a further 60% increase
29by 1985. Most of these projections however were based upon "dis-
covery trends" and not proven finds; and while off-shore production
significantly increased as a proportion of total domestic production
in these years, the fact remained that overall production progres-
30
sively declined as well.
That the oil situation had perceptibly worsened in the govern-
ment's eyes was borne out when, in the midst of PETROBRAS ' announce-
ments of new discoveries, President Geisel made known in late 1975
that international oil companies would be allowed to explore for oil
in Brazil by entering into contracts on a risk basis with PETROBRAS.
Under these agreements PETROBRAS will receive exploitative rights to
all the oil which is found while the international oil company gets
a fee for its services. Little was immediately accomplished in this
area but by the end of 1976 a number of oil companies had contracted
to explore in Brazil on both on-shore and off-shore locations. To
those familiar with the situation, the significance of this decision
as an indication of the government's view of the gravity of the oil
problem could not be underestimated. It now allowed substantial
80
foreign involvement in an area which Brazil had long husbanded as a
sovereign domain and was perhaps the most telling sign of how desper-
31
ate the government's search for oil had become.
While the search for new sources of petroleum received the
greatest attention in this period the government also began to
initiate some efforts aimed at both fuel conservation and the use of
alternative fuels to oil. In the electric energy field there was a
move to convert diesel powered generating plants—which accounted
for approximately 10% of production— to coal, a purpose for which
the low quality Brazilian coal was suitable. A program of increased
exploration for coal and for its conversion into gas for power gen-
eration had been implemented by 1976, but the inefficiencies of the
coal industry continued to be the major obstacle to its greater
utilization
.
The government also took its first action in an attempt to cut
gasoline consumption which, with the rapid expansion of the Brazilian
automobile industry, had been a major contributing factor to the
progressive rise in petroleum consumption. The government imple-
mented a pricing policy in late 1975 which was designed to reduce
gasoline consumption by merely adding a non-returnable tax to its
price at the pump. This measure met with some public resistance and
had no significant effect in 1976 as gasoline consumption rose again.
One major innovation in this area which did achieve some level
of success was the National Alcohol Plan (PR0ALC00L) which was also
launched in late 1975. The Plan's purpose was to reduce gasoline
81
consumption by substituting anhydrous alcohol to an eventual level of
20% in gasoline. The prospects for this Plan appeared sound as Brazil
had available an abundance of sugar cane and manioc from which the
alcohol could be processed and, more importantly, the proposed addi-
tive level could be reached without any retooling of the automobile
engines sold in Brazil. The most important obstacle to the Plan was
the state of the alcohol industry in Brazil which had to be quickly
revitalized to meet the increased production demands which the
program would entail (i.e. to reach a 10% additive level the amount
32produced in 1974 would have to double)
.
The crisis worsens: 1977 to present . The past two years have seen
Brazil's total energy situation become more precarious as the energy
program embodied in the Second Plan has met with some serious setbacks
and delays in implementation which have served not only to defuse the
optimism that accompanied its launching, but to also call into ques-
tion the logic of the entire energy program's strategy.
The case of petroleum remains the most critical as the relation-
ship between domestic production and consumption continues to deteri-
orate, with domestic production in 1977 falling to 17% of total con-
sumption. Preliminary estimates on the first half of 1978 also
appear to indicate that the situation has worsened as production fell
slightly while the consumption and import of petroleum both rose over
the same period in 1977. Imports in 1977 reached a cost of "US$4
billion, fully one-third of total export revenues, and, after a slight
34
fall-off in 1978 are expected to cost $7.5 billion in 1979 as well.
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The primary response to the oil situation continues to be an
acceleration of PETROBRAS 1 off-shore exploratory drilling. The com-
pany's drilling more than doubled between 1973-1977 and an additional
$2 billion has been committed for exploration between 1978-1981. The
fruits of this effort have, however, been increasingly questioned in
recent years and been subject to widely different interpretations of
success and potential. At the least, the unrestrained optimism pro-
duced by the initial continental shelf finds has been decidedly
silenced as, according to one account, their promise had yet to be
filled by mid 1978: "Though PETROBRAS and the foreign companies
drilling under risk contracts are optimistic, no evidence has yet
3 6
surfaced of really major oil deposits."
In addition there are conflicting assessments of Brazil's
reserve situation which dispute whether this situation has improved
significantly in the past two years. The most recent government
figures, for example, put "proven reserves" at approximately 1,118
million barrels at the end of 1977 with 56% of these reserves now
located off-shore, a significant increase over the 1976 level. A
number of outside sources put the "proven reserve" level considerably
lower, however, primarily due to questions about the reliability of
some off-shore discoveries; two of the most recent put Brazil's
"proven reserve" level at approximately 880 million barrels—a fig-
37
ure not substantially different from the 1976 level.
Besides these questions about supply PETROBRAS has failed to
make any dent in imports through increased production. The recent
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production decreases have been caused in part by the increasing deple-
tion of the on-shore oil fields which has outdistanced increases in
off-shore production. Although off-shore production has continued
to increase as a proportion of total production (reaching 33% by -mid
1978) , PETROBRAS has failed to bring off-shore fields into production
as quickly as it expected. The company has encountered serious
difficulties in extracting oil from the continental shelf which has
both caused delays and driven the costs of obtaining the oil high
above original estimates. A prime example is that of the Campos oil
fields—once heralded as the greatest oil find in the country's
history—where it will cost, according to PETROBRAS, an estimated
US$2 billion to bring them into service by 1981, a figure more than
38
double the original expected cost.
In the face of PETROBRAS' difficulties the government has put
a greater emphasis on measures to limit oil imports, again primarily
by attempting to cut gasoline consumption through pricing policies
and the acceleration of the PROALCOOL program. A more stringent
conservation program was instituted in January of 1977 which had the
announced goals of reducing gasoline consumption by 10% and fuel
oil consumption by 20% within the year, thereby saving an estimated
half billion in import costs. Under this program a tax was added
to the cost of gasoline increasing its price by 20% which, hopefully,
would prove to be an incentive to both conservation and the use of
substitute fuels. The program had some moderate success in 1977 as
gasoline consumption fell (unfortunately this was almost totally
84
offset by an equivalent falloff in domestic production) and it was fol-
lowed by new initiatives in 1978 which aimed specifically at encourag-
ing substitution of coal for fuel oil in industry, by utilizing both
financial subsidization and a government guarantee of an improved,
dependable national distribution system for coal. An additional
incentive was the continued employment of a government pricing pro-
gram which raised the price of gasoline and fuel oil by 15% in
February of 1978, with another price rise planned for August as
well
.
The most successful aspect of the government's program to cut
gasoline consumption has been the PROALCOOL plan which has been
accelerated and is now ahead of the scheduled plan to replace 20%
of gasoline with alcohol by 1980. While possibly the brightest part
of the government's energy program it too has been subject to some
recent criticism, particularly by the World Bank which criticized it
for being "uneconomic", since, with current technology, alcohol costs
approximately twice as much to produce as gasoline. This brought
forth a reply from the Planning Minister Joao Paulo dos Reis Yelloso,
who declared that the World Bank had not understood the program, for
"energy self-sufficiency", not economic logic, was the rationale
behind the program. Still the Brazilian hope is that improved produc-
tion technology will reduce the cost differential and make alcohol a
40
good economic alternative as well.
The other major phase of the government's energy program which
is focused on the electrical energy field has also encountered seri-
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ious difficulties in its implementation stages which, while not having
the immediate impact of developments in the oil-related areas, do not
bode well for the future. The more important developments have
occurred in the nuclear program where, it appears, much of the
initial justification for the choice of the nuclear alternative has
been undermined.
In March of 1977 President Geisel had issued a detailed state-
ment in which he explained and justified the government's somewhat
surprising commitment to the nuclear option. The need for energy
self-reliance, which was couched in both economic and strategic
terms, was the ultimate justification for the program: "... Brazil
needs to secure a constant, reliable supply of energy for its economic
41development and for the well-being of its population." Electricity
had a key role as part of the new energy mix which the government had
chosen but, according to Geisel, the hydroelectric option which had
previously been the mainstay of Brazil's electric production was now
approaching its "natural economic limits". He made clear that this
judgment was based upon. current consumption patterns where the
prospects were for the exhaustion of hydropower resources in the next
decade in most industrial regions of the country, where nearly 80% of
electrical demand was concentrated. Based upon these considerations
Geisel concluded:
The Government considers nuclear energy to be the only
viable alternative, in view of the technical reliability
it has already reached on a commercial scale as well as
the competitiveness of its production costs against the
new backdrop of the oil economy.
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This rationale for the nuclear program has, however, been severely
weakened by a number of problems which the construction phase of the
program has encountered in the past two years. Construction had begun
on three plants in 1975 and all were to be completed by 1984, but
greatly increased costs and construction difficulties have already
set the program back at least three years. As President Geisel -men-
tioned, comparable costs had originally been an important factor in
choosing nuclear production of electricity, but by 1978 costs had
become a major factor undermining the program's viability. According
to recent knowledgeable estimates the cost per kilowatt of installed
capacity for the plants under construction in Brazil is now one of
the world's highest for the type of reactor involved and the total
cost of the nuclear program has doubled since 1975 to a current level
43
of US$12 billion.
Major construction problems have also been encountered on Angra
I (the first plant expected to begin operation) including cracks in
the foundation, which have been caused by the geological weakness
of the plant's construction site. These problems have resulted in
both delays and increased costs which have now led to charges of
poor planning and site selection being levelled at the government's
44
nuclear agency.
To compound matters there has also been a growing disagreement
between West Germany and Brazil over the workings of the 197 5 agree-
ment. The central issue has been the increased West German concern
over the actual amount and quality of Brazil's uranium reserves
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which was a primary motivation for its entering into the agreement.
The latest government figures released by Nuclebras are again the
most optimistic, putting "proven reserves" in November 1978 at 142
thousand tons, more than double the level at the end of 1977. There
are serious doubts, however, about the recoverability of these
deposits over the short-term as most are located in the Amazon. More
importantly, there are also questions concerning their quality and
thus their suitability for usage in standard nuclear plants. Despite
the Brazilian government's positive opinions on both of these points,
West Germany's doubts have increased and the latest indications are
that it will ask for greater assurances on these points and a
renegotiation of the 1975 agreement to reflect the changed circum-
45
stances
.
In view of these difficulties with the nuclear phase of the
energy program the hydroelectric area has retained its important role
and become more prominent in the government's most recent policy plans.
A National Electricity Plan, announced in May 1978, provides for the
building of 14 hydropower plants, 3 nuclear plants, and a number of
thermal plants in the 1978-1987 period. By 1977 hydropower had
increased its share of electrical output to 92% with thermal sources
providing the remainder, and the new program appeared to recognize
that it will have to bear the burden of increased demand for a
significantly longer period than was envisioned in the Second Devel-
opment Plan.
Nevertheless, the hydroelectric area has not been without its
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difficulties recently. The most important project in this area, the
Itaipu plant, has experienced both massive cost increases and political
problems in the past two years which have delayed its completion date
and jeopardized its future successful operation. From an initial
estimate of US$2 billion in 1973, the costs of the project had reached
$8 billion in 1978 and were expected to be in the neighborhood of
$13-15 billion by the time the project is completed in the mid 1980s.
Adding to these problems have been recent demands by the Paraguayan
government to renegotiate the level of financial compensation which
it will receive from Brazil once the plant starts operation. This
will further increase the costs of the power generated by the plant,
a cost which will be borne largely by Brazil, to whom the electricity
is decidedly more important.
Finally, the problem of the unequal distribution of electrical
energy and its retarded development in some regions of the country
remains, and last year had more serious consequences for the country's
development. In 1977, for example, 79% of electrical consumption was
accounted for by industry, with only 14% going to residential usage,
and the remaining 7% to commercial uses. The worst drought that the
country had experienced in three decades occurred in 1978 and had a
disasterous effect on the industrial and agricultural heartland when
hydropower plants were forced to cease operation. This revealed an
oft-neglected aspect of the country's electrical system as power
from the north could not be transferred to the south due to the
lack of sufficient linkages within the system, and, more importantly,
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to the failure to adequately develop energy resources in the non-
i a *. 4 i • 48industrial regions. It was a symptom of one of the fundamental
weaknesses of Brazil's urban-oriented energy system and of the energy
policy which continued to foster it, illustrating, in this case, that
the -unbalanced growth of the past fifteen years would have serious
consequences for the country's developmental health when all condi-
tions were not at their optimum.
Population
Background to the population situation
. As the world's fifth largest
and sixth most populous state Brazil has been a popular subject of
those analyses which approach the population issue at the global level.
The concern is understandable, for Brazil has been conspicuous among
the nations of the world as a state with a large and rapidly expand-
ing population whose growth rate since World War II has been one of
the highest in the world (i.e. Brazil's population doubled between
1950-1973 at an average annual growth rate of 3%) . But as in the
case of Tanzania, the macro-level demographic measures contribute
little to a total understanding of Brazil's population conditions
and even less to an understanding of the government's perspective on
this issue. The key aspects of the population situation in Brazil
which have had the most determinate affect on policy have been the
internal variabilities among the major demographic characteristics
and the age structure of the populace.
It is once again necessary to begin with a caveat about the
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reliability of the basic data which is currently available on Brazil's
population. For example, the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e
Estatistica (IBGE)
, the government's primary statistical gatherer,
acknowledged in 1974 that the data available on births and deaths in
Brazil was still imprecise due to the incomplete registration of these
events throughout the country and they concluded that in speaking
about developments in these areas, "considerable allowances must be
made for margins of error". Infant mortality rates are uncertain
as well, producing a situation where, in the view of some analysts,
"the estimation of the effects of changes in these rates on future
trends in Brazil's population or its characteristics is dependent on
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guesswork more than on hard data". Given this context references
to statistics can only indicate general trends, not accurate depic-
tions of the reality.
The most recent estimates put Brazil's population at 120 million
in mid 1978 with an annual growth rate of 2.8%, which is down from a
rate of 3% in 1960-1970. The birth rate is relatively high at 38
per 1000; the death rate is comparatively low at 10 per 1000; and
the life expectancy has increased significantly in the past decade
to 64 years. Infant mortality is estimated to be at 110 per 1000
and has apparently worsened in recent years, becoming a major health
problem in some cities where it has reached rates of 467 per 1000.
Over the past three decades Brazil's population has become progres-
sively more urbanized, increasing from 36% of the population in 1950
to an estimated urban population of 62% in 1975, a trend which is
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expected to continue in the near future. In gross terms, however, the
country is not overpopulated with an average density of 13 persons per
square kilometer in 1977, a measure which in itself tells you less
about the demographic situation of Brazil than any other. 50
The two aspects of Brazil's population situation which have had
the greatest affect on the government's perception of this issue are
the geographic maldistribution of the population which has produced
wide internal variations among the major demographic characteristics,
and the age-structure's increasing youthfulness, which has become the
most important population-related concern of the current government.
Brazil is similar to most other Latin American states in that its
population has always been highly concentrated along the coastal
regions of the country. In 1960, for example, approximately 93% of
the population occupied an area constituting only one-third of the
total land area. The persistent flow of rural to urban migration over
the past decades has exacerbated this distribution problem and despite
recent government attempts to settle the uninhabited interior regions
of the country, it has not been measurably altered. The most immed-
iate effects of this settlement pattern is its undermining of density
figures, growth rates, and birth, death, and infant mortality rates
at the national level. The last full census in 1970 revealed wide
fluctuations among all of these major demographic -measures at the
regional, state, and local levels and more recent findings have
indicated that the disparities have worsened in many cases. Regional
density figures, for example, fluctuated from 1 person per square
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kilometer in the North to 52 in the Southeast in 1977. Among states
the differentials were even higher. The 1970 census also found that
the urban population growth rate was -much higher than the rural at 5%,
which ultimately reflected the considerable differences among birth
and death rates as well."^
But perhaps the most important in this area is the age-structure
of the population. By 1970, 42% of Brazil's population was under the
economically active age of fifteen with another 3% over the age of
sixty-five. In national terms this development has created an increas-
ing burden for the employable age groups which by 1970, according to
one observer, had resulted in a situation where there were 82 depend-
ents (under the age of fifteen and over sixty-five) for every potential
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100 wage earners. As will be seen, this is one aspect of the popu-
lation which has drawn increased government attention— for it has had
an immediate affect on the economic health of the country, which has
become more apparent with the slowing of economic growth in recent
years
.
Population as a non-issue: 1964-1973 . Throughout its history as an
independent state the availability of an abundant supply of unpopu-
lated land has been the major factor influencing a government policy
in this area which has been traditionally pro-natalist in character.
Historically, population growth has been seen as an essential, posi-
tive aspect of the country's economic development which was necessary
to fully exploit the country's natural resources and, by filling out
its borders, to preserve the national security. For primarily these
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reasons population growth has normally been encouraged in Brazil as an
unchallenged benefit to the nation's development. This was a percep-
tion of the population situation which did not change under the first
two military Presidents, Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva (1964-
1969)— if anything it became more prominent with the military's pre-
occupation with national security.
There were a number of indications that the traditional view of
the population "issue" still held official sway in this period. For
example, one could still find the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare
enforcing a series of pro-natalist financial incentives which included
among them monthly bonuses paid to families for each child born after
the first six, maternity bonuses for federal employees for each birth,
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and monthly stipends for each child under eighteen years of age.
According to a number of accounts, in this period population con-
trol was, for all practical purposes, a forbidden public topic.
"Officially sanctioned" discussions of population-related questions
in the 1960s focused most often upon the aspects of redistribution,
migration, or its effects upon the labor force. With the increasing
economic growth rate as a backdrop, the underlying presumption of the
large portion of this public discourse was that if a population prob-
lem existed, it was one of under not over population, given the con-
54
text of the country's developmental needs.
Perhaps the clearest public indication that the views on popula-
tion growth had not changed in this period came in the form of a let-
ter which President Costa e Silva conveyed to Pope Paul VI, upon the
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publication of the Pope's pro-natalist encyclical Humane Vitae in 1968:
In the name of the people and the government of Brazil
I express to Your Holiness the joy and gratitude occa-
sioned by the encyclical in which the supreme voice of
the Church gives the appropriate condemnation of the
anti-Christian methods of birth control. As a leader
of a country which is still seeking to occupy more
than half of its territory, and still exposed to the
risks of population density which is incompatible
with the global necessity of development and security,
I applaud this notable document.
While this statement by the President made a somewhat superficial
reference to the traditional themes associated with the government's
perspective on the population question, the views expressed by govern-
ment officials in international forums at this time made a more force-
ful and substantive connection between population growth and economic
development. The views of the Brazilian representative to the "United
Nations' Economic Commission, made in response to the calls from the
industrialized states for population control in the less-developed
countries, typify this position:
... in the Brazilian case, preliminary studies in
this matter indicate that at least one-third of the
growth of our income is directly attributable to the
increase of the population. In general the least
one can say is that there is an undeniable relation
between the growth of income and the growth of popu-
lation, and this relation ought to be closely
analyzed and understood before the under-developed
countries are inundated with^gropaganda and methods
to reduce population growth.
Indeed, with Brazil's gross economic growth rate averaging close to
11% over the 1968-1974 period, the government liked to point out that
Brazil was the exception to the argument, made by many demographers,
that a rapid population growth rate was an obstacle to economic
growth.
In addition, the preliminary results of the 1970 Census appeared
to lend more support to the view that government intervention was not
necessary to control population growth, as it had slowed to about 2.8%,
down from the 3% of 1960. The initial flush of the census results
produced a number of public statements by government representatives
which now denied the existence of a population "problem": "The phan-
tasm of excessive demographic growth does not exist anymore, since it
is known that the index of growth dropped from 3% in the past decade
to 2.7% presently." and the relevance of the population control issue
to the Brazilian context: "The question of limiting birth ought not
to even merit our attention in the present state of Brazil's develop-
ment. This control will come in its own time and will be exercised
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by each one individually."
Interestingly, the only notable exception to the succession of
optimistic appraisals of Brazil's population situation by the govern-
ment in this period also came in response to the findings of the recent
census. In his comments on the results of the census, issued in mid
1970, President Medici appeared to make a major departure from the
traditional government interpretation of the country's population
situation when he acknowledged that rapid population growth was a
reality for Brazil which could have negative consequences for the
country's development:
The Brazilian public figure cannot copy lines of politico-
administrative action of peoples with gradual and con-
trolled population increase if our reality is demographic
explosion ... He who speaks of a demographically young
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nation discerns the economically active minority in con-
trast with the immense contingent in which consumption
surpasses production . . .
But when it came to recommendations for remedial action the President
assumed the traditional laissez-faire attitude which saw no appropriate
role for the government:
It violates our sensibility for the State to undertake
as its problem control of natality, when we are con-
vinced that it can only enter the intimacy of the
family through education respeg^ing the inalienable
power of decision of each one.
While this recognition of rapid population growth as a reality
was interpreted by some as a significant change in the government's
perception of the issue, especially when compared to the position of
Costa e Silva two years earlier, no significant government activity
in the population control area followed.^ What little activity
there was confined itself to attempts to redistribute some of the
population to the interior regions of the country, primarily in the
6 2
Amazon. Despite Medici's comments, the population issue did not
assume any great importance and, in the judgment of one recent study,
remained largely a non-issue through 1972-1973 as the continued
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economic success overrode any pressing concern with the situation.
A policy defined: 1974-1975 . In comparison to past years 1974 saw
a considerable increase in the amount of attention which the govern-
ment was devoting to the population area. The most significant
development which occurred during this year was the emergence, for
the first time, of a clearly defined policy on population. Although
the year was to see no substantive change in governmental activity
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on this front, the process of articulating a policy, which had in the
past been a largely implicit one, resulted in some of the tradition-
ally unquestioned benefits of population growth being more critically
investigated
.
This process was initiated by Brazil's participation in the
World Population Conference at Bucharest where its representative
presented the most detailed explanation of his government's position
then available. There were few indications beforehand that the
Brazilian delegate to the Conference would say anything new in his
presentation for at the pre-Conference prepatory meetings he had been
an outspoken opponent of any type of population control, especially
when it was prescribed by the developed countries as a "solution" to
Third World problems.
At the Conference itself much of what the Brazilian delegate,
Miguel Ozorio de Almeida, did say followed the expected traditional
government position. Population growth continued to be viewed by
the government as a positive contributor to the nation's economic
development, national integration, and security. The growth of the
population fulfilled these purposes by creating the large internal
market that the economy needed and by providing the manpower which
was necessary to guarantee the development of the agricultural and
mining potential of the country's interior—all of which were identi-
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fied as essential aspects of preserving the national security.
Given this premise the demographic policy which his government
had formulated was, according to the Representative, to be utilized
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as a tool for understanding the nation's potential development. Its
primary goals at this time were to lower both the mortality and infant
mortality rates, and to achieve a more balanced regional growth. He
made it clear that control of the population growth rate was not an
aspect of the current policy because:
The data available indicate that Brazil will be able to
absorb the foreseeable demographic increments, and,
further, that their growth is even to be considered
as a necessary element for economic development, for
national security, and for the integration of vast
empty stretgb^es of national territory into national
production.
The one indication in Almeida's statement of a possible change in
the government's position came in the last paragraph when he made ref-
erence to what he termed "an individual's right to family planning
information" which the government had the responsibility to assure was
available to all equally. While still maintaining that any decision
regarding birth-control was to be made within the family without
government interference, Almeida appeared to indicate that the cur-
rent government had committed itself to an active role in providing
every citizen with the knowledge to make such a decision.
The situation was expected to be clarified with the publication
of the Second National Development Plan which followed close on the
heels of the Population Conference. The Plan was notable in that it
contained the first explicit proposal of a national policy in the
population area within the context of national planning. As in the
past the Plan still viewed population size as a key to achieving the
objective of fuller national integration through the inhabitation of
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unsettled lands and, at the international level, Brazil was still
placed at the underpopulated end of the spectrum. But for the first
time the Plan also acknowledged that there needed to be a major
effort to increase employment and earnings opportunities— if the full
potential of human resources presented by the population's growth
were to be effectively utilized—for the pressures of population
growth on per capita income and social services were potentially
66damaging if these opportunities did not continue to expand adequately.
Once again, though, when it came to programmatic proposals in
these areas the Plan made it evident that the government's demographic
policy would not substantially change:
. . .
Brazil's demographic policy is to respect the right
of each family to decide how many children they want, and
to offer information which will allow them to examine the
question fully.
Families have complege freedom to choose the number
of children they desire.
The Plan contained no mechanisms by which such a national information
system would be created, however, and, although it established specific
"growth rate goals" for the life of the Plan, their achievement was
to be dependent upon a hopeful volunteerism, not effective government
action:
It is hoped that by allowing each family to make its
own decision, taking into consideration their moral con-
science and socioeconomic conditions, Brazil will
achieve a population growth rate that will reconcile the
various needs and demands.
It is hoped that during this decade the population
growth rate will decline, with the average between 1970
and 1980 being 2.7-2.8 percent. In tjag following decades,
the decline should become more rapid.
In sum, the Plan laid out the outlines of what is best described
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as an ambiguous demographic policy. On the one hand, it appeared to
depart from the previous position by recognizing that there was a two-
sided relationship between "population growth" and the economy's
capacity to expand but, on the other, it seemed that this was still
an acceptable trade-off for the benefits derived from expanded mar-
kets and adequate labor supplies—the positive aspects still out-
weighed the negative. The measurable affects on policy were minimal;
it remained a laissez-faire one with respect to population growth
which only left the door open to public commitment and support of
family planning on the grounds of equal access to family planning
materials—a commitment which did not materialize in the near future.
Population policy since 1975 . Under the Second National Development
Plan the government's activities in the population field have not
significantly increased. The "program" outlined in the Plan has not
materialized and at the national level there has not been any attempt
to pursue the goal of "providing couples with the necessary informa-
tion to make family size decisions". It is difficult to pinpoint
the exact reasons for the government's neglect in this area but among
those which have been suggested, the deteriorating economic situation
appears to be the most important. Along with what could accurately
be judged as a lack of commitment in this area from the beginning,
it appears that the worsening economic situation has made -many of
the Plan's objectives unrealizable and the lower priority ones, like
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the population area, have suffered from a lack of funds.
Below the national level, however, family planning activities
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have increased recently and are becoming more integrated into health
services at the state and local levels. The large majority of this
family planning activity has been initiated by the Brazilian Society
for Family Welfare (BENFAM)
, a private organization which was founded
in Brazil in the 1950s and which receives considerable outside
assistance from organizations such as the International Planned
Parenthood Foundation. BENFAM's original goals were to work for the
right of all families to have access to family planning information
and to promote "responsible" parenthood.
The activities cf BENFAM had expanded considerably from 1964-
1974 when the number of family planning clinics which they sponsored
grew from 9 to 102. But the organization's goals were altered some-
what in 1974 on the basis of the leadership's overly optimistic
appraisal of the government's intentions in the population area. At
this time BENFAM believed that one of its primary goals was going to
be taken on by the government, as a statement by its Executive
Secretary in 1974 indicates:
Family planning has not yet been incorporated into the
government's service network, but in view of the state-
ments in the Second National Development Plan and at
the World PopulationQConf erence , this step is expected
in the near future.
Upon this basis BENFAM adopted a strategy which it hoped would result
in a shifting of the financial burden for its clinical operations over
to the national government under a family planning program. In Dr.
Rodrigues words:
BENFAMS plans for the next three years will be aimed
at convincing decision-makers that Family Planning
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is an effective public health measure that will have
direct and favorable effect on the economic. and social
interests of the country and its security.
In short, the strategy was to try to translate family planning into
terms which were acceptable to the military government.
This campaign has not produced any startling achievements at
the national level but BENFAM has redirected much of its efforts at
the state and local government levels where they have been more suc-
cessful. The organization has been able to transfer the costs of
operating its clinics over to local governments in a number of areas
where, under its agreement with the involved officials, BENFAM pro-
vides only the technical assistance for family planning services.
These increased activities in the family planning area have been
interpreted as an indication of, at the least, a tacit approval of
these services at the national level where, it is suggested, a more
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active commitment will eventually be forthcoming.
Food
Background to the food situation . Among the issues discussed in this
chapter the food "issue" has received comparatively little attention
as an important domestic issue by the government over the last decade.
Although one would expect that with its burgeoning population the
maintenance of an adequate food supply should be a priority for
Brazil, the present government has not seen fit to view the domestic
food situation as a crucial concern. Recent developments in world
food conditions have, however, exercised a considerable if indirect
103
influence over Brazil's domestic food situation; for they have pre-
cipitated a export-oriented policy response toward agriculture which
has, ultimately, significantly undermined the nutritional status of
a large portion of the Brazilian population.
Despite a history of government neglect Brazil's agricultural
sector has been able to progressively expand its productive capacity
enough to supply the country, in gross terms, with adequate amounts
of the basic foodstuffs that were essential to the majority of the
73population's diet. This has been a considerable achievement in a
country where the population growth rate has been around 3% annually
over the past three decades. In fact, Brazil is nearly self-
sufficient in producing all of its staple crops; the one important
exception is wheat, where imports have traditionally constituted a
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large portion of total consumption.
Since World War II the growth of the agricultural sector has
been both impressive and consistent, with production increasing at
an annual rate of 4% between 1947-1963 and then reaching a nearly 6%
average from 1968-1974. It is all the more impressive because it
is generally acknowledged that this record was achieved despite the
obstacles of a government policy which has generally been indif-
ferent to the agricultural sector's needs (the only exceptions, as
will be seen, are in the area of the major export crops, primarily
coffee and soybeans), and the persistence of land-holding patterns
and cultivation methods which are still widely described as tradi-
tional and primitive.
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The agricultural sector has been long-neglected by Brazil's gov-
ernments, regardless of their ideological character, and this neglect
became even more pronounced after World War II when the growing pre-
occupation with industrialization took hold. Indeed, under the
current military regime's developmental orientation, it has been
argued that this trend has perceptibly worsened as the agricultural
sector has been forced to sustain its overall growth in the face of
industrial-biased policies adverse to its development.
Under the military, when the government has turned its atten-
tion to agriculture it has done so primarily to enhance the export
capacility of the sector, an approach which has done increasing harm
to the development of the domestically oriented food-producing sector.
While periodic food shortages still occur in some regions of the
country—most notably in the Northeast—their causes have most often
been attributed to either a lack of infrastructure (transport and
storage facilities) or inefficient marketing practices, rather than as
a sign of some fundamental weakness in the food production and dis-
tribution system. ^ As such, Brazil's domestic food situation has
not been an object of serious concern to the military government.
While it is clear that the export-orientation of its agricultural
policy, along with the affects of developments in the world's food
situation, has had serious consequences on the quality of life of
most Brazilians in the 1970s, the government's essentially benign
view of the domestic food situation has remained unaltered by these
events.
"
In addition, the agricultural structure has remained fundamentally
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the same over the past three decades, as neither the patterns in land
ownership and utilization nor the dominant methods of cultivation have
changed significantly. The landholding system is characterized by a
pattern of highly unequal land distribution which finds large estates
and extensive farming techniques predominant, as the traditional views
of land as an investment and a hedge against inflation still prevail
among the owners of the larger holdings.
The most recent agricultural censuses by the government have
revealed that the trend toward larger estates and the concentration
of land ownership has in fact increased under the military, while
the rural labor force has become increasingly made up of landless
7 6tenants, sharecroppers, and wage laborers. Along with this increase
in larger holdings the recent surveys have also found that the best
land, primarily occupied by the larger estates, remains the most
underutilized. In actuality, there is an inverse relationship between
the size of the holdings and their degree of utilization, with the
smaller minifundios being the most intensively cultivated and
contributing a much larger share, proportionally, to total production.
As a consequence the dominant methods of cultivation used by
Brazil's farmers remain
—
particularly in the food-producing sector
—
the primitive, labor-intensive techniques characteristic of a hoe
agriculture. An observation on the state of Brazil's agricultural
techniques made quite some time ago by the late T. Lynn Smith, a noted
scholar on Brazilian society, is still not far off the mark:
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... I became convinced that in the 1950s fully half
of all Brazilians engaged in agriculture were using
ways of getting products from the soil that were less
effective or more antiquated than
?
those in use by the
Egyptians at the dawn of history.
The persistence of the traditional structures is the factor which is
most often cited in perpetuating a situation where agricultural
innovation is stifled, where all crops are characterized by produc-
tivity levels that are uniformly lower than under similar conditions
in other parts of the world, and, where productive results—again
specifically among the food crops produced for domestic consumption
—
are still highly subject to the vagaries of the weather and soil
conditions
.
In spite of all these disadvantages, however, the one positive
quality of the abundance of uncultivated land and the seemingly inex-
haustible supply of resources it presents has enabled Brazilian
agriculture to sustain its increased production. Although Brazil's
prevailing soils are generally low in fertility and relatively unre-
sponsive to known techniques for increasing productivity, the wealth
of suitable land has allowed agriculture to expand at will into the
interior and frontier areas of the country in response to the grow-
ing demand for its products. This facility has allowed agriculture
to effectively circumvent all of its aforementioned drawbacks since
World War II, for virtually all increases in production over the
past twenty-five years are directly attributable to the expansion in
80
land under cultivation (see Table 10).
This abundance of land has also been a determinant factor influ-
encing government agricultural policy in this period as well. The
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effort to increase the area under cultivation has in fact been the
primary technique by which the government has attempted to influence
production levels while increased productivity and better utilization
of land have drawn less attention. Although there have been inter-
mittent efforts to implement "land reform" programs which have had
the latter two goals in mind, the preferred route has been to
emphasize the politically more palatable route of colonization of
unsettled lands as the primary means of dealing with the problems of
rural unemployment and landlessness which have become more widespread
m recent years.
Agricultural policy 1964-1972 . Until around 1969 agricultural develop-
ment was almost exclusively dependent upon private initiatives as all
the important sectors of agriculture remained in private hands. The
limited measures which the government attempted to implement had
little apparent impact on agricultural output. The policy was essen-
tially a crisis oriented approach which was only activitated when
the agricultural sector's performance as an intermediate industry
providing raw materials for industrial processing was lacking, thereby
interfering with the push to industrialization.
The techniques which the government employed in dealing with
the agricultural area consisted of a mixture of market mechanisms,
subsidization of inputs, and credit expansion. During Castelo
Branco's term for example, the problems of the sector were generally
diagnosed as both low productivity and inadequate production; the
government's response was a plan to initiate new incentives for
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private investment in agriculture, including as its most important part
a minimum price program which, it was hoped, would stabilize chroni-
cally unstable prices and thereby increase both investment and produc-
82
tion
.
When Costa e Silva assumed office in 1967 there were more frequent
public indications that the military government was going to give more
attention to the persistent problems of the agricultural sector.
Although the new pronouncements included among their goals the produc-
tion of: "... an adequate food supply at prices that would stimu-
late producers without being burdensome to consumers", the diagnoses
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and prescription for the problems remained the same. What had
begun to change was the increased emphasis on the potential export
role for agriculture, which gave much of the impetus to the govern-
ment's programs of credit expansion, minimum prices, and incentives
for mechanization and fertilization.
While this new policy involved a more active role for the govern-
ment in the agricultural area—especially when compared to the pre-
vious neglect— there has been much debate about the ultimate effects
of these programs on productivity. A more frequent explanation for
the continued growth of the sector suggests that the external fac-
tors of favorable world prices and demand contributed more to the
improved performance of agriculture in this period than did the
government's policy. As one analyst has observed:
.
Brazilian agriculture has performed remarkably
well over the 60-70 decade, that it did so is far
more attributable to the enterprise and energy of
the Brazilian farmer than to the sporadic crisis-
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oriented policy of the government.
The results of the government's policies within the agricultural
sector itself were less open to question. It was becoming increasingly
clear that the government's strategy had served to accelerate an already
unbalanced growth pattern between the export-oriented and food-
producing domestic-oriented sectors. The more modernized and com-
mercialized farmers, located in the East and South Central regions,
responded much more favorably to the incentives of the government's
programs than did the staple food crop producers whose cultivation
methods remained comparatively primitive, and the evidence available
in the early 1970s unquestionably showed that the benefits were highly
85dxsproportionate
.
The growth in agricultural exports in this period reflected the
bias of the agricultural sector's development, as exports tripled be-
tween 1964-1972 after being stagnant for the previous decade. While
the total production of all major crops increased in this period the
proportionale increases in export-crop production were significantly
higher than in the food crops. In addition the few significant
"productivity" increases which were achieved involved export crops
while the productivity of the major food crops remained stagnant or
Q £
even declined (see Table 10). The basic food crops showed little
improvement in production techniques as with dry beans, oft-cited as
the primary source of protein for the rural population and the lower
income urban groups of which it could still be said in 1974:
"almost no technology is used . . . , despite its importance as a
Ill
The growth in the popularity of export crops which was encouraged
by the government was also to have consequences for the domestic food
situation which were only beginning to be recognized in the early 1970s.
The increased commercialization had led to the supplanting of food crop
growing by export crops around many of the urban areas at the same
time that the increased urbanization was driving up the demand for food
products. Due to the better financial return for the commercialized
crops, subsistance food growing became a less than attractive economic
88
alternative in many cases.
As a result, the growing of food for the domestic market was
driven further inland into the interior and frontier areas away from
where the demand for food was centered. This was a trend that was
further strengthened by the government's approach to land reform which
avoided real reform and, in its place, encouraged colonization of the
unsettled frontier as an alternative to redistribution of already
occupied land. The Program for National Integration (mentioned above)
and the building of the Trans-Amazonian Highway were the major
programmatic efforts of the government in this area. Although they
were judged to have largely failed to achieve their goals, one of
the consequences of the "colonization" philosophy was to make trans-
port and marketing costs a major contributor to rising food produc-
tion costs in the 1970s.
Ultimately, the effects of the government's policy on the popu-
lation's accessibility to an adequate diet were pronounced. During
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the 1960s the average daily caloric intake of the Brazilian people was
among the world's highest, although it was acknowledged to be protein
deficient and had a heavy starch content. But by the early 1970s both
outside observers and government representatives had noted a signifi-
cant decline in nutritional standards. The combination of rising
production costs and stagnating levels of basic food crop production
had reduced the nutritional quality of the average Brazilians diet. 89
The effects of these developments were felt most severely in
the poorer regions—like the Northeast where, in the early 1970s, the
nutritional level was one-half to one-third below the national
average—but were not confined to any one area. The Brazilian dele-
gate to the Pan American Health Organization at a 1970 meeting in-
cluded "conditions of malnutrition" as one of the most significant
causes of mortality in infants and small children throughout the
country. The fact was that the progressive increase in agricultural
production over the past two decades had not eliminated serious food
and protein deficiencies among the majority of the population, for
the next few years was to see malnutrition recognized as a serious
social problem affecting adults as well as children.
Agricultural policy 1973-1976: the push to exports . These years
saw the agricultural sector assume a greater role in the government's
overall development plans as the effects of the changes in the world's
energy situation on the industrial sector became more apparent.
Although much of the military's agricultural policy remained the same,
the pjjsh to expand the country's agricultural exports became more
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imperative as, in the face of persistent trade and balance of payments
deficits, they became a crucial source of foreign exchange. The
export strategy was, interestingly enough, to gain a new rationale
in the government's eyes in this period when the developments in the
world's food situation provided an increased financial incentive for
export expansion. In government circles there was a growing aware-
ness of the opportunity presented by the world "food crisis" for Brazil
to assume a global role as one of the world's major exporters of food
products
.
The primary emphasis on "colonization" of the interior agricul-
tural regions was continued under the agricultural policy set forth
in the Second National Development Plan, albeit in a different form
from that represented by the Program for National Integration and
the Trans-Amazonian Highway which preceded it. The Highway, once
the central focus of the Amazon colonization program, was barely
mentioned in the new Plan and was replaced with the Programme for
Agricultural and Agro-Mineral Nuclei in the Amazon Region (Polama-
zonia) . The new Amazon program, along with Polocentro and
Polonordeste, represented an attempt to both increase agricultural
growth and achieve a more coordinated development among those
regions not yet adequately integrated into the national economy. The
Plan proposed an accelerated growth rate of 7% annually for agricul-
ture over the next five years; but once again proposed the standard
formula of land reform, the more rational use of land, and the expan-
sion of the agricultural frontier into the Center-West and Amazon
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regions as the primary means for achieving these goals. 90
Although the labels had changed however, it was soon clear that
colonization would receive the most effort and that the purpose of the
programs had retained their export orientation. A government descrip-
tion of the goals of Polamazonia is revealing in this respect:
.
. .
Polamazonia ' s aims are threefold: to increase
the cattle herd of the area . .
.
, to support the
growing of traditional crops of the region (rubber,
sugar, cocoa, dende, fruit, pepper, and rice) . .
.,
and to carry out derailed surveys of the major
mineral resources.
The overall neglect of the domestic food producing sector con-
tinued under the new Plan, despite clear indications that the domestic
food situation had deteriorated. From all signs, the government's
perception of the "food issue" was conditioned by its external orienta-
tion as well. While little attention was focused on the domestic
situation, references to a "world" food problem appeared more fre-
quently in government statements which rationalized agricultural
policy. The expectations were high that the changed world food
situation had given Brazil a great opportunity to forge a role in
the world's food market:
National conditions offer the basis for practically
unlimited development. Brazil at this time shows
every indication of becoming, if not the granary of
the world, at lea^t, one of the major forces in avert-
ing world hunger.
This appeal for Brazilian agriculture to fulfill its world role
became increasingly popular in these years as the statements of in-
fluential government officials emphasized both the humanitarian and
profitable opportunities which were being presented. An example of
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the former type of appeal is that of the Minister of Agriculture,
Allyson Paulinelli:
. . .
despite the huge food production of the United
States and the prominent role it plays in the world
supply, we continuously talk about food shortages in
many areas of the globe. In fact it is not new to
anybody that thousands of people die of hunger and
malnutrition daily. Although several economic and
political facts are co-responsible for these deaths,
food production must be increased and stabilised ifgg
we are to be proud of our accomplishments on earth.
While the latter sentiments are represented in the comments of a
Ministry of Labor official: "Now that foodstuffs are coming to be
recognized as one of the world's great riches owing to the increased
scarcity, we should in fact be stepping up production."'
It was ironic that the effect of this outpouring of concern for
the world food situation was the further undermining of the domestic
food producing sector. The value of exports of food and live animals
increased by 54% in the 1973-1976 period alone with meat and soybean
products leading the way. The rapid development of the soybean in-
dustry is perhaps the best example of how food crop production was
most influenced by external contingencies in this period. In this
four year period soybean production doubled, its productivity in-
creased by 26%, and the value of soybean exports increased by 87%
—
a performance which far outdistanced that of any domestically-oriented
food crop (see Table 10) . Its acceptance as a food product among
native Brazilians, however, was less spectacular; as one government
publication wryly commented:
Despite Brazil's glowing performance, however, the
average Brazilian is still unaware of the soybean's
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nutritional value. He still has not accepted it as
a complete food, like the Chinese and Americans have.
In fact, the situation of some of the major domestic food crops
significantly deteriorated in this period, with dry beans again the
most prominent example. Both the total production and the productivity
of the crop declined in these years, producing severe shortages in
1973 and 1976 which precipitated food riots in some areas of the
country. Government neglect of the bean growers was a major con-
tributing factor in the crop's decline; as one account noted, in 1976
when dry bean production fell 17%--while all other major crops
registered gains—the bean growers received only 1% of the subsidy
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that went to export farmers.
The poor performance of the domestic food sector had an immed-
iate affect on food prices which continued to climb. The agricultural
sector as a whole did not perform up to the expectations set forth in
the Development Plan (averaging a growth rate of 3.8% in 1975-1976)
as poor weather in Brazil and a declining demand in world market
stunted the agricultural expansion. The government acknowledged that
the rising food prices were a primary contributor to inflation which
reached 26% in 1975 and leaped to 46% in 1976. The situation became
critical for the Brazilian consumer in 1976 when food prices rose
higher than the 46% inflation rate; at the time estimates were that
the average Brazilian was spending nearly one-half of their wages on
food. These developments had, in turn, exacerbated the incidence
of malnutrition which had noticeably increased in the urban areas
97
and was believed to be even worse in the rural areas.
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The food situation 1977 to present: a continued deterioration
. In the
last two years the limitations of the military government's agricul-
tural policy have become more evident while the goals of the program
outlined in the Second Plan have, as in the past, remained elusive.
After an impressive recovery in agricultural growth to 9.6% in 1977
—
when Brazil became the world's second largest exporter of agrarian
products—the agricultural sector experienced a disasterous year in
1978 when output fell by about 7%. Poor weather conditions, which
hit particularly hard in the southeastern breadbasket states of
Parana and Rio Grande do Sul who alone account for one quarter of
total agricultural output, were acknowledged to be important causes
for the poor performance. All major crops suffered serious produc-
tion declines, in particular wheat and maize. The 1978 wheat crop
was expected to be only 60% of the 1977 level, necessitating an in-
crease in imports to provide for two-thirds of domestic consumption.
In the case of maize, after exporting $135 million worth of the crop
in 1977, the government estimated that about $100 million in imports
. . .
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would be required in 1978 to avoid sharp increases m its price.
Although the poor weather was an immediate precipitating event,
there was also increased criticism directed towards the inefficiencies
in the government's agricultural programs which, it was charged, had
abetted the poor agricultural performance. A number of reports re-
leased in the past two years have found that the traditional barriers
to a balanced agricultural development still exist. The expansion in
acreage under cultivation remains the primary means of increasing
118
production, while coffee and soybeans—two chief export crops—are the
only crops to show any significant improvement in productivity over
99
the past decade.
There were also numerous indications that the government's pric-
ing programs and credit policies had directly contributed to the de-
clines in food crop production in these years. For example, one of
the primary measures in the government's anti-inflation program of
1977 involved cutbacks in its rural agricultural credit program and
the imposition of price freezes on many basic foodstuffs. The response
of many farmers was to cutback in the planting of a number of food
crops for which prices were considered to be too low. This was a
widespread reaction in Rio Grande do Sul— the primary wheat growing
area—where acreage planted to wheat declined by 15-20% in 1977; at
the national level there was a 10% drop in acreage planted to wheat
and a 4% drop in acreage planted to maize in that same year. A dis-
satisfaction with the low government price levels was generally
acknowledged to be the most important factor influencing these cut-
backs, with one survey by the Comissao de Financimento da Producao
estimating that nearly 60% of the production declines in 1978 could
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be attributed to low minimum prices, not poor weather.
The other phases of the government's agricultural policy have
also encountered unexpected obstacles in their implementation stage
or, as in the area of land reform, there has not yet been an earnest
effort at implementing them. The colonization effort, which had pre-
viously focused on the Amazon region, has been redirected toward
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unexploited agricultural areas closer to the coast, such as in the
cerrados of the Center-West region, where the reduction in transport
and marketing costs which will be realized makes exploitation more
economically viable.
This switch in emphasis away from the Amazon has also been con-
siderably influenced by the growing realization that the exploitation
of the Amazon was not going as planned. In 1978 there were still
significant unanswered questions about the resource potential of the
region. The ranching industry—which was once thought to be a
bonanza in the region—had difficulties adapting its methods to the
Amazon environment and had its progress detered. This was coupled
with a growing concern about the affects of deforestation on the
ecology of the Amazon and serious doubts about the actual agricul-
, 1 * s.U .101tural potential of the region.
Land reform has remained the most neglected phase of the agricul-
tural program. In a recent defense of its program the government
suggested that "protectionist barriers erected by the industrial
countries" were the principal obstacles to Brazil's increased agricul-
tural production, not the structural impediments that would be re-
moved by a more thorough going land reform. Thus far over 40% of the
funds spent under the program have gone to infrastructure improvements,
such as road construction and storage facilities. From all indications
the administration of President Figuerido will continue to follow
this line, making land reform the least effective measure in the
_ ...
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government s agricultural policy.
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Ultimately, the most immediate impact of the failures in agricul-
tural policy has been on domestic food conditions. Basic food costs
are now the primary expense for most Brazilians and a sufficient diet
has become increasingly difficult to obtain. The results of an IBGE
survey, taken in 1976 and published in 1978, revealed that fully 70%
of the population was making less than the cost of the government's
"basic food basket" and thus were living below the official survival
level. Another study, this one by the Getulio Vargas Foundation,
published shortly thereafter, found similarly that thirty million
Brazilians were earning less than the subsistence level of $140
per year in 1978. The only notable government response to this
decaying situation came in mid 1978 when the minimum wage was raised
by 41%. Given the rate of inflation, however, this did not make up
for the loss in purchasing power which had occurred in only the past
year and was a wholly inadequate response to domestic conditions which
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the government s policies have themselves precipitated.
In summary then, it is ironic that the world food "crisis", by
being perceived as an essentially external phenomenon by the Brazilian
government, has exercised a significant and deleterious affect over
Brazil's domestic food situation. As we saw with Tanzania, although
in this case under a more conscious and deliberate effort to expand
imports, the economic imperatives of producing agricultural products
for export have increasingly overridden domestic food priorities.
And, as a consequence, the rush to forge a role for Brazil in combating
world hunger has created serious obstacles to its own population's
ability to acquire an adequate and nutritional diet.
CHAPTER IV
THE "ISSUES" OF ENERGY, FOOD, AND POPULATION IN YUGOSLAVIA
Introduction
In the case of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY) we now come to an example of a semi-industrialized socialistic
state which stands apart from most other socialist states which came
into being after World War II. Yugoslavia is most interesting for its
attempt to sustain a system under the banner of socialism which com-
bines political and economic centralism with widespread ethnic and cul
tural diversity and autonomy. In contrast to both Tanzania and Brazil
its policymaking process is characterized by essentially centralized
decision-making, followed by extreme decentralization in the imple-
mentation phase (i.e. see the discussion of energy policy below).
The SFRY has been in existence since the end of World War II
when it was established under the leadership and guidance of the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Josip Broz Tito, who has remained
as the country's President since that time. The Yugoslav state
presently consists of six separate Republics and two autonomous
Provinces bound together in a cooperative federation whose institu-
tional structure directly reflects the wide variety in ethnic,
national, historical, and social traditions of each constituent
region and their significantly different levels of economic develop-
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merit. Indeed, the most striking aspect of Yugoslavia is the extreme
diversity it presents in its social-cultural facets: it is a country
with two alphabets (Cyrillic and Latin); three religions (Orthodox,
Roman Catholic, and Moslem); four languages (Croatian, Macedonian,
Serbian, and Slovenian); and five nationalities (Croats, Macedonians,
Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes).
Any discussion of the Yugoslav context must take as its point
of departure a realization of the determinant influence which the
"diversity factor" exercises, particularly with regard to the policy
issues under consideration here. The Yugoslav system has been beset
by a major contradiction since its inception which finds political
uniformity encouraged and at times enforced, within a structure which
allows and perpetuates wide social and cultural diversity at the same
time. While the social and cultural differences among the Republics
and Autonomous Provinces are in fact maintained and even enhanced by
the complex institutional structure—which has as its fundamental
premise the "preservation of all nations and nationalities"—political
diversity is discouraged in the attempt to forge some degree of
Yugoslav national identity which, at least in political terms, will
2
hopefully transcend all other more parochial allegiances. The
developmental history of Yugoslavia in the post-war period has been
dominated by the ongoing struggle to resolve this major societal and
systemic contradiction.
The current political and economic structure of Yugoslavia fully
reflects the complexities of the society which it attempts to serve.
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Presently there are major institutions at the Federal level (a Federal
Chamber, Federal Executive Council, and a Chamber of Republics and
Provinces—all of which are allocated members on the basis of inter-
regional parity)
; at the Republic and Province level (Chambers of
Associated Labor, Chambers of Communes, and Socio-Political Chambers);
and at the Commune level (Chambers of Associated Labor, Chambers of
Local Communities, and Socio-Political Chambers). All of the members
of these bodies are elected by a complex system of indirect elections
over which the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and the Social-
ist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY) have a deter-
3
minant influence.
During the period under consideration in this chapter, power in
the system has devolved more and more to the local level where the
Basic Organization of Associated Labor (BOAL) has recently emerged as
the fundamental unit and the central legal entity of the economic sys-
tem. The BOAL is now the forum through which all individuals exer-
cise their basic constitutional rights as workers, and it has become
of crucial importance in the de-centralized system of planning and
policy implementation which has emerged over the past fifteen years in
Yugoslavia (see the discussion below)
.
The economic structure possesses some uniquely Yugoslavian
characteristics as well, with two major economic divisions co-existing.
The economic structure is dominated by a large socialized sector,
marked by social ownership and worker s elf-management , which accounts
for virtually all industrial and service activities, generating
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roughly four-fifths of the national income and employing approximately
98% of the salaried labor force. Alongside of the socialized sector
however, there also exists a private sector, consisting primarily of
small farmers and artisans, which accounts for the remainder of
national income and employment but, more importantly, dominates in
the agricultural sector—where it accounts for approximately 94% of
employment—and, as will be seen in the discussion on food policy,
exercises a deterrent influence on the growth of the agricultural
5
sector
.
The postwar development of Yugoslavia has consisted of several
periods but, for the purposes of this analysis, the Economic Reforms
of 1965 and the 1974 Constitution represent the benchmark events when
the Yugoslav system acquired all of its current essential features and
general developmental orientation.^ In the early U950s, after its
break with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia departed on a path to build a
new kind of socialist society which has, at various rimes, been
described as a "socialist market economy" or a "soci3list democracy".
The basis of the system which has since developed has had as its
foundation a concept of "social ownership and control of the means
of production." The basic structures and values of the system have
been built upon this precept which has informed developmental policy
since the mid 1950s:
Social ownership as an economic category is not vested
in any holder. No one holds the right of social owner-
ship, not even the federation . . . But the law recog-
nizes a special property right which it calls the
'right to use'. Under social ownership the worker is
vested with the management of the means of production
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and the right to dispose of the product. Worker's
self-management is seen as the fundamental principle
of social organization, without which socialism is
not possible, because without worker's self-manage-
ment they would not have the disposition of the
'surplus value' created in production. Thirdly, the
decentralization of political and economic decisions
from the federal government to the republics, com-
munes, and enterprises is necessary because worker's
management cannot be realized without it ... as a
corollary of decentralized decision-making there has
to be greater reliance on markets as a guide to the
allocation of resources. This means a reduction of
centralized planning and control. There has to be a
decentralization of the planning function to the
enterprises, communes, and the republics. The plan
for the economy as a whole is 'only aimed at channel-
ing and coordinating the trends of general develop-
ment ' .
Although the decision to follow this overall developmental
strategy was made in the early 1950s, it met with many delays in its
implementation. The task of implementing these goals was given new
impetus in 1965 when a general dissatisfaction with the speed with
which a decentralized market and self-managed economic system was
being established produced the Economic Reform. The ultimate inten-
tion of the Reform was to replace "administrative decisions" and the
political interference which they represented with "market relations"
and the economic rationale which they represented. "Market relations"
were to become the main determinant of economic development in all
areas of the economy in the hopes that it would make the system more
g
efficient in its allocation of all resources. In seeking to achieve
this overriding goal, the Reform involved a trend away from the
traditional method of increasing production via increases in employ-
ment to one which emphasized increases in productivity as an alterna-
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tive. While the affects of the Reform were to vary among sectors of
the economy, its impact was to be felt throughout the whole system
over the next decade.
Since 1965, for example, the role of the Federal government in
the economic arena has steadily decreased. Its duties have now been
effectively reduced to areas of foreign affairs, defense, the pro-
tection of ethnic identity, and the creation and maintenance of
instruments designed to guarantee a single market in the country
—
its most important economic function. Every Republic and Autonomous
Province has its own independent fiscal system, which contributes to
the Federal budget on the basis of Gross Material Product created by
them and the amount of basic sales taxes which are collected. Thus,
much of the fiscal control over the economy is located at the Repub-
lic and Province level where, ultimately, policies are carried out.
At the Federal level there is a smaller degree of influence to be
exercised in some areas of fiscal, price, credit, and foreign trade
policies, which affect the market indirectly.
1
^ The delimitation
of Federal power has had a deleterious affect on the ability to
implement "national" policies in a number of areas including those
under discussion here.
In addition, the Reform has had a significant influence over
the planning process as it has developed over the last decade.
Planning remains the primary means by which "national" policies are
articulated, and the planning procedure is still important for
coordinating the numerous self-managed worker organizations' produc-
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tion and development goals. Since the initiation of the Reform, how-
ever, planning has taken on much more of an indicative character, where
five year Social Plans provide only a general policy direction, not
set production quotas, which is neither binding nor enforceable. Most
often, the final product of a Social Plan represents more the diverse
inputs of Republics and Provinces with different needs and interests,
than any generally agreed upon set policy.
The planning process in Yugoslavia has become both a top-down
and bottom-up process which involves all administrative levels. The
Social Plan is supposed to represent the common targets for economic
and social development jointly agreed upon via this process. The
major coordination of the Plan takes place at the Federal, Republic
and Province and commune levels, while enterprises and BOALs establish
production and development goals under their general guidelines—in
practice they are allowed a great deal of autonomy within the limits
of the overall plan targets.
Ultimately, plans are coordinated and implemented through "self-
management agreements" and "social compacts" which occur in the opera-
tional phase of the planning process and are negotiated among BOALs
,
enterprises, and Republics and Provinces. These agreements have
become the primary means by which the specific goals of economic
policy are elaborated and, as will be seen in the following analysis,
they have made it exceedingly difficult for central control to be
11
exercised over the implementation phase of the planning process.
The influence of the Reform, by the early 1970s, had extended
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beyond the intended goals of reconstituting economic relationships into
the political realm as well. The economic decentralization encouraged
by these measures had also brought with it uncontrolled trends in poli-
tical decentralization, which precipitated a political crisis in 1971-
1972. The major political manifestation of decentralization was the
growth of "pluralism" and the emergence of the "nationalist" doctrine
as an overt organizing principle in some republics—notably Croatia.
Eventually, this movement was perceived as a serious threat to the
Yugoslav state by the LCY national leadership, and it caused the Fed-
eral government, primarily in the personage of Tito, to intervene in
the affairs of some republics and purge the local LCY of leaders with
12
"particularist" tendencies.
In this same period there was also a growing awareness that the
economic consequences of the Reform had not all been beneficial, and
that it had in fact aggravated one of Yugoslavia's most serious and
chronic problems: the unequal development levels of its constituent
republics. The division between the northern developed republics of
Slovenia and Croatia and the lesser developed southern republics of
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia had historically
been of crucial socio-economic significance. Indeed, the economic
inequalities among its constituent Republics/Provinces had always
been a primary concern of the central government's development policy,
which had often pushed economic preferences for the less-developed
areas over the objections of the developed regions. Every five year
Social Plan had contained specific provisions for aid to the under-
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developed Republics/Provinces, with an "equalization of living stand-
ards" in all areas having been a long-standing national goal. 13
The policy had been partially successful in that the under-
developed regions had increased their growth rates under the preferen-
tial policy. But it was not successful enough, since the gap between
the developed and underdeveloped regions had still increased. Under
the decentralizing affects of the Reform it was clear by the early
1970s that the gap had continued to increase as the decline in cen-
tral authority, which had been the major impetus for the supplemental
resources being allocated to the underdeveloped regions, brought with
14it a declining interest in the equalizing policy. The tendencies
encouraged by the Reform had allowed Republics/Provinces to make
economic decisions based on local and ethnic preferences, where, most
often, they aimed at maximizing Republic not national development. 1 "^
Thus, by the early 1970s, both political and economic conditions
had coalesced to produce some retrenchment of party centralism in the
political arena and considerable reassessment of the "market-oriented"
strategy of the Economic Reform. In the political realm, this pro-
duced a series of Constitutional amendments in the early 1970s which
culminated in the promulgation of a new Constitution in 1974. The
primary political intent of the new Constitution was to reassert in
legal terms the primacy of the LCY as the chief organ in all spheres
of social life. The new Constitution contained the most explicit
confession to date of the LCY's ultimate power as the leading politi-
cal and ideological organization, and made a point of reasserting the
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LCY's right to intervene in decision-making and selection of officers
by enterprises and communities— the levels at which such intervention
was most crucial. While the system was to remain based upon autonomous
enterprises and communes and social self-management, it nevertheless
still required strong party management. Within the political arena
then, the recent strains of reemergent national-ethnic cleavages has
produced a new thrust to reinvest the ICY with the will, authority,
and power to exert social controls, in its role as the most reliable
all-Yugoslav social organization for carrying out this task."^
The move to political retrenchment also spilled over into the
economic area as well in the early 1970s, particularly when the over-
all economic situation in Yugoslavia began to deteriorate under the
effects of the world recession. Similar to most other industrial
countries of the world, by the mid 1970s, Yugoslavia was suffering
from serious problems of unemployment and inflation, and a persistently
negative trade balance which had more than doubled between 1971 and
1975 (see Table 11) . The primary response to the economic problems
was an effort to gain greater overall control over the economy,
expressed in an attempt to reinvest planning with more meaning at
all levels as a necessary alternative to total reliance on "market
forces", which the 1965 Reform had encouraged.
The new emphasis on planning was an integral part of the new
1974 Constitution and gained greater explicit support in a document
produced by the Federal and Republic/Province Assemblies in 1975.
17
Both documents asserted that much of the recent economic difficulties
TABLE 11
ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR YUGOSLAVIA, 1968-1978
Cost of
*Trade Unemployment Living Increase
Year Balance (percentage) (percentage)
1968 -0.5 8.0 5.7
1969 -0.6 7.8 7.5
1970 -1.2 7.0 11.1
1971 -1.4 6.7 15.3
1972 -0.8 7.0 16.
1
1973 -1.7 8.1 20.0
1974 -3.7 9.0 21.0
1975 -3.6 10. 1 24.
1
1976 -2.5 11.4 11.9
1977 -3.1 11.9 14.5
1978 -3.5 12.0 13.6
SOURCES: Drawn from data in OECD, Economic
Survey for Yugoslavia, 1973-1978 . Paris: OECD;
and International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics, November 1979.
*amount is in $US billion.
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could be remedied by a greater emphasis on more coordinated planning,
which was increasingly being seen as a necessary means to guide and
correct some of the adverse effects of the over-reliance on the market
that recent events had revealed. The latter document, entitled the
"Draft Outline of a Common Policy for Long-Term Development in Yugo-
slavia (until 1985)", cast proper planning in a role crucial to the
country's overall development:
Our country's chances for future economic develop-
ment lie in a common and unified long-term development
policy. Only as a unified whole can Yugoslavia success-
fully cope with the fundamental questions of her future
development, such as . . . production of energy, raw
materials, and food . . . the present document provides
the groundwork for a common policy the existence of which^g
is one of the preconditions for self-management planning.
In summary, the political and economic context in which the
Yugoslav government has attempted to implement policies in the areas
under consideration in this chapter has changed significantly over
the past decade. As the preceding has pointed out, the government's
capacity and ability to formulate and implement "national" policies
has been hindered by the constraints of an institutional structure
which is based largely on preserving the country's multiple diversi-
ties. The ongoing dilemma of Yugoslavia's institutional development
of securing a proper balance between decentralization/self-management
and the essential requirements of coordinated economic planning re-
mains unresolved and, as such, still exercises a determinant influ-
ence over discussions of national policy issues.
The following sections will present an overview of the energy,
food, and population situations in Yugoslavia and will review the
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important developments which have occurred in these areas over roughly
the past decade. This account will provide the essential background
for an examination of the present state of the government's policies
in these areas and of the major factors which have influenced their
formulation and implementation. The primary purpose again is to
characterize the government's perception of these issues by drawing
upon the policy responses as the primary representation of the
government's understanding and treatment of these issues.
Energy
Background to the energy situation 1960-1970 . Of the three issues to
be discussed in this chapter, energy has been, by far, the one which
has drawn the most attention from the Yugoslav government. Although
energy-related problems have plagued Yugoslavia for virtually the
entire postwar period, the energy "issue" has assumed a growing
prominance in recent years as international events have altered the
domestic energy situation.
Increases in energy consumption
—
particularly that of electricity
and petroleum—has been a crucial variable in the success of Yugo-
slavia's development policy in the postwar period, which has rapidly
industrialized an essentially agrarian society in a relatively short
time.
19
The expansion of the industrial sector over the past twenty
years (from 15% of Gross Domestic Product at factor cost in 1951 to
33% of GDP in 1971) has sharply driven up total energy consumption
(e.g. electricity consumption increased by eleven times between 1955
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and 1975), and made Yugoslavia's natural energy resources a critical
factor in the future growth of its economy.
Unfortunately, the profile of Yugoslavia's natural energy re-
sources is lacking in a number of important respects, which have
begun to exercise a significant influence on the government's future
development plans. On the plus side, the country possesses adequate
amounts of two important sources of electricity production, soft coal
and hydropower potential. But, on the other hand, the country lacks
adequate deposits of either petroleum or natural gas, two energy
resources which have grown in importance with the encouragement of
industrial expansion.
An authoritative 1975 study of Yugoslavia's natural resources
assessed the energy picture and presented a breakdown of the country's
total energy resources. According to this study coal accounts for
84.6% of all power resources, water for 11.5%, petroleum for 1.9%,
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nuclear fuel for 1.9%, and natural gas for 0.9%. The major energy
resource is clearly coal, but the coal resources are composed of 99%
lignite and brown coal which are of very low calorific value, have a
low recovery rate (for lignite about 47%) , and thus are more suitable
for power generation than for important industrial uses such as coke
and gas production. For these reasons the country's coal resources
have not been adequately exploited, even for power generation, and
hydropower has emerged as the chief source of electrical production.
This source averaged 59% of total power generated for the 1965-1969
period and held good promise for further expansion, with only 17%
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of the total hydropower potential being exploited in 1968.
During the 1960s the country's deficiencies in petroleum and
natural gas became more obvious and costly as consumption of these
products increased rapidly with the growth in industrial production
and the rise in the standard of living. By 1968, for example, in the
breakdown of total power production, oil had assumed second place to
coal, with coal accounting for 60%, oil 30%, hydropower 7%, and
natural gas 3%. The developments in energy consumption represented
by this breakdown had seen the porportion of imports in total energy
consumption increase from 17% in 1965 to 25% by 1969. The dorvestic
oil situation in particular had deteriorated considerably in the lat-
ter half of the 1960s. Although domestic crude oil production had
increased by 60% between 1964 and 1970, total consumption had grown
by over three times in the same period. Concurrently, imports of
crude petroleum grew from 50% to 61% of total consumption, while the
cost of these energy imports had more than tripled over this seven
year period (see Table 12)
.
The Federal government's policy in the energy area passed through
two distinct phases in the 1960s which were set off from each other
by the Economic Reform of 1965. Prior to 1965 the electricity supply
industry and the energy area was under the strong administrative influ-
ence of central government agencies which made most of the develop-
mental decisions and established the norms and standards of operation
for the industry. Most of this was changed with the Reform when the
greater development of self-management and autonomy was alloved among
136
TABLE 12
YUGOSLAVIA'S OIL SITUATION 1968-1978
Domestic
Year Production*
Imports
(Volume)
*
Imports Oil Imports as %
(Costs, $US Billion Total Consumption
1968 2.49 2.72 0.10 52%
1969 2.70 3.23 0.10 54%
1970 2.85 4.54 0.14 61%
1971 2.96 4.93 0.19 62%
1972 3.20 4.23 0.18 57%
1973 3.33 8.32 0.36 71%
1974 3.46 7.44 0.95 68%
1975 3.69 7.37 0.94 67%
1976 3.88 8.11 1.08 68%
1977 3.95 N/A 1.11 N/A
1978 N/A N/A 1.25 N/A
SOURCE: United Nations, World Energy Supplies 1950-
1974. New York: 1975; and OECD Survey, 1973 to 1978.
*in million metric tons
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the energy industries. Although the energy industry remained in the
socialized sector, the way was open for the market and "economic laws"
to play an increased role in its development.
As part of the movement to greater decentralization instituted by
the passage of the Reform, the Federal Assembly also passed a Basic
Electricity Supply Act in 1965. This act was the first step in a pro-
cess which was to drastically curtail the Federal government's role
in the energy sector. It instituted large cutbacks in the central
government's financing of energy-related construction projects (i.e.
supply lines, power plants, and the sinking of coal mines) in the
hopes that it would create conditions under which the industry would
become more production efficient and financially self-sufficient.
This philosophy, which was to inform the government's policy in this
area for the next decade, was perhaps best expressed in the comments
of Edward Kardelj , who was President of the Federal Assembly at that
time
:
. . . Kardelj said that those who use electric power
should be responsible for building electric power
stations. The Federation of Electric Enterprises
should not be vested with the authority of a govern-
ment agency. Those who decide to build power sta-
tions at greater than the optimal cost will have ^
to pay dearly for it and bear the costs themselves.
Thus, by the latter half of the 1960s, the electric power system
had been decentralized and was based upon regional enterprises which
were responsible for planning the operation and development of the
23
industry in each Republic/Province. At the Federal level, all auto-
nomous generation and transmission enterprises were mandatorily
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united in the Association of Yugoslav Electric Power Suppliers. The
Association's rights, however, were mainly confined to coordinating
activities—although it was hoped that it would provide the basis
for increased "rationalization" of the country's power facilities in
the future.
Despite these hopes, by the end of the 1960s the most striking
aspects of the power industry were its fragmentation, its lack of
coordination, and its failure to grow adequately to meet the nation's
power needs. This situation obtained even though the energy area
had been singled out as a "priority" area in the Social Plan for
1966-1970. Under the Plan the energy sector was expected to increase
its share of total industrial investment from the 28% of the 1961-
1965 Plan to 35% by 1970. The development of the energy sector was
cast in a role which was crucial to the fulfillment of the projec-
tions of growth for the total economy in this period. As one Yugoslav
planning official expressed it: "The further advancement of the power
industries is a basic premise for the growth of overall production
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and consumption in the forthcoming period. '
The results achieved under the 1966-1970 Plan in the energy
area were far short of what was envisioned, however. For example,
although the annual increase in total energy and fuels averaged 5.4%
for the 1965-1969 period, this proved to be sorely inadequate to
meet the increases in domestic demand. The affects of the trends to
decentralization had clearly undermined the attempts to plan and
coordinate development of the electrical supply industry which was
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close to total disarray by 1970. As one study described the state of
the energy sector, it was beset by:
Deficient interconnections and transmission capacities,
droughts and failures to complete both thermal and
hydropower plants on schedule (which) have led to
endemic power shortages, frequently requiring the
imposition of limitations^of power consumption by
industry and households.
The limited construction achievements were the result of both a
lack of inter-Republic coordination and the failure of adequate financ-
ing for construction to be forthcoming after the system of Federally
subsidized funding had been abolished with the Reform. In fact,
capital investment in the energy sector declined in both absolute
terms and as a proportion of total investment in the economy as the
electrical supply industry proved incapable of becoming self-financing.
This situation was in part caused by the Federal government's pricing
policies (toward electrical energy)— an area over which it retained
some control—which maintained low electric rates for both industrial
and household users (i.e. the rates did not increase between 1965
and 1970). This policy severely aggravated the situation, as it
served to both undercut the power enterprises 1 ability to become
self-financing and continued to encourage, via low rates, power inten-
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sive industries which drove up consumer demand.
Because of these systemic problems the country experienced a num-
ber of shortages in energy supplies in this period, which were now
beginning to have more serious economic consequences. The lack of
coordinated planning in the oil refining industry had produced a
situation where the construction of new refining facilities had left
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the country with an excess refining capacity of 50% by 1970. At the
same time, the lack of adequate storage facilities caused chronic
winter fuel shortages in certain parts of the country.
Electricity shortages, which had occurred in parts of Yugoslavia
throughout the 1950s and 1960s despite the heavy investment in energy,
were also beginning to have more serious ramifications for the economy
as the frequency of the problem created production problems in some
heavy industries; in the words of one observer:
In recent years in particular large users of electricity
like manufacturers of carbide, ferroalloys, and aluminum
were not able to obtain a large enough supply of current
at al^gtimes being forced therefore, to curtail produc-
tion.
The government clearly acknowledged that the energy sector was
plagued by problems of poor development and lack of coordinated plannin
when, in a Resolution of Economic Policy for 1969, it called for coor-
dination and integration of the sector as a precondition for any effect
ive policy. By the late 1960s, the government was moving on a number
of fronts including an acceleration in the exploration for oil in
the Adriatic and a new emphasis on the exploitation of the country's
coal reserves for electric power production as ways of alleviating
the energy situation. The course of national policy was to push in
these directions for the next decade, as world energy-related events
pushed the energy issue to the fore in Yugoslavia.
Energy Policy 1971-1975 . The major dimensions of Yugoslavia's
national energy policy in the early 1970s were first outlined in the
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Social Plan for 1971-1975. According to the Plan, which was delayed a
year due to the political crisis in Croatia, the accelerated develop-
ment of the energy sector was a priority, given the progressive in-
creases in energy demand which were projected over the next five years.
The Plan focused primarily on the electrical energy field and
proposed a strategy which was to emphasize coal exploitation and
thermal power generation as the best means of utilizing the country's
comparative advantage in its most plentiful energy resource. Prior
to this, while the government's approach had always emphasized utili-
zation of Yugoslavia's "native" energy resources, the policy had
centered upon exploitation of the country's vast hydropower potential.
Now, however, under the new imperatives of the energy situation,
time, costs, and reliability of supply had forced a shift away from
hydropower
:
. . . due to the susceptibility of hydro-potential to
weather fluctuations, the long lead time in their
(hydroplant) construction, and the presence of large
lignite resources suitable for p^wer and the lower
capital costs of thermal plants.
Little was accomplished toward these goals in the early 1970s,
however, as the combination of the preoccupation with the political
crisis and a worsening in the world energy situation hindered the
Federal government's ability to act effectively in this area. In
addition, the shortage of capital for investment in the electrical
energy industry continued, with total investment in the energy area
30
actually declining by nearly one-half in the 1970-1972 period.
The reduction in the Federal government's financial role in the
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energy sector had clearly not produced the desired results. Over the
1966-1973 period, for example, the proportion of investment in the
energy sector had declined from 33% to 18% of all industrial develop-
ment. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the
composition of the investment made was very unfavorable, given the
government's goals for the electrical industry. During this period
there was a serious lag in investment in coal production for thermal
generation and in the construction of hydropower facilities and a
distribution network—all of which had been high priorities under
the Social Plans for 1966-1970 and 1971-1975. Meanwhile, there was
an above average increase in investment in power facilities relying
on imported energy (e.g. diesel fueled thermal generators) which went
directly against the policy to encourage usage of the country's own
energy resources. The immediate results of the situation in the
electrical industry were continued power shortages; whereas the pro-
jected increase in power production for the 1971-1975 Plan was expected
to be 12% annually, in the 1971-1973 period it had achieved only a 10%
31
growth rate.
In the oil-related energy area, the expectations set out in the
Plan were not being met in the early 1970s either. While domestic oil
production had shown a 5.3% annual increase during 1971-1973, the
projected necessary increase to meet the Plan's goals had been set at
9%. Consequently, over the first years of the 1970s oil imports as
a proportion of total consumption had jumped to 71% by 1973, with the
volume of imports increasing by over 70% and the costs doubling in
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this three year period (see Table 12)
.
Once the political crisis of the early 1970s had been defused, the
Federal government was able to turn its full attention to the progres-
sively deteriorating energy situation, and by the mid 1970s a number
of major new national policy initiatives had been announced. The new
responses to the energy problems attempted to take a more comprehen-
sive view of the total energy picture and, with the growing emphasis
on more effective planning, began to take a more long-term view of
the situation.
The immediate concern of the government was to attempt to remedy
the more critical deficiencies in the national energy system: speci-
fically, the continued poor development of the electrical system which
was having increasing economic consequences. During 1973 and 1974
for example, four of the five Republics had experienced severe elec-
trical shortages which this time forced them to considerably reduce
supplies to households. The chief cause of these cutoffs was the
vulnerability of the hydropower plants to rain fall patterns. In
this case, a severe drought in the Autumn of 1973 had drastically
reduced the total systems generating capacity, and by the end of the
year, all Republics/Provinces had been required to place restrictions
32
on electricity consumption. The problems presented by these short-
ages were exacerbated by the continued lack of an adequate national
transmission network, which could alleviate supply and demand im-
balances and allow greater transference of power between regions.
The response of the national government now included measures
TABLE 13
OUTPUT OF ELECTRICITY, 1967-1977
(in million kilowatt hours)
Year Total Output Hydroelectric Thermal
1967 18702 10655 8047
196o ZU64Z 1 i / DO 00/4
1969 23375 14732 8643
1970 26024 14741 11283
1971 29509 15644 13865
1972 33231 17982 15249
1973 35062 16394 18668
1974 39456 20659 18797
1975 40040 19317 20723
1976 43573 20555 2301S
1977 48580 24354 24226
SOURCES: United Nations, World Energy Supplies 1950-
1974. New York: 1975; and OECD, Economic Survey for
Yugoslavia, 1973-1978 . Paris: OECD
.
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designed to both cut consumption and increase production. A pricing
policy was the primary means utilized to accomplish the former goal.
As one Yugoslav observer had noted, traditionally electricity rates
had been largely subject "to the need to insure adequate conditions
for efficient operation and development of activities concerned, as
determined by social development plans", in other words, it was
considered to be more a public need than a commodity to be sold at
a fair profit. Thie approach now changed and price adjustments were
more frequently employed to reflect world energy conditions—a change
which saw electricity rates rise by from 12% to 28% annually over
the 1971-1974 period. On the production side, the Federal govern-
ment selectively increased investment incentives in a number of
energy related areas, including reducing financial requirements for
some investments, enabling greater access to foreign loans, and easing
import duties on energy production-related materials—all in the hope
of reversing the serious downward trend in energy sector investment.
By 1974 there was also general agreement that no more diesei powered
thermal plants would be built, and there had been increased discus-
sion among the Republics of better ways to deal with the serious
kind of energy shortages which had been encountered in recent years,
both of which illustrated a degree of cooperation among Republics/
33
Provinces which thus far had been lacking.
Amidst the increased activity in the electrical energy field,
comparatively little was forthcoming in the oil related area. Although
there was some concern expressed over the growing cost of oil imports,
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the situation was not viewed to be nearly as critical as that in the
electrical energy area. The government position in this area was
aptly characterized by the OECD's 1974 Economic Survey :
Yugoslavia is not as heavily dependent on oil imports
for its fuel needs as many other countries, as wood,
coal, and hydroelectric power provide most heating and
industrial energy requirements
. . .
Accordingly there have been no major measures to
reduce oil consumption. More significantly the Yugo-
slav authorities have expressed a willingness to run-
down foreign exchange reserves if necessary to pay the
extra oil costs rather than restrict the growth of the
economy this year
.
Indeed, the only measures implemented in this area at this time were
price increases which were imposed on oil products and natural gas.
Although they effectively increased costs of these products by about
66%, they still left prices well below the levels of similar products
in most other Western European countries.
These generally piecemeal responses to the changes in Yugoslavia's
energy situation in the early 1970s were soon followed by two major
policy pronouncements which emerged out of the general trend towards
re-emphasizing more comprehensive, long-term planning in all sectors
of the economy. Both measures tried to present a more comprehensive
view of the country's energy situation, and exhibited an increasing
tendency to view Yugoslavia's energy problems within a world perspec-
tive, which recognized the growing influence that international con-
tingencies were playing in the formulation and implementation of
the government's domestic energy policy. This only entailed the
"realization" that such was to be the case, however, for although
the world energy situation now had a clear influence on domestic
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policy, it did not lead, as we saw in the case of Brazil, to any sig-
nificant alteration in the view that increased energy consumption was
integral to future economic growth.
The first of these measures appeared in late 1974 and was the
product of negotiations among the Federal Executive Council and the
executive councils of the Republics/Provinces. 35 The measure, entitled
the "Social Compact on the Fundamentals of the Development of the
Electricity Supply Industry from 1974-1980", was aimed specifically
at the energy sector, and laid out the major aspects of the develop-
ment of the industry over the next six years. It has remained the
basic planning document for the electrical energy sector since its
passage.
As with the past documents in this area, the compact indicated
that the basis of policy in this field was to be "more coordinated
development" of the electrical system, but this time a degree of
obligatory cooperation was to be imposed:
It was now made obligatory for the Federation, republics
and provinces to adopt measures to encourage justified
joint construction of electricity generation and trans-
mission facilities and/or to make such construction
possible on^the territory of other republics and
provinces
.
After noting that past policies in the electrical energy field had
largely been failures, the compact went on to call again for the
immediate exploitation of the country's coal resources and thermal
power potential (as a faster and more preferable option for in-
creasing power production than hydropower) , and the rapid construc-
tion of an adequate inter-Republican transmission system. Fully 65%
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of the 63 milliard dinars which were to be invested under this compact
were to go to fulfill these two priorities, and hopefully increase
37generating capacity by 133% by 1980.
In addition to reasserting these now standard e-nergy policy
priorities, the new compact also departed from past policy proposals
in two significant ways. The most important was the initial sugges-
tion that nuclear power would, over the long term, be increasingly
exploited as a new resource for electrical energy, and the announce-
ment that construction on the first plant was to begin shortly. The
justification for this option was based upon the second point which
now saw the energy "issue" as an immediate and critical problem for
the whole nation. As such, nearly 75% of the total financial outlay
under the compact was to be expended in the next three, years, "since
it is necessitated by the present situation in the Yugoslav electrical
system". The change in perspective represented in the .new compact
signalled a growing tendency on the part of the government to treat
... .38
the energy issue as a crisis situation.
A major revision in the Yugoslav government's perspective on the
domestic energy situation and its policy approach followed about a
year later, appearing as an integral part of the "Draft Outline of a
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Common Policy for Long-Term Development in Yugoslavia" - In this
statement, which contained a detailed explication of the country's
overall development priorities for the next decade, a considerably
revised energy policy was set forth upon the newly accepted premise
that Yugoslavia's energy resources were not adequate for her future
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power needs.
This reassessment of the country's energy resources and the con-
tinued deterioration in the energy situation, presented primarily in
the growing deficit in electric energy and the rapid increase in oil
imports, now saw the energy issue cast as one of the "major problems
of economic development for the country":
Production of power, raw materials, and food should take
a central place in (our) production orientation and
development policy. This production is of extraordinary
importance for the establishment of economic stability,
the elimination of the balance of payments deficit, the
harmonization of the structur^ of the economy, and dynamic
and more stable development.
Reflecting on the development of the energy sector since World War Two,
the Draft Outline concluded that despite all past efforts, energy had
now become a limiting factor on the country's dynamic economic develop-
ment and the further rise in the standard of living which this would
bring
.
Under the energy policy proposed in the statement, the role of
"power production" remained unaltered as a "general factor of economic
development" whose rational production and consumption demanded, first
and foremost, the "joint efforts of the entire country". Unlike
previous policy statements however, the new posture recognized the
inherent limitations of Yugoslavia's relatively plentiful but struc-
turally unsound natural energy resources. On this basis, the domestic
power strategy required greater exploitation of the country's coal
reserves, an intensified exploration for new resources, and a greater
emphasis on endeavors to adapt the structure to increasing the share
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of high-yielding forms of power production, like nuclear.
In the oil-related area, it was now publicly acknowledged that
the domestic oil situation was critical (with imports accounting for
over two-thirds of consumption), due, in large part, to the continued
dearth of significant domestic resources:
The insignificant capacity of domestic sources, whose
exploitation should be intensified by accelerating
prospecting as much as possible, imposes the need for
increasing imports of crude which should be
arranged on a long-term basis.
In a most surprising departure, oil dependence was now viewed as a
necessity which had to be dealt with on a long-term basis to ease its
effects. While another aspect of oil policy also called for a reduc-
tion of oil imports to an economically reasonable level for balance
of payments reasons, it was quite clear that self-sufficiency was
not held to be a realistic goal.
The Draft Outline reiterated the critical need for the creation
of a united power system as well, invoking it as in the best interests
of associated labor, the economy, and all parts of the country. Like
its predecessors, however, it left the problem of implementation of
policy to agreements and coordination among organizations of associated
labor and Republics/Provinces, which necessitated a degree of coopera-
tion and planning among these units which had hitherto not been forth-
coming .
In sum, few of the past failures of the government's energy policy
had been remedied by the end of 1975, for, despite all of the concern
expressed at the national level, little had actually been accom-
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plished. In the area of oil, for example, no new deposits had been
discovered after more than five years of exploration in the Adriatic.
The primary measures in the oil area contined to be progressive price
increases, supplemented by "recommendations" by the Federal Executive
to Republics/Provinces on measures which could be taken to conserve
petroleum by cutting transport costs through more inter-Republic
cooperation. These activities had little significant affect, how-
ever, as total consumption of oil continued to rise with oil import
costs reaching 12-13% of total import costs in 1974-1975 (see Table
14).
By most assessments, the government's responses to the energy
situation had produced no significant results in this period. One
could still find any number of analyses which cited the persistent
chronic problems, particularly in the electrical energy industry,
as the main obstacles to an effective government policy {i.e. lack of
proper planning and coordination in construction, construction delays,
lack of investment, and the vulnerability of the power system to the
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vagaries of the weather) . It thus remained to be seen whether these
difficulties could finally be overcome in the ensuing years.
The energy situation 1976 to the present . Since the flurry of acti-
vity in the energy area in the first half of the 1970s, little has
changed in the fundamental aspects of Yugoslavia's energy situation.
Much of the policy orientation thus remains the same. The most
recent government initiatives in the energy area are contained in
the Social Plan for 1976-1980. The Plan basically restates the
TABLE 14
Oil and Food Import Costs As A
Percentage of Total Import Costs, 1967-1977
Year Oil Imports Food Imports
1967 5%
1968 5 . 5% f Of6%
1969 5% 6%
1970 5% 6%
1971 6% 8%
1972 5.5% 9%
1973 8% 10%
1974 13% 8%
1975 12% 5%
1976 15% 8%
1977 14% 8%
SOURCE: Derived from data in United Nations,
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics , 1968
to 1977; Yugoslav Survey 20 (May 1979).
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priorities of the preceding years with the "acceleration of electric
power production" still being pushed as the best way to eliminate
the energy constraints on development. The other important goals
which are mentioned include increases in the domestic production of
oil, natural gas, and coal and a significant reduction in the cost
and volume of imported oil.
The Plan projects an overall growth in the energy branch of
industry of 9% annually over the life of the Plan, a rate which is
higher than that achieved during the whole previous decade. This is
to be accomplished through the exploitation of both hydro potential
and the country's soft coal reserves, as well as through stepped up
exploration for petroleum in the Pannonian Basin—where Yugoslavia's
major onshore deposits have been found—and in the Adriatic. Based
upon what are believed to be "promising" prospects for oil discoveries,
the Plan envisions a decrease in dependence upon imported oil and a
reduction in dependence on oil for total energy requirements from
46% to 41% by 1980. By 1980, it is expected that the structure of
electrical energy output will be altered considerably to where hydro-
power will account for only 36% of total output, coal-fired thermal
plants for 50% of output, 8% from liquid fuels, and 6% from nuclear
power. This projects a very significant increase in the role of
nuclear generation with the first plant expected to be completed in
46
1979 and approximately twelve plants in service by 2000.
The more decided emphasis on coal-fired and particularly nuclear
powered plants has been precipitated by the increasing lag in power
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production, and the persistence of serious power shortages which have
spread throughout the country over the past few years. Although power
production grew by approximately 10% annually over the 1976-1978
period, demand was not fully satisfied, requiring electric power
imports of $43 million in 1976. More recently, a summer drought and
winter freeze in 1978 combined to nearly paralyze the country's
hydropower generating capacity, which has become very susceptible to
47poor rainfall patterns and climatic conditions. These conditions
required all Republics/Provinces (except Slovenia) to impose power
cuts of several hours a day in 1978 and forced a drastic increase in
power costs to cut consumption. The poor development of the country's
distribution system prevented the possible transference of excess
power between regions during this crisis and continues to aggravate
the shortages which have occurred.
The country's continuing energy difficulties over the past few
vears have produced progressively more drastic responses by the
government in certain energy-related areas, some of which have con-
tributed to the deteriorating economic situation as well. Electric
rates have been continuously increased over the past few years in
line with developments with world energy prices. These increases have
driven up industrial costs in particular and made them a chief con-
48 _
tributor to the rapidly increasing inflation rate. In recent years
the government has also removed all import duties on imported oil
(this was in the neighborhood of 6.8% in 1971), and either eliminated
or lowered all tariffs on imports of equipment related to energy-
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production activities.
But the most significant changes have come in the form of alter-
ations in the laws governing foreign investment in energy related
areas. These laws have recently been greatly liberalized to -make
the investment climate both more attractive and more profitable to
foreign capital. The most important changes in this area include
those which now allow foreign investors to invest in power generation
facilities and which allow foreign firms to undertake exploration for
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new power resources within Yugoslavia itself.
The most recent events affecting the energy situation in Yugo-
slavia and the character of the government's responses to these
developments clearly underlines the severity of the country's energy
problems. Furthermore, they indicate that in general the government's
domestic energy policy has largely failed to alleviate the critical
problems in the energy area."^ One need go no further than the recent
comments of Stane Dolanc, then a high LCY official, to find that the
energy situation in Yugoslavia has not perceptibly improved in recent
years
:
. . .
the great problem has been the crude oil supply
while all the other sources of power—coal mines,
hydropower stations, a^nd atomic power stations—are
in a state of crisis.
It is still apparent that effective implementation is the most crucial
obstacle which the government's national energy policy faces.
Food
Introduction: Yugoslav agricultural policy to 1970. Unlike the world
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energy "crisis", the recent developments in the world's food situation
have had a comparatively minor impact on the living conditions of the
Yugoslav population. The provision of an adequate supply of basic
foodstuffs to meet domestic requirements has not been a serious prob-
lem for Yugoslavia since the mid 1960s. The country is virtually
self-sufficient in producing all but two of its major food staples
(the traditional exceptions have been wheat and sugar) , and since
the 1960s it has been a net exporter of food and live animals in most
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years
.
This is not to say, however, that world food conditions have not
exercised some influence over the formulation of Yugoslavia's domestic
agricultural policy. Indeed, as in the case of Brazil, in recent years
world food conditions have tended to progressively overshadow domestic
factors in the formulation and implementation of Yugoslavia's agricul-
tural policy. There has been a growing awareness of the value and
strategic importance of food exports under current international con-
ditions. In a situation where a chronic, increasing trade deficit
has persisted and progressively worsened in the 1970s, the quest to
exploit the export potential of Yugoslavia's agricultural sector has
become the dominant factor shaping the government's current agricul-
tural policy.
For most of the postwar period Yugoslav agriculture has been
able to expand production sufficiently to meet the large portion of
domestic food needs, despite what is generally acknowledged to have
been, at least until 1965, a government development policy which dis-
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criminated heavily against agriculture in favor of industry. Under the
government's industrially oriented policies, agriculture has been viewed
as a secondary sector whose primary function was to provide low cost
inputs (food and raw materials) to fuel the industrial development
process. Consequently, the agricultural sector's role in the economy
has declined significantly in the postwar period with its share of the
Gross Domestic Product falling from 38% in 1951-1953 to 21% by 1969-
1971, while the proportion of the labor population in agriculture fell
53from 68% to 47%. The decline in the agricultural sector, which was
encouraged by the government's postwar agricultural policy, began to
have more serious economic effects by the late 1960s, which precipi-
tated important changes in the government's posture. By this time,
agriculture was becoming a drag on the country's overall development
as it failed to expand sufficiently to meet the raw material needs of
the food processing industries. The growing problems in the agri-
cultural sector were to make it a focus of the government's overall
development policy as it was elaborated in the 1970s.
Before embarking upon our analysis of the major policy develop-
ments in this period, it is essential to say a few words about the
unique characteristics of the Yugoslav agricultural sector. Agricul-
ture is the only major sector of the economy which does not belong
exclusively to the socialized sector. Agriculture consists of a
large private sector and a small socialized sector, a situation which
has existed since the abandonment of the government's ill-fated forced
collectivization policy in the early 1950s. While the separation of
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these two sectors has since been maintained, and although they differ
widely in their essential characteristics, they have carried on a
relationship which has been based more upon their complementarity
than upon their mutual exclusivity."*^
In reviewing the performance of agriculture in the postwar
period it is, therefore, crucial to differentiate between the primi-
tive peasant agriculture of the private sector and the modern agri-
cultural techniques of the socialized sector. Private farm holdings
predominate, accounting for approximately 70% of all agricultural
land, 96% of the agricultural labor force, and 71% of total agricul-
tural production in 1970. The private farms are characterized by a
fragmented land-holding pattern, small farms, and the practice of
primitive non-mechanized methods of cultivation. The private farmers
are primarily subsistance farmers who grow mainly staple crops (wheat
and maize) and livestock (e.g. although they accounted for 71% of
total production in 1970, only 40% of this was actually marketed).
On the other hand, the socialized farms lie in sharp contrast
to the private. The socialized sector consists of much larger hold-
ings which employ modern cultivation methods, a high degree of
mechanization, and use high-yeild seeds and fertilizer. This sector
occupies only 30% of the farmland (of which only one half is con-
sidered arable), employs only 4% of the agricultural labor force,
56 ^
but accounts for, on average, 29% of total agricultural output. The
social sector is most involved in the production of wheat and maize
and industrial crops (sugarbeet and sunflower) for marketing purposes;
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TABLE 15
COMPOSITION OF PRIVATE FARMS BY SIZE, 1969
(in percentages)
up to 1-2 2-3 3-5 5-8 8-10 over
1 ha* ha ha ha ha ha 10 ha
in total number
of farms
in total
land area
21.1 16.9 15.4 20.2 14.8 5.0 6.5
2.7 7.0 10.1 20.7 24.2 11.6 23.7
SOURCE: Dzemal Drace, "Development of Agriculture," Yugoslav
Survey 17(February 1976):45-66.
*ha = hectares.
TABLE 16
COMPOSITION OF SOCIALIZED FARMS BY SIZE, 1973
(in percentages)
up to 50 to 300 to 1000 to 2500 to over
50 ha* 300 ha 1000 ha 2500 ha 5000 ha 5000 ha
in total
number 40.2 24.3 14.8 8.8 6.5 5.4
of farms
in total Q 3 2>g 7>2 n 5 19>3 58#9
land area
SOURCE: Same as TABLE 15.
*ha = hectares.
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approximately 80% of its total production is normally marketed, account-
ing for about 44% of all marketed production. 57 The socialized farms
have carried the brunt of the expansion in agricultural production in
the postwar period, primarily through increases in productivity accom-
plished through the progressive application of modern cultivation
techniques
.
Given this basic structure, Yugoslavia's agricultural context has
many similarities to those of the less-developed countries in the world.
Little structural change has occurred in agriculture, particularly
since the aura of the new regime's collectivization policy wore off
in the early 1950s. Weather conditions are, for example, still the
primary determinant of the agricultural sector's year to year perform-
ance, especially in the private sector where the level of cultivation
methods make them particularly susceptible to weather variation. By
most accounts, variabilities in production levels are still almost
totally attributable to the weather conditions.
In addition, while water resources are plentiful in most areas
of the country, irrigation has not been developed to any significant
degree, with only 2.5% of the total arable land equipped with -modern
irrigation facilities in 1975. Both erosion and flooding are also
important problems which have detrimentally affected the agricultural
sector's performance in recent years, assuming greater importance in
t1 . .58
the 1970s when most all potential arable land was being utilized.
The persistence of this generally backward agricultural struc-
ture is attributable, in large part, to the government's traditional
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policy of neglect in this area and one which, when attentive, discrim-
inated heavily against the development of the private sector. The
widespread fragmentation of private holdings is a direct result of
laws, still in effect, which prohibit private holdings of more than
10 hectares (about 24.7 acres) and which, until 1965, did not permit
59private farmers to purchase capital equipment for their farms. Until
then the opportunity to autonomously improve their agricultural
techniques was not granted to private farmers, as the government's
policy allowed only voluntary cooperation between peasant farmers
and the socialized farms—who had a monopoly on modern technology and
management skills—as the major device for private farmers to improve
their production techniques. In the words of the World Bank study:
. . .
the government concentrated on developing agri-
cultural marketed production through a modem social
sector . . . , which replaced collective farms as the
-main basis for providing the marketed output a^rapidly
growing nonagricultural population (required)
.
The biases of this policy in the performance of agriculture could
clearly be seen in a number of factors. While the agricultural sector
as a whole grew at average annual rate of 3.2% between 1953-1971, the
socialized sector expanded at a 7.2% rate while the private sector
grew at only 2.4%; indeed, overall, the productivity of the private
sector in the late 1960s was only about one half of that in the
socialized sector.
Prior to the 1970s, the most significant change in the government'
posture toward the agricultural sector came with the initiation of
the
Economic Reform in 1965. The passage of the Reform had great import
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for the agricultural sector which was now to be placed on an equal
footing with industry in the country's developmental plans. Under
the Reform, intensification of production, increased productivity,
and a greater valuation of work through the market were to become
priorities of agricultural policy. The measures instituted under
the Reform included the elimination of artificially low prices on
agricultural products, which had heavily subsidized industry and had
shielded agriculture from market forces, in the hopes that the sec-
tor would become more economically efficient. A system of price
parity for agricultural products was initiated (raising producer
prices by 43% on average) , and a more selective system of guaranteed
minimum prices for cereals and livestock were initiated in a move to
both increase productivity and stabilize production levels. Lastly,
the amount of Federal aid to the agricultural sector was also signi-
ficantly cut, as agriculture was now expected to provide more of its
-
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own investment resources for expansion purposes.
The affects of the Reform on agriculture were generally favor-
able over the next few years as production increases were realized
under the stimulation of the price parity program. These initial
positive results produced some very optimistic appraisals of future
gains in agriculture's performance , such as those envisaged in the
Social Plan for 1966-1970. The Plan projected a rate of agricultural
growth of 4.5% to 5% annually over the life of the Plan, with the
growth of the social sector at 10% and that of the private sector at
4.6%—rates which involved a considerable acceleration of growth in
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both sectors to be achieved.
By the end of 1970, however, the bases for these expectations for
agriculture had been significantly attentuated. Agriculture's growth
rate of expansion had fluctuated from plus 7% to minus 4%, due to
continued crop fluctuations (see Table 17). Over this period the
social sector had managed only a 5% growth rate while that of the
private sector was at 1.3%.
The basic problem with the Plan's agricultural policy was the
continued relative neglect of the development of the private farmers,
who could still only acquire most of the benefits of the new measures
through direct cooperation with the socialized farms.. The socialized
sector clearly continued to benefit most from the policy of the govern-
ment. During the five years of the Plan, the social±zed farmers
received 71% of the total gross fixed investment in agriculture, a
figure which was only slightly less than the previous five year period.
In this time the socialized sector had significantly increased its
share in the production of most major agricultural products; over the
1960-1970 period, its share of total output had climbed from 13.5%
to 20.2%, while its total volume of production had grown by 110%.
The socialized sector's accomplishments had been primarily
achieved by the adoption of a consolidative, capital intensive
strategy which had been encouraged by the Reform's push to make
agriculture more "economically efficient". Thus, over the 1961-1971
period, the number of workers in the socialized sector of agriculture
had declined in absolute numbers by 14% and the number of socialized
TABLE 17
PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL FOOD PRODUCTS, 1966-1977
(thousand metric tons)
Year Wheat Maize Meat Sugarbeet Sunflower
1966 4600 7980 709 4030
1967 4823 7204 780 3680 250
1968 4363 6813 857 2910 309
1969 4882 7821 806 3636 390
1970 3792 6928 847 2948 264
1971 5604 7443 843 2961 347
1972 4844 7930 875 3274 277
1973 4750 8253 857 3338 434
1974 6283 8031 953 4300 298
1975 4396 9392 1005 4213 272
1976 5979 9106 1052 4711 319
1977 5622 9856 1256 5280 479
SOURCE: United Nations, Food and Agricultural
Organization, Production Yearbook , 1967 to 1977.
Rome
.
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holdings declined from 5120 in 1960 to 2155 in 1969, as the smaller
holdings were consolidated.^
On the other hand, the government had grossly overestimated the
response of the private farmers to the measures instituted under the
Reform and the Social Plan for 1966-1970. The primary purpose of the
government had been to more fully integrate the private farmers into
the market economy, largely through increasing the incentives to and
economic benefits from cooperation with the social sector. The new
incentives were apparently not enough, as not only was the increased
cooperation not achieved, but the number of private cooperators actually
declined in the 1966-1970 period.
^
Overall then, the performance of the agricultural sector had not
perceptibly improved and had even measurably worsened in some respects
in this period. The financial situation of agriculture, for example,
had deteriorated as investment in agriculture over the last half of
the 1960s had virtually stagnated. There were also increasing pro-
duction short-falls in food products as well, with shortages of some
products, such as meat, becoming more frequent in the urban areas
in the late 1960s. The livestock area, in particular, suffered from
poor pricing policies which were cited as the major cause for the
decline of this sector, as the number of cattle actually declined
over the 1966-1970 period and total production reached a 1970 level
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only 9% above that of five years earlier.
A further result of the government's pricing policies was the
affect of food price increases on the rate of inflation which nearly
166
doubled from 5.7% in 1968 to 11.1% in 1970; in the latter year food
prices alone increased by 12% (see Table 18). According to one
report, by the end of the 1960s the rapidly rising food prices were
beginning to have an affect on the nutritional standards of the
populace, as the per capita daily caloric intake virtually stagnated
between 1966-1970. In addition, the consumption of total proteins
had actually declined, led by a fall of 8% in meat consumption in
1968-1970, as the prices of the higher protein foods became prohibi-
e 67tive for many consumers.
Thus, by the end of the decade, the fundamental problems of the
agricultural sector remained unaltered. Weather remained the primary
determinant of yearly production levels of the staple crops which
accounted for the persistence of wide fluctuations in these levels,
necessitating continued food imports, which were to become a growing
drain on the country's balance of payments as world events drove up
the price of food products on the world market.
Agricultural policy 1970 to the present . In the 1970s Yugoslavia's
agricultural sector has drawn increasing attention from the govern-
ment, as the policy failures of the past and world events have made
the economic costs of agriculture's inefficiencies more difficult to
bear. The increased concern with the problems of agriculture has
been reinforced, and progressively influenced, by the changes in
the world's food situation. Under the influence of these develop-
ments, the production of agricultural products, particularly food,
has been seen as an important method of alleviating Yugoslavia's
TABLE 18
FOOD PRICE INCREASES, 1968-1977
Year Increase in Percentage
1968 3.3
1969 7.5
1970 12.0
1971 17.0
1972 19.1
1973 22.0
1974 16.0
1975 24.0
1976 14.1
1977 18.3
SOURCE: OECD, Economic Survey ,
1969 to 1978.
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serious balance of payments problems as their value has drastically
increased on the world market.
By the early 1970s, the failures of agriculture had imposed a
growing financial burden on the country. Between 1970-1973, for
example, the import costs of food and animal products had risen from
6% to 10% of total import costs— in particular, major increases in
wheat and sugar had been necessary to close the gap between produc-
tion and demand (see Table 14). At the same time, the rise is food
prices continued to be a major cause of the higher inflation rate,
with food prices increasing by an average 19% annually over the 1971-
1973 period (see Table 18).
The first major policy response to these developments came in
the Social Plan for 1971-1975. The agricultural policy which it pro-
posed involved a significant cutback in the growth expectations for
agriculture. Overall growth for the sector was now projected at 3.2%
annually (social sector at 5% and the private at 2.8%), which, while
a drastic reduction from the previous Plan, still required an accelera-
tion of the growth in the private sector to a level which it bad not
achieved over the past decade. Although the private sector was to
receive increased attention under the Plan, however, the Plan did
not propose to create any new services or agencies to accomplish
this, leaving as the primary means cooperation with the socialized
farms. In the production related areas, the Plan singled out expan-
sion in the foodstuffs sector, particularly of livestock, as a
priority which now had as its justification both the need to supply
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domestic demand and the need to improve the balance of payments by
reducing imports and increasing export revenues through food exports.
There were problems with the implementation of the Plan's goals
for agriculture, however, as the government encountered similar
problems of coordination at the national level as those of its energy
policies. The planning and implementation of agricultural policy was
also highly decentralized. At the Federal level coordination of
agricultural policies was controlled by the Federal Chamber of the
Economy and the Secretariat of Agriculture, with the latter 's func-
tion being to coordinate the plans, programs, and legislation of the
Republics/Provinces. The "responsibility" for policy implementation
lay with the Republics/Provinces Secretariats of Agriculture, however,
which, due to decentralization of decision-making, was in reality
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alloted out to autonomous self-governing organizations. In fact,
the Secretariats exercised only indirect control through fund dis-
bursements. The situation was aptly characterized by the World
Bank in 1975:
Difficulties of orderly coordination, lack of enterprise
response to overall guidelines, and the non-participation
of the peasant-farmers in the decision-making proce^g are
the major shortcomings of the institutional system.
Because of the failure of the policy of the Social Plan to be
effectively implemented, and the continued problems with production,
a significant reassessment of national agricultural policy was under-
taken in 1973. This was manifested in the passage of an inter-
Republic "Compact for Agricultural Development for 1973-1975". This
new initiative supplanted the policies of the current Social Plan by
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once again retreating on the growth expectations for agriculture and
calling for a more moderate, long-term growth rate of 2.8%. The
two primary tasks of agricultural policy were now to: 1) accelerate
the socialist transformation of agriculture and the countryside by
creating the conditions whereby the socialist sector would exercise
a decisive influence on the market and production levels; and 2) to
further accelerate the overall production expansion in the whole
71
sector
.
The new agreement committed both the Federal government and
the Republics to increased investment in the agricultural sector.
At the Federal level it expanded intervention in the market to levels
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comparable to the early 1960s. A protective minimum price policy
was established at the national level for agricultural products
which were now deemed to be of "nationwide" significance (wheat, milk,
sugarbeet, and oilseeds), and the tariff treatment of agricultural
inputs and products was altered to encourage expansion. At the
Republic/Province level, the compact increased the resources to be
alloted to socialist farms and once again relied upon them as the
primary vehicle for extending aid to the private farmers in the
hopes of modernizing that sector. A primary concern was to increase
the cooperation among private and socialized farmers and thereby
raise the former's comparatively lower rates of labor productivity.
Once again, however, the compact lacked in providing for the imple-
mentation phase of carrying out the policies which it had proposed
and it was, therefore, to have little immediate effect on alleviating
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the problems at which it was directed.
The following two years saw the domestic agricultural and, in
particular, the food situation deteriorate in a number of areas as
the agricultural performance in both the domestic and the export-
related spheres failed to live up to expectations. In the domestic
sphere, for example, the conflicting goals of satisfying both domestic
demand and providing a surplus for export produced periodic shortages
of certain food products. These became more frequent as the differen-
tial between domestic and international market prices progressively
widened in the mid 1970s.
The outstanding example in this area was that of meat produc-
tion, which seemed to be responding more and more to the international
rather than the domestic market. Up to 33% of total meat production
was exported in these years as attractive export prices and the need
to satisfy the demands of the tourist trade took precedence, in many
cases, over meeting the demands of domestic consumers. Government
pricing policies were also cited as a contributing factor, as the
raising of prices to encourage production often led to meat being
priced out of the reach of the average consumer, a situation which
produced a continued stagnation of domestic beef consumption through-
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out the 1971-1975 period.
The poor performance of agriculture caused the government to
take measures to limit exports of some food crops (wheat and rice)
and, off of a very poor production year in 1973 in which output fell
by 2%, saw an increase of food imports costs of 110% in the first
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ten months of 1974 over the comparable period in the previous year.
The government reaction also included continued substantial rises
in the marketed prices of the basic agricultural commodities, which
pushed the increases in food prices to a level of 24% in 1975. 75
By 1975 the persistence of the problems with agriculture had
led to another fundamental revision in the major aspects of the
government's policy. A number of studies of the subject by Yugoslav
economists and agricultural experts generally agreed that the fail-
ures in policy were chiefly to blame for the situation. The diagnoses
of these analyses found, despite all of the recent policy initiatives,
that the relative position of agriculture had not changed over the
1966-1975 period, and had indeed deteriorated in a number of important
respects
.
Over this period, for example, investment in agriculture had re-
mained at an insufficient level and the sector's share of total in-
vestment had declined. The proposed export thrust which was to pro-
vide a large part of the incentive for agricultural expansion had
also failed to occur, with agricultural exports actually falling as
a proportion of total exports from 17.3% in 1965 to only 7.6% in 1975.
Of increasing importance also was the worsening decline in the number
and the quality of the agricultural labor force, which was now affect-
ing the overall productivity of the agricultural sector. Low labor
productivity and poor utilization of agricultural resources were only
the two most obvious symptons of this trend, which had seriously
reduced the utilization of agricultural resources. According to a
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number of these studies, this trend was not due so much to the modern-
ization of certain segments of agriculture but more to the failure of
policy to alter the agricultural structure and improve the economic
situation of the farmer. As one author noted:
The fragmentation of agricultural holdings and the
passing of a major number of such holdings into
ownership of non-farmers is indicative of the rising
tendency to abandon agriculture as a primary occupa-
tion. Such trends are enhanced by unfavorable
tendencies regarding the demographic structure of
the agricultural population, as a result of which
its working potential has diminished and the finan-
cial prospects of agricultural holdings changed.
The continued decline in agricultural land utilization, which had
occurred throughout the 1960s, was further proof of the impact of these
trends on agriculture. From 1971-1975 alone, the total area sown to
crops fell another 17%, with that planted to cereals declining by 6%
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while that under industrial crops and fodder increased by 30% .
Thus, while these factors undercut the ability of agriculture to
respond to the imperatives of the government's policy, its fundamental
problems (production fluctuations, lack of proper water utilization,
imports of wheat and sugar) went unresolved. Not surprisingly,
agriculture was unable to fulfill the duel role of meeting increased
domestic demand and providing a greater surplus for export. As a
result, it was unable to perform either task sufficiently.
The latest major attempt by the government to reinvigorate its
agricultural policy was contained in the "Draft Outline ..." (dis-
cussed above) in 1975, which, while reiterating the now standard ills
of the agricultural sector, tried to give its development new impetus
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by emphasizing its crucial export role. The document recognized that
the past development of what was now termed the "agro-industrial com-
plex" had been unsatisfactory and attributed this failure largely
to the government's inadequate agrarian policies. The poor policies,
and unstable market which was their result, were seen as the chief
reasons why the private agricultural sector had failed to expand as
expected, along with the persistence of extensive cultivation on these
farms and their continued lack of cooperation with the social sector.
It concluded that the current situation, which had been reinforced
by the decline in the labor potential of the agricultural population,
78had been a major cause of the recent overall economic instability.
There was also a more subtle change which underlie the govern-
ment's position on agriculture, for now the domestic situation was
becoming a secondary factor to international ones when it came to
rationalizing the impetus for the new policy; as the Draft expressed
it:
In view of insufficient food production at home and
the food crisis in the world, and bearing in mind
existing comparative advantages, the strategic
importance of food, and its significance for the
stability of the economy as a whole and for the
balance of payments, special attention will be
devoted to the development of the agricultural-
industrial complex in the long-term period.
Although the long-term goal was set as the elimination of "dependence
on food imports and to increase exports of cereals, meat and meat
products, fruits, and vegetables", the statement signalled a decided
shift in emphasis away from the exclusive goal of domestic self-
sufficiency in food as the major dimension of agricultural strategy.
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For example, some of the tradional policy goals, such as self-
sufficiency in wheat production, were now to be abandoned to, in the
words of the Draft, make use of "favorable export-oriented possibili-
ties". Indeed, the food shortages in the world were frequently invoked
as major reasons for the new strategy. Food production was now to be
geared more to trade with developing countries, which had raw material
resources (most importantly oil and natural gas) not available to
Yugoslavia domestically. That food and agricultural products were
now to be produced as much for their strategic significance in the
international market, as well as for their domestic value and their
demand, was made clear by the priorities of the policy; such as in
the emphasis on livestock breeding and on increasing maize production
as the principal focus in accelerating agricultural production. Maize,
for example, had increasingly been used as only a fodder crop in
Yugoslavia, but now on the world market its value as a food crop to
less developed countries had obviously increased.
The policy embodied in the Draft Statement has been followed up
upon more recently in the Social Plan for 1976-1930, which projected
an increased overall growth rate for agriculture of 4% (social sector
at 8% and private at 3.1%). Although this again envisaged the
accelerated growth of both sectors of agriculture, the basic premises
of meeting domestic demand and providing an exportable surplus remained
unchanged
.
Both policy pronouncements, however, like their predecessors
still appear to be long on prescriptions and short on implementation.
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Although both, under the influence of the new emphasis on long-term
planning, called for an "active and successful agrarian policy", the
social sector has remained the focal point of agricultural develop-
ment, and the primary means of implementation of policy has been
left to social compacts at the Republic/Province level and below
—
the same strategy which has not worked in the past.
Meanwhile, the domestic situation goes on relatively unchanged
from that of the past decade, and worse in some important respects.
Rising food prices, which topped 14% and 18% in 1976 and 1977 respec-
tively, are still the most serious food-related problem for consumers.
This inflation in food costs has been affected by a number of govern-
ment measures in pricing policy in 1976-1977, which have considerably
increased prices for some basic foodstuffs which were judged to in
plentiful supply in the domestic market (these included bread, flour,
meat, and edible oils). These measures eliminated subsidies for those
products and increased minimum prices for others as well.
The pricing policies have had some beneficial affects, particu-
larly on industrial crops like sugarbeet, sunflower, and maize which
had record harvests in 1977. But production in food crops was not
nearly as successful. Despite the second highest wheat crop in a
decade in 1976, imports in the amount of 863,000 tons—a level com-
parable to the early 1960s—were required in that year, the highest
amount in a decade. Among other food imports, sugar imports, which
were below 100,000 tons in 1974-1975, jumped to nearly 300,000 tons
1976. Total food and animal product imports again had approached
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8% of import costs in that year while, at the same time, agricultural
o-i
exports failed to increase significantly.
A number of other important goals of agricultural policy have
also not been achieved. Chief among these has been the failure to
make much further progress in the "socialization" of the agricultural
sector in the 1970s. The agricultural area in the socialized sector
increased by only 0.7% in the 1972-1976 period and the total number
of cooperators in livestock and crop production, whose expansion had
been a priority, actually declined by 1,000 in the same period. In
addition, the trend in land utilization away from food-crop growing
also continued, as the area under wheat and maize declined by another
17% between 1971-1977, while that under industrial crops increased
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slightly.
In summary, it appears on the basis of the most recent evidence
that the large part of Yugoslavia's chronic agricultural difficulties
have not been remedied by the government's policy responses in this
area. Most of the problems which have plagued this sector throughout
the postwar period remain unresolved. One would never know this,
however, based on some of the government's most recent assessments
of the situation. The current government strategy appears to be to
emphasize the positive aspects of the situation. A good example
is contained in President Tito's report to the 11th Party Congress
of the LCY in 1978. After citing the generally positive performance
of agriculture in certain areas over the past few years, Tito went
on to declare that: "Today our farmers are able to produce enough
staple food to feed our own population and also to provide considerable
83quantities for export." Such has not been the case in all circum-
stances, however, and Tito's overly optomistic appraisal belied the
persistence of agriculture's problems, problems which had not been
significantly altered by his government's agricultural policies.
Population
Introduction
.
Among the three issues under consideration in this
chapter, the parameters of the population "issue" most clearly reflect
the unique characteristics of the Yugoslav national context. The
major dimensions of Yugoslavia's population situation cannot be under-
stood without reference to the multi-ethnic makup of the country and
its eight constituent regions, for it plays a determinant role as
the basis for the national perspective of the population issue.
It is perhaps best then to begin with what the population issue
does not involve at the national level, and then move to a considera-
tion of the important aspects of the issue as it is subsequently
defined. At the national level, population growth rates and demo-
graphic pressure do not constitute major developmental problems for
the government. The most recently available estimates of Yugoslavia's
population characteristics present a picture of a state which is
demographically quite comparable to the rest of Europe. The popula-
tion of Yugoslavia is approximately 22 million, with a density of
84 persons per square kilometer, and a growth rate which has been at
1% or less over the past decade. The birth rate is estimated to be
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at 18 per 1000; the death rate at 8 per 1000; and the life expectancy
is around 68 years. The only demographic measure which seemingly does
not fit these conditions is the infant mortality rate which, although
it has declined consistently over the past decade, remains at about
36 per 1000, more than twice the average rate for Eruope.
But, as with Brazil, a full understanding of the population
issue cannot be achieved without reference to the wide variabilities
in population characteristics among the regions of Yugoslavia, which
constitute the most distinguishing feature of the national population
picture. These regional variations in Yugoslavia have been given
greater impact by their delineation largely along ethnic lines as
well. Of all the eight regions only one, Bosnia-Hercegcrvdna , is not
dominated by one ethnic group, as the ethnic factor played a -major
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part in the drawing up of most regional boundaries. The concept
of ethnic autonomy and identity is one which has been preserved by
the institutional structure, as noted in the Introduction above,
and is an idea which has grown in popularity in recent years, sig-
nificantly undercutting the hopes of achieving greater Yugoslav
8 6
national identity. Thus, in relation to the variations in popu-
lation characteristics, much of the variations among Republics/
Provinces also constitute demographic differences along ethnic lines.
As will be seen, this has complicated discussion of some population-
related issues at the national level (e.g. control of growth rates
and inter-Republic migration) , by opening them to the charge of being
associated with ethnically motivated goals.
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In addition, the developmental differences among the Republics/
Provinces, manifested through their dissimilarities in history, social
structure, religion, and customs, have also affected the perception
of the population issue at the national level. These differences
have served to undercut the validity of some national population
characteristics and have caused some demographic aspects (e.g. birth
rate and population density) to fluctuate widely in importance among
the regions (see Table 19) . The result has been a difficult context
in which to apply a "national" policy in this area; as one study
concluded
:
Variations in population growth patterns existed in the
different regions and complicated the establishment of
broad government programs designed to influence popula-
tion growth. Regional differences in population densi-
ties, growth rates, and pressure upon land and other
resources have greatly complicated the definition of
desirable population goals and the implementation of
guidelines for the nation as a whole.
Despite the difficulties presented by the regional and ethnic
factors, the Yugoslav government has attempted to carry out a national
policy in the population area. It has, however, been a policy which
has largely confined itself to the less controversial aspects of
this issue: in this case these include infant mortality and abor-
tion rates, and the problems associated with internal and external
migration. Overall, the national population policy has been defined
in a manner which has studiously avoided connection with the poten-
tially incendiary ethnic and nationality issue.
Population policy to 1970 . Prior to 1970, official public discussion
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of the population issue was most often concerned with methods to deal
with the comparatively high infant mortality rate throughout the
country. In the latter part of the 1960s, however, policies in this
area also became concerned with the issue of abortion and its high
incidence in the country. Since that time, much of the policy acti-
vity in this area has been directed at supplanting abortion, which
is the most frequent form of birth control utilized in the country,
with other, less costly, methods of contraception, in the hopes of
making the control of unwanted births a more humane process than at
present
.
Throughout the 1960s the Tito government was always passively
pro-family planning, although it is still possible to find a body of
legislation in health and labor related fields which tends to foster
population increase. Among these are included a system of financial
incentives which provide for free maternity care, compensation for
work time lost during pregnancy, and a family allowance scheme in
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which the rate of compensation increases with each additional child.
These incentives have, however, been outweighed by others which have
exercised both direct and indirect influence on reproductive patterns
and, therefore, kept the population growth rate at 1.1% for the 1950-
1970 period.
The most important of these has been the ready availability of
clinical abortions since the early 1950s. Under the Tito government,
abortion has been legalized since 1952—when it was legalized primarily
for health reasons and to eliminate illegal abortions—and its incidence
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progressively increased to where it was by far the dominant method of
controlling unwanted births in the 1960s. In addition to abortion,
the government's policies which encouraged industrialization and
discouraged extensive agricultural cultivation in these years both
served as dampening affects on population growth. The large scale
rural to urban migration encouraged by industrialization had a signi-
ficant affect in this area, as it drew people to the cities where
value changes and housing shortages, among other factors, discouraged
having large families. At the same time, the agricultural policies
of the government, particularly toward the private sector, undercut
the economic benefits of large rural families— through limitations on
land-holdings—and encouraged a capital intensive type of agricultural
development
.
But although there was no real concern with the population growth
rate in this period, there was a growing interest in encouraging
family planning, which gained support both as an alternative to abor-
tion and, as a part of a wider push for increasing women's rights in
Yugoslavia. The first important support for family planning came in
the early 1960s when the Conference for Social Activity of Women in
Yugoslavia formed a Coordinating Committee for Family Planning. Their
support for family planning was placed in the wider context of a
movement to alter women's position in Yugoslavia and, in their words,
was
:
. . .
aimed at elimination from the sphere of human re-
lations of all factors which, as a heritage of the past,
hampers the development of co-equal relations between
the partners in marriage, or undermine mutual responsi-
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bility for the education and upbringing of children.
The influence of this initial rationale for the concept of family
planning has since been maintained, as all subsequent official dis-
cussions of family planning have emphasized, almost exclusively, its
importance in widening human freedoms and independence, its emanci-
pation of women, and its enhancement of individual responsibility.
The LCY and state agencies involved in the family planning area have
consistently maintained that they oppose the concept of family planning
as an aspect of "population policy", and all such policies are offici-
ally condemned as inhuman, implying an unwarranted state interference
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upon the right of individuals to make a free choice.
While improving the health and social status of women initially
provided much of the rationale for support for family planning, over
the 1960s there was also a growing interest in presenting family
planning as a preferable alternative to abortion as the primary means
of controlling unwanted births in the country.
Both of these reasons played major roles in the growing official
support for family planning, which culminated in the 1960s with the
passage of a resolution on family planning at the 9th Congress of the
LCY in 1969 and, subsequently, a Federal Assembly Resolution on Family
Planning. The Assembly resolution laid emphasis on the concept of
family planning as a basic human right and duty of parents, a right
which now necessitated state intervention if it was to be properly
exercised
:
For this to be feasible, society should make it
possible for married couples to get information about
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modern methods of birth control and provide them with
adequate means to plan families so they can decide how
many children they will have and at what intervals.
But though government intervention was to increase, it was still not
to be construed as support for population control. Rather, family
planning had a multiplicity of benefits for all concerned, none of
which had to do with control of population growth: "Family planning,
as a lasting human and social effort, will bring about very signifi-
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cant social, health, economic, political and other advantages.
It was becoming clearer, however, that aside from these indi-
vidual rights' concerns, which were often couched in glowing gen-
eralized terms, that a more concrete concern with the abortion rate
in Yugoslavia was also equally informing family planning' s popularity.
This could be seen in the latest amendments to the 1952 abortion law
in 1969 which attempted to tighten the conditions under which an abor-
tion took place. The incidence of abortion, which was available
through clinics virtually on demand, had grown to alarming propor-
tions in the late 1960s, constituting a proportion equal to fully 70%
of all live births in the country in 1967. The revisions in the abor-
tion law attempted to combat this high incidence by now requiring that
the patient be made aware of the physical and mental health dangers
involved and, also be encouraged to utilize contraceptive techniques
instead in the future. As the Assembly resolution expressed it:
"... interruption of pregnancy as the least desirable form of birth
control, is only an extreme means which now was to be sup-
94
planted by the preferable alternative of family planning.
186
As part of this move to increase family planning and contraception
practices, by the end of the 1960s the government had initiated a num-
ber of additional measures in this field. Part of the expense of abor-
tions, for example, was now to be borne by the client as a disincentive
to this option, a change in policy precipitated by the realization that
economic costs and wastage of medical expertise on performing abortions
was now reaching unacceptable limits, which should not be shared by
95the society as a whole. At the same time, a new Federal law on
Health Insurance authorized the Republics to extend the availability
of free contraceptives to all such means and citizens; until this
time only the pill was free when prescribed as a medicine and it was
only available to those covered by health insurance-approximately 63%
of the population in 1969.
Despite all of this policy activity at the national level, how-
ever, there were similar problems, as we have seen in the energy and
food areas, with the implementation of these goals. Much of what was
passed at the Federal level, for example, were only guidelines which
were subject to the interpretation of each Republic/Province, and
even each commune. The Federal Resolution on Family Planning, for
instance, only directly applied to the "basic conditions under which
pregnancy may legally be interrupted"; the rest was left to the lower
administrative levels, because, as the Resolution expressed it:
In view of the existing differences in the level of
development of the health service, its activity in
contraception and its accessibility to -marital part-
ners, the general level of health culture, tradition,
prejudices, etc. in individual Republics and Autonomous
Provinces, these matters should be regulated in agree-
ment with relevant social factors in a way which best
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96suits any particular environment.
Party and state commitment to family planning thus was in accordance
with the principles of self-management by autonomous organizations
which, hopefully, would be sensitive to the "guidelines and resolu-
tions" formulated at the national level. The implementation phase
devolved to the local level; once again in the Resolution's terms:
The realization of society's views on family plan-
ning and birth control, as a means of providing the
necessary conditions for the execution of society's
policy in this field, calls for an active role and
certain obligations on the part of the social services,
research institutes, social and^ther organizations,
associations, and institutions.
In large part, the homogenization of the goals of population
policy in this manner dissipated their intended impact. The push to
substitute family planning for abortion as the primary means of con-
traception was not that successful, as many regions encountered
funding problems in implementing the national initiatives. The best
evidence of this came out of the first country-wide survey of family
planning in 1970. The survey found that abortion was still the
most common method of birth control by far, with 45% of married
respondents utilizing this method to only A. 6% who used contracep-
tive devices.
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The successful implementation of this policy clearly
had a long way to go.
Population policy 1971 to the present . In the 1970s the government's
orientation in the population area has shifted, somewhat, toward a
greater concern with the problems that the widespread migration the
society has recently experienced have presented to the future
develop-
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merit of the country. As the general economic conditions throughout the
country have deteriorated over the past few years, there has been a
growing awareness of the need to exercise more direct control over
migration patterns to ameliorate their economic effects. Thus,
recent efforts in the population area have focused on the issue of
internal migration, and national policy has begun to wrestle with the
difficulty presented by the national and ethnic factors to the formu-
lation of an adequate strategy in this area.
While the problem of migration has progressively assumed greater
importance due to economic developments, the government has also main-
tained its interest in the related issues of infant mortality and
family planning throughout the 1970s. The successes in each of these
areas have not met with expectations recently, and they are still
included among the priorities for an effective population policy.
In the area of infant mortality, there has been a significant
reduction in the national rate since 1971, as it has fallen from 49
per 1000 to around 36 per 1000 in 1977. But the overall rate is still
high for Europe, to which Yugoslavia compares itself, and it is
particularly high in some of the underdeveloped regions of the country
(i.e. 80 per 1000 in Kosovo). As such, infant mortality has been
singled out in a recent government study as the single most important
problem of child care in the country and, in the "Draft Outline . .
of 1975, its reduction was seen as a necessity for the future improve-
9.9
ment in the standard of living.
The successes in the spread of family planning practices and the
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reduction in the incidence of abortion have not been as great, however.
A significant step was taken in this area when family planning was
formally institutionalized in the 1974 Constitution. The concept of
planned parenthood was integrated into the sections dealing with
education, information, and health protection, and specific reference
was made to the "rights" of parents to plan the number and timing of
their children—a right which was now theoretically enforceable
before the law.
The central focus on family planning was retained in the most
recent articulation of Yugoslavia's "national" population policy
which followed in the "Draft Outline . . .", in 1975. In this
document the more equitable spread of family planning practices among
all regions of the country was encouraged as the most preferable
method of reducing the growing interregional demographic disparities:
Common policy should strive for a moderate birth
rate which will with time bring about a decrease in
existing demographic, social, and economic irration-
alities, the elimination of discrimination with respect
to child-bearing, and the realization of parents' rights
to decide on the size of the family. Society should
create conditions under which it will be possible to
humanize and rationalize natality, and to make informa-
tion on and means for regulating child-bearing acces-
sible to all its members, regardless of the area in
which they live, aijid^of their social status, education
and other factors.
By the late 1970s, provision of professional family planning
services had also been instituted as a legal aspect of maternity
care as well, and the government had continued to expand the free
availability of contraceptives and contraceptive information. All
of these measures had some effect, with the number of women using
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family planning services increasing by about 72% over the 1968-1976
period. In addition, total expenditures on contraceptives over the
same period increased by about seven times.
But the accomplishments toward displacing abortion as the primary
means of birth control had been minimal, as the incidence of abortion
progressively increased during the 1970s. Most recently, officials
have estimated that approximately 300,000 legal abortions are per-
formed yearly in Yugoslavia and, according to one authoritative
source, the unfavorable consequences for the health of women and the
102great material loss incurred have made it an increasing problem.
Along with the problem of infant mortality and the push for
family planning, the other issue which has drawn increasing govern-
ment attention in the population area has been the worsening economic
consequences which the regional demographic disparities have had on
the developmental chances of the country. As the economic situation
has deteriorated in the 1970s, this issue has become more relevant
as a developmental problem, since the consequences of a higher popu-
lation growth rate in some regions has become more obvious.
The aspect of this problem which the government has chosen to
focus upon, however, has been the least controversial one of migra-
tion, both internal and external, and it has been in this area that
the government has begun to try to exert some control.
External migration to other Eruopean countries for work had
been a popular option of a great number of Yugoslav workers in the
1960s, due to the lack of adequate work opportunities in some areas
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of Yugoslavia and the lure of much higher pay scales in other European
countries. This migration went largely unregulated and by the early
1970s it had begun to reach alarming proportions with, according to
one estimate, 20 Yugoslavs employed abroad for every 100 employed
domestically. Initially, this large migration of persons—which the
government referred to as "temporarily employed abroad"—had signi-
ficant economic benefits for the government, since it kept the
unemployment rate down and provided a major source of foreign exchange
flowing back into the country. According to the OECD, for example,
it was estimated that in 1971 7% of the labor force was employed
abroad with annual earnings estimated at $2.5 billion, as compared
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to a total domestic wage bill in that year of $5 billion.
By the mid 1970s, however, with the worsening economic situa-
tion, the benefits of this huge migration were beginning to be out-
weighed by the economic costs. Because the migration pattern had
been largely unregulated, it had come disproportionately from the
developed regions where growth was being held back to an extent to
foster more rapid growth in the underdeveloped regions. This had
depressed employment opportunities in these regions and, as a con-
sequence, had led to a larger outflow from these areas. When the
government realized this, it had stepped in and tried to encourage
more migration from the economically depressed areas by selectively
disseminating information on foreign employment to these regions.
The government had little success in regulating migration in this
manner, however, and by 1973 the "official" position of Yugoslav
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authorities was that employment abroad had reached the maximum accept-
able levels, and sterner measures were taken to reduce and control
the composition of migrants
.
At the same time that the Yugoslav government had decided to
exercise more influence over migration, the affects of the world
recession were beginning to be felt throughout Europe, a circumstance
which effectively reversed the migration trend, as, most often, the
migrants were the first to be layed off in their host country. These
developments had a devastating affect on the flow of Yugoslav migrants
to Europe. According to one source, in the short span between 1973-
1975, the number of yearly Yugoslav migrants to Europe fell from
100,000 to 15, 000.
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The drastic reduction in emigration in this period has added con-
siderably to the economic problems of the government, as it has had
the double effect of undercutting a crucial source of foreign exchange
and added to the pressures on domestic employment. Unemployment, for
example, has risen steadily in the 1970s, and by 1978 had reached an
unprecedented level of 12%.
The problems attended by the decrease in external migration
have once again, however, exhibited significant internal variabilities;
as unemployment, for example, has become a more pressing problem in
the underdeveloped regions. The affects of the country's economic
difficulties are clearly being felt more harshly in the already
depressed regions of the country.
The most recent strategy which the national government has
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chosen to follow in this area now focuses on formulating a policy
which will control internal migration and, thereby, hopefully amel-
iorate the most serious economic affects of the regional demographic
variabilities. The preference for this strategy, as opposed to one
which would more directly affect population growth rates, is based
upon the findings of a recent study by the Centre for Demographic
Research in Belgrade. This 1975 study projects that the major dis-
parities in fertility rates among the Republics/Provinces will con-
siderably decrease by the year 2000. More importantly, it projects
that pressure on employment will peak in 1985 and then gradually
diminish, with an overall decline in the proportion of the working
age population in the total population.
While the employment pressures on the whole society will decrease,
however, the working age population will continue to increase in the
underdeveloped regions for the foreseeable future. Based on the find-
ings of his study, the author concludes:
Separate projections for the republics/provinces have
been primarily made for purposes of drawing up separate
socio-economic plans for these regions, and because of
the different level of demographic development, which
determ^ges the different tempo of their future develop-
ment .
The projections of the Centre's study thus initially informed
the choice of an internal migration policy as the best means to cope
with the continued employment problems of the underdeveloped regions.
The support for this policy at the national level was most clearly
articulated in the "Draft Outline . . ."in 1975, when a migration
policy was proposed as the primary -means which would be utilized to
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eliminate regional economic and demographic differences
:
Our self
-management socialist society should devote
special attention to internal population migration
because it will continue to play an important role
in the elimination of regional differences. Social
guidance of internal migration based on agreements
should be a significant component of common policy.
The obstacles to the implementation of such a policy are, under-
standably, quite substantial. Among them is the fact that internal
migration in Yugoslavia has, thus far, been largely an intra-Republic
phenomena which has involved movement from rural to urban areas, not
from one Republic to another."1"10 The ethnic and nationality factors
have clearly been the determinant factors in the lack of inter-
Republic migration, and any policy which attempts to control or
encourage population movements as an aspect of development policy
in Yugoslavia will have to overcome their restrictive affects.
Once again, the success of such a policy will depend on a much
greater degree of cooperation among the Republics and Provinces than
has as yet occurred— a persistent problem which has plagued the
implementation phase of all of the policy areas which have been dis-
. .
Ill
cussed in this chapter.
In summary, the population situation of Yugoslavia, while most
closely akin nationally to that of an advanced industrialized state,
remains dominated by factors which a global or even cursory national
level could not give proper value. Despite a relatively low popu-
lation growth rate over the past three decades, these factors of
ethnicity and regional variation have given an immediacy to the
population issue in Yugoslavia which, from the global level, might
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not be apparent.
CHAPTER V
THE "ISSUES" OF ENERGY, POPULATION, AND FOOD
IN THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
Of the four political systems under consideration in this study,
the United States exhibits the lowest degree of centralization in its
policy-making apparatus. Although formal "national" policy-making
power officially resides in the Congress, the formulation of federal
policy usually consists of an amalgam of Executive initiatives, interest
group pressure, Congressional acts, and the administrative policies of
the involved federal bureaucracies, while its successful implementation
invloves the participation of a number of different levels of govern-
ment and private organizations. The structural constraints imposed by
this multiplicity of actors in the policy-making process often pre-
cludes the formation of an effective national policy. In many areas,
including those under consideration in this chapter, federal policy is
distinguished by its less than compulsory character, with its effect-
iveness depending instead on the voluntary participation of the lower
levels of government and private organizations at which it is directed.
Consequently, much of what is labeled federal or "national"
policy in this chapter serves primarily a directive function, by
establishing the parameters under which other levels of government and
private organizations and individuals are allowed to function,
196
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thereupon relying upon their induced participation to carry out the
implementation of the policy and its goals. In this context, at the
federal level the creation of a new bureaucratic organization, such as
the Federal Energy Office or the Center for Population Research, is
often the clearest signal that an "issue" has been recognized as
having national significance. The institution of a federal role then,
more often than not largely involves the initiation of a financial
commitment and the creation of inducements for the involved lower
governmental levels and private organizations to activate the policy.
While the U.S. government's role in different policy areas may fluctu-
ate considerably, in the three areas under consideration here federal
government activities primarily follow this approach (see the discus-
sions of energy and food policy in particular)."'"
During the period under consideration in this chapter, the
economic situation has exercised a determinant influence over the level
of government activity in the energy, population, and food areas.
Throughout this period the fundamental developmental priorities which
have informed government policy have been the maintenance of economic
stability and the continuation of economic growth at a satisfactory
pace. The increasingly precarious economic situation, manifested by
the world decline of the dollar, the growing trade deficits, and the
persistance of a corrosive inflation rate, has exerted an important
affect on the shifts in government policy in these areas. The level of
federal government commitment in the food and population areas, for
example, has varied considerably in recent years as inflation has
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assumed a growing precedence. At the same time, the energy issue has
achieved a greater prominance as, among the three issues, it has been
perceived to be the most serious and direct threat to the maintenance
of economic stability.
The following sections will present an overview of the energy,
food, and population situations in the United States and will review
the important developments which have occurred in these areas over
roughly the past decade. This account will provide the essential
background for an analysis of the present state of the U.S. government's
policies in these areas and of the major factors which have influenced
their formulation. The primary purpose is to characterize the
government's perception of these issues by drawing upon the policy
responses as the primary representation of the government's understand-
ing and treatment of these issues.
Energy
Introduction . The energy issue has been, along with inflation, the
dominant domestic issue in the United States during the 1970s. There
have been perhaps more "major" addresses directed at this issue
—
Carter alone has now given five—than at any other over the past
decade, as a procession of Administrations has wrestled with an issue
which has proved to be exceedingly difficult to confront. Given its
position as the world's largest consumer of energy, it is not surpris-
ing that the recent alterations in the world's energy distribution and
market system have had a substantial impact on the United States.
199
Indeed, it is a measure of both the United States' energy dependence
and its inability to alter the situation that in 1978 the U.S., with
6% of the world's population, still consumed roughly one-third of the
world's energy—a figure not substantially different from that of 1973
when the impact of the world energy "crisis" was initially felt.
Growth in energy consumption has historically played a crucial
role in stimulating the economic growth of the U.S., and the importance
of energy
—
particularly of cheap and abundant oil—has increased over
the past quarter century. As a major study by the Ford Foundation has
pointed out, during the 1870-1950 period Gross National Product (GNP)
per capita rose sixfold while energy use per capita doubled; but since
1950 energy per capita growth has actually exceeded per capita growth
in production, with energy consumption growing at a 4.5% rate during
21965-1973 alone. The increasing energy intensity of the U.S. economy
has fueled the widespread belief that these increasing levels of energy
consumption were necessary for a healthy growing economy. Tnis is a
position which has now come under serious challenge, but, as will be
seen, this belief has been the foundation for much of the government's
energy policies, which have primarily been concerned with securing a
3
stable and sufficient supply of energy for continued economic growth.
Moreover, this accelerated energy consumption has been charac-
terized by a shift away from the energy source which the U.S. has in
the greatest abundance (coal), toward increased utilization of fuels
which are of much more limited supply (oil and natural gas). For
example, between 1950-1977 oil and gas' share of total energy
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consumption increased from 58% to 77%, while coal's share declined
from 50% in 1945 to about 18% in 1977. The demand for oil in particu-
lar has grown dramatically, increasing at an annual rate of 4.4%
between the end of World War II and 1972, with total consumption
nearly tripling between 1960-1972 alone.
More importantly, this accelerated increase in demand occurred
at the same time that domestic production of these two energy
resources was reaching its upper limits and beginning to fall off
significantly
.
~* The natural gas situation was the worst, as discovered
reserves of gas peaked in 1967 and then fell off precipitously into the
1970s. In fact, it was the inability to meet growing demand for
natural gas which contributed to the increased demand for the next
best substitute, oil— a demand which was increasingly met by imports in
the early 1970s as domestic production proved unable to meet domestic
requirements. Thus, on the eve of the Arab oil embargo, which was to
be the country's first serious brush with the energy "crisis", the
U.S.'s energy demand pattern was already placing growing pressure on
those two sources of energy which it was becoming least able to supply
in sufficient quantities.
In the face of these developments in energy demand patterns, the
importance of the U.S.'s domestic energy resources has understandably
grown. Under the closer scrutiny which has accompanied out greater
energy awareness, however, the country's energy resources have been
found to have serious limitations as, over the last decade, they have
become increasingly unsuitable for meeting the country's critical
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energy needs.
For example, according to most estimates the U.S. has approxi-
mately 28% of the world's coal resources, which constitute fully 90%
of the country's total energy resources. Recoverable reserves are
conservatively estimated at A50 billion tons under existing recovery
methods. There are, however, major constraints to coal's expanded use,
including its suitability as a substitute for oil and natural gas, the
environmental hazards entailed in its mining and usage, and transporta-
9tion costs and obstacles. All of these factors have combined to
discourage any serious expansion in coal usage since 1973, when, in
response to the oil embargo, the greater exploitation of coal resources
was first encouraged.
While the abundance of coal resources is well known and accepted,
the most recent estimates of the extent of the U.S.'s oil and gas
resources have been the subject of much dispute. The estimates of thes
resources have fluctuated drastically since the early 1970s when
increased attention was focused on the methods by which such estimates
were computed . As a result, in general the estimates of the U.S.'s
total oil and gas reserves have declined since 1970, when totals includ
ed much more optimistic appraisals of unexplored areas such as the
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The estimates of "proved reserves"
of oil and natural gas—defined as amounts reasonably certain of being
recovered from known resevoirs—which are the most dependable measure,
have progressively declined in the 1970s, with oil at 27.8 billion
barrels at the end of 1978, and natural gas at 209 trillion cubic feet
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at the end of 1977. 11 Based on recent discovery trends, and barring
major technological breakthroughs in oil shale recovery and geopres-
surized gas recovery, the outlook is bleak if current rates of consump-
tion are maintained, for current domestic reserves of oil and gas would
be exhausted by around 2010 according to the Department of Energy. 12
The country's other two major energy resources are hydropower
and nuclear power. Hydrosources
,
however, are not abundant and it has
been estimated that the U.S. has already exploited over one half of the
existing hydropower potential, with few, if any, large-scale potential
sites remaining to be exploited. Hydropower' s share of total electric-
ity generation has declined during the 1970s and in 1977 was the source
13
of 10.4% of electricity generated.
The country's nuclear resources are, on the other hand, quite
abundant and appear sufficient to provide adequate fuel resources for
expansion of nuclear power plants and generation facilities for the
foreseeable future. But while fuel resources have not yet been a
problem for the nuclear industry, its expansion has been limited in the
1970s by inadequate growth in electrical demand, increased costs in
plant construction and electrical generation, and by increasing ques-
tions concerning safety of plant operation and nuclear waste disposal.
Even before these latter factors were dramatized by the Three Mile
Island episode the nuclear industry was experiencing serious economic
difficulties. The growth in electricity demand, which had averaged 7%
annually over the previous decade, was virtually halted in 1973 by the
afteraffects of the oil embargo, and over the 1974-1976 period
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electricity demand stagnated. As a consequence, the demand for new
nuclear plants fell, as utilities cancelled plans for 23 reactors and
deferred plans. for building another 143 reactors in the three year
period. Even when electricity demand rebounded, growing at an average
annual rate of 5.3% in 1976-1977, it did not turn the nuclear decline
around. In these two years eight more reactors were cancelled and plans
deferred for 50 more; since 1975 new orders have totaled only 13. The
increased costs of building nuclear plants were cited by the utilities
as the primary reason for their inability to follow through on construc-
tion plans in this period, a factor which will clearly become more
crucial as safety concerns continue to add to plant construction costs
and, thereby, undermine one of nuclear' s primary economic attractions
14
in the past, its comparative costs.
Energy policy prior to the embargo . Prior to the 1970s there was little
official concern with the need for any kind of comprehensive energy
policy. Although there had been instances of energy-related difficul-
ties in the electricity sector in the mid 1960s, such as the increased
frequency of brownouts and the great Northeast blackout, little official
action had resulted. These temporary shortages in supply were being
caused by an annual increase in electricity demand of 7% a year which,
it was expected, would eventually be satisfied by the rapid expansion
of nuclear generation, an area which the government had heavily subsi-
dized since the inception of nuclear power during World War II.
National energy policy, if one could call it that, emanated from a
variety of federal sources at this time, including the Departments of
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Interior, Treasury, State, Defense, Commerce, and, from another group
of agencies such as the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Power
Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Taken together,
policies at the federal level essentially combined to stimulate both
energy usage and, secondarily, the continued expansion of supply,
utilizing manipulation of the pricing mechanism and tax incentives as
the primary means to achieve these ends."'""'
In the early 1970s, however, the United States' domestic energy
situation began to deteriorate as the limits of domestic energy pro-
duction began to be reached, while energy demand continued its upward
path. Total U.S. energy demand increased 4% annually between 1970-
1973, with oil and natural gas providing roughly 75% of primary energy
needs by 1973. In this same period, domestic production of oil peaked
in 1970 and then declined, while, in 1972, production of natural gas
peaked as well. In order to fill the void left by this fall-off,
imports of oil grew at about a 21% annual rate during 1970-1973,
rising from filling 23% of demand to 36% by 1973 (see Table 20).
In addition, the prospects for a future decrease in the role of
imports was less than optimistic. A study by the National Petroleum
Council in 1971 projected that demand for crude petroleum would nearly
double in the 1970-1985 period, and to meet this demand, because of
poor domestic prospects, it would require a quadrupling of oil imports
by 1985 to an equivalent of 57% of total demand.
16
In the early 1970s, the government's response to changes in the
energy situation was aimed exclusively at maintaining a sufficient
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supply of energy to meet the growing demand. The central tool
employed by the government at this time in dealing with the deteriora-
ting domestic oil situation was the Mandatory Oil Import Program
(MOIP). The MOIP had originally been established in 1959, purportedly
for national security reasons, to control the flow of cheaper oil
imports into the United States and preserve the domestic market for the
American oil industry."^ Under the pressure of the growing gap between
domestic supply and demand, the MOIP's purpose was altered from that of
preserving the domestic oil industry to that of assuring sufficient oil
imports to satisfy demand, and stimulate domestic refinery expansion
and construction. In the early 1970s the MOIP import quotas were
adjusted upward a number of times by Executive Orders which ultimately
allowed the volume of oil imports to increase by over 50% in the 1970-
18
1973 period.
In addition, the government employed a number of other measures
which attempted to manipulate oil prices as a primary incentive for
increasing domestic production. Chief among these was the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970 and Nixon's four phase price control program
which was instituted in 1971. Under these programs the government
began to differentiate between "old" oil, or oil which was under price
controls, and "new" oil, or oil which was not to be under price controls.
By instituting a two-tier price system it was hoped that energy prices
would be kept down to reasonable levels while, at the same time, there
would be sufficient price incentives for new production to occur.
In the electrical energy area, the government had clearly
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indicated that expansion of the country's nuclear capacity was the
preferred route to meeting increased demand. In a June 1971 energy
message to Congress, Nixon had declared the administration's priori-
ties in this area:
A sufficient supply of clean energy is essential
if we are to sustain healthy economic growth and
improve the quality of our national life. Our best
hope today for meeting the nation's growing demand
for economical c^gan energy lies with the fast
breeder reactor.
Indeed, in the early seventies, the development of nuclear power was
the one energy-related area which was being pursued with substantial
federal funding, with fully 85% of all federal energy research and
21development funds being allocated to the nuclear area in 1973."
These piecemeal responses by the government to the deterioration
in the domestic energy situation proved to be inadequate however, and
by early 1973 the government was forced to take more drastic action.
After some areas of the country experienced fuel oil shortages in the
Winter of 1972-1973, the President announced that some major new
initiatives would be implemented to improve the declining oil and
natural gas situation. The most important of these was the termina-
tion of the MOIP and its replacement by a license-fee system which
removed all existing tariffs and quantity restrictions on oil imports,
a move which would lead to unrestricted imports by 1980. In addition,
a National Energy Office was created to coordinate the response to what
had now, according to Nixon, become an energy "challenge". This
response was to be almost exclusively directed at increasing energy
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supplies, a task which, in the President's words, the country was quite
capable of meeting, for ".
. . long before our present energy sources
are exhausted ,. America ' s vast capabilities in research and development
can provide us with new, clean, and virtually unlimited sources of
22power.
Essentially, the strategy of the Nixon administration was to rely
on increased imports to prevent shortages in the short-terra, while it
was hoped that in the long-term domestic production would recoup
through government initiatives to step up exploration and development.
It was, as future events would indicate, a particularly inopportune
time to increase the U.S.'s reliance on imports and, at its base, vastly
overestimated the country's ability to meet its own critical energy
needs
.
Energy policy 1973-1976: the response to the embargo . The serious
inadequacies of the nation's energy policies were clearly revealed in
late 1973, when a number of Arab countries placed an embargo on oil
exports to the United States and other Western countries for their
support of Israel in the Middle East. This cutoff of what was, at the
time, a relatively minor supply of oil changed the energy "challenge"
to the energy "crisis", and provoked a response from the government
which was noteworthy for illustrating just how little the government
23
knew about the country's total energy situation at the time.
The immediate effects of the Arab countries' actions was a short-
fall in oil supplies in the United States and a rapid escalation in the
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world price of oil— from $3.00 per barrel in October 1973 to $11.65
per barrel by January of 1974. In response, the government precipi-
tously proposed Project Independence, a program unveiled by Nixon in
a November 1973 national address when he declared: "Let us set as our
national goal
. . .
that by the end of this decade we will have
developed the potential to meet our own energy needs without depend-
24Ing on any foreign sources." The program set the goal of complete
energy independence by 1980, a goal which was the product of an almost
fanciful optimism concerning the energy situation; a position perhaps
best exemplified by then Federal Energy Administrator William Simon
when he said:
The energy problem, as far as the United States is
concerned, is the most infinitely soluble problem in
our country today. We have been blessed with a super-
abundance of natural resouces and technology. We
have the ability to become self-sufficient. We are
today domestically 85 percent self-sufficient in
energy— that other 15 percent is going to tje achieved
over the next decade to decade and a half.
The aura of possible energy independence in the near future
quickly faded, however, and by early 1974 in his statements Nixon had
reduced the goal to ". . .a point where we are no longer dependent to
any significant extent upon potentially insecure foreign supplies of
26
energy." By late 1974, when the Federal Energy Administration
released its Project Independence Report—containing the most compre-
hensive government appraisal of the domestic energy situation ever
compiled— the goal of "independence" had been effectively revised to
27
"allowing a safe level of imports" by 1985. Even then, however, the
mo re limited goals required a massive increase in production of
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domestic energy supplies over the remainder of the decade. In its
major recommendations the Report called for a tripling of coal
production by 1985, an increase in domestic oil production of 28% by
1980, an increase of 32% in natural gas production by 1980, and a
quadrupling of the number of nuclear power plants to 200 by 1985. 2 ^
In addition to the proposal of the Project Independence program,
the Nixon administration also requested a number of other measures to
be enacted by Congress during 1973-1974. The administration received
very little of what it requested, however, as there was serious disagree-
ment between the administration and Congress as to the proper type of
response warranted by the energy situation. The two most important
measures enacted in this period were the Alaskan Pipeline bill and the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, both of which were sent to the
President within three weeks of the imposition of the oil embargo. As
with past measures, both acts were directed primarily at increasing the
supply of domestic oil; the former by facilitating rapid construction
of the Alaskan Pipeline, and the latter by allowing domestic oil prices
to increase and expanding the amount of oil which was not subject to
i
29
price controls.
These were the only major measures to be enacted, however, as with
the end of the embargo the sense of crisis vanished. In 1973, for
example, the only additional Congressional response was the passage of
two minor conservation measures which established a 55 mile per hour
speed limit and initiated year round daylight savings time- In 1974,
less was actually accomplished. The primary achievement was the creation
211
of the Federal Energy Administration, whose function was to manage
federal efforts to cope with fuel shortages, and an Energy Research and
Development Administration, which was to centralize the government's
research and development efforts that had been scattered among a number
of government departments.
The decline in concern over energy shortages was reinforced by
an overall decline in U.S. energy demands following the oil embargo.
Total energy consumption declined slightly in both 1974 and 1975, led
by the falloff in electricity demand which fell nearly 7% to a near
zero growth rate in 1974-1975. Domestic demand for oil fell by 4% in
1974 and another 2% in 1975 as well, reducing much of the pressure for
30the acceleration of domestic production.
The falloff in demand was outdistanced by the continued decline
in domestic production, however, as it fell by 8% between 1973-1975
(see Table 20). Consequently, while the volume of imports also fell
off in this period, they continued to constitute an ever-increasing
proportion of total domestic demand, reaching the 38% level by 1975.
The continued prominance of imports, which were now subject to fairly
regular costs increases by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), shifted the focus of government concern in the energy
area to the rising energy costs. After the shock of the initial mas-
sive increases in world oil prices at the time of the embargo, energy
prices as a whole continued to rise at a 6.2% annual rate from 1973
to 1976. Overall, the costs of oil imports to the U.S. jumped from
$7.7 billion to $25 billion between 1973-1975, and became a serious
212
drain on the country's balance of payments. According to one adminis-
tration source, fully half of the 12.2% increase in the Consumer Price
Index for 1974 was attributable to the increase in energy costs.
^
But despite this growing concern with rising energy prices, the
energy policy of the Ford administration in late 1974 and 1975 basically
remained the same as that of the Nixon administration. Ford supported
the goals of Project Independence and increasingly called for the de-
regulation of oil and natural gas prices as the best means to accomplish
the goals of the program. His program, like Nixon's, essentially relied
on the voluntary cooperation of the oil industry and consumers to
achieve the primary goals of increased domestic production and reduced
consumption. One source has neatly summarized the approach of the Ford
administration at this time in commenting on the position of William
Simon, a chief energy official:
Simon has repeatedly indicated his belief in the
willingness of consumers to substantially, and
voluntarily, reduce energy use. The administra-
tion would rely equally on American business,
industry, and science to come up with the energy
resources needed for self-sufficiency.
Congress, however, refused to adopt the "conservation-by-price"
approach of the administration, as well as its proposals for the de-
regulation of all domestic oil. Instead, in the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975 it chose to retain the complex price control
system over domestic oil for another four years and established a
number of programs which would increase energy conservation.- In its
major provisions, the Act effectively extended price controls over all
domestically produced oil by establishing a "composite" ceiling price,
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which was the average price of a barrel of "old" and a barrel of "new"
33
oil. The immediate impact of the bill was an 11% reduction in the
composite price of domestic oil. The reasoning, according to the
provisions of the bill was to ". . . provide for a level of domestic
oil prices which would both encourage production and not impede economic
..34 Trecovery. It was a contradictory purpose which proved quite incapa-
ble of being achieved in the ensuing years.
In its other major aspects the Act established the authority for
a strategic petroleum reserve of one billion barrels and, in the conser-
vation area, it set future fuel economy standards for automobiles,
allowed the Federal Energy Administration to order major power plants to
switch to using coal in place of oil or natural gas, and issued general
calls for conservation in other areas.
Upon signing the Act in December of 1975 Ford declared that "This
legislation. . . puts into place the first elements of a comprehensive
national energy policy." His general dissatisfaction with its failure
to decontrol either oil or natural gas prices was indicated a little
over a month later, however, in another energy message to Congress
which reiterated the primary goal of energy independence: "We must
regain our energy independence. . . during the past year we have made
some progress toward achieving our energy independence goals, but the
35
fact remains that we have a long way to go." Ford then went on to
ask Congress to act on 16 energy proposals, the most important of
which called for the de-regulation of natural gas, increased produc-
tion from Naval Petroleum Reserves, and acceleration of plans to build
a pipeline for natural gas transportation from Alaska to the lower
forty-eight states.
By the end of the year, however, Congress had acted on only four
of the proposals. As in the past, these were aimed primarily at
increasing the domestic production of energy by allowing greater
production from Naval Reserves, facilitating the decision-making
process on Alaskan gasline construction, and creating incentives to
spur coal production on federal lands where only 3% of production
occurred in 1974.
In the wake of Congressional ambivalence on energy issues, in 1976
administrative decisions made by the Federal Energy Administration and
the Federal Power Commission proved to have the most direct impact on
the energy situation. Under its authority the Energy Administration
was able to take a number of "energy actions" which would take effect
if neither the House or the Senate disapproved. Thus, by administra-
tive decisions, the Ford administration was able to exempt more than
half of the products of a barrel of crude oil— in this case residual
fuel and middle distillate oil— from price controls during 1976.
Also, in the natural gas area, the Federal Power Commission took
actions in July which increased the nationwide ceiling price of new
interstate gas, a move which would effectively triple its price over
37
the following year. Without the active participation of Congress
then, the administration had been able to at least partially imple-
ment its de-regulation strategy. As Ford's tenure in office came to a
close, however, it remained to be seen whether the price-incentive
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approach would prove successful in both increasing domestic energy
supplies and reducing consumption, as had been widely suggested.
By the end of 1976, nearly three years after the energy "crisis"
had initially impacted on the United States, the state of the energy
situation was more precarious than ever. The Energy Policy and Con-
servation Act stood as the only comprehensive attempt to deal with the
energy problem; otherwise, the responses had been sporadic reactions
to the press of events. Indeed, in retrospect, the formulation, imple-
mentation, and purpose of what constituted energy policy in these years
had been an extremely disorganized affair which sought contradictory
goals and of times produced the opposite of what was intended. As an
increasing number of analyses of energy policy in this period pointed
out, where independence had been the goal, greater dependence had
resulted; where increased domestic production had been the goal,
declining production had been the outcome; and where decreased consump-
38
tion had been the goal, continued increases had been the result.
A quick glance at the U.S.'s energy situation in 1976 clearly
reveals how inadequate the policy response had been in almost all
respects. As noted above, domestic oil and natural gas production
progressively declined in the 1973-1976 period, with domestic oil
production reaching a ten year low in 1976. Consequently, the role of
imports in meeting total demand had proportionately Increased to 43%
by 1976, while the cost of these imports had more than quadrupled to
$31.4 billion. In addition, the dependence on Arab oil imports in this
period increased as the percentage of imports from these countries more
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than doubled to 36% by 1976. At the same time, the existing incentives
to increase domestic exploration and exploitation of oil and natural
gas proved inadequate as well, for, despite increased drilling, the
proved reserves of the country continued to decline. 39
Finally, the move to encourage greater utilization of alterna-
tives to oil and natural gas had been less than successful. Over the
three years following the embargo, the energy profile of the country
had not changed significantly. Coal usage, which had been the focus
of the switch from oil, grew only marginally from 17.8% to 18.3% of
total energy consumption, while the proportion of oil was nearly the
same at 47%. The only significant decline was in the usage of natural
gas, which fell 5% to 25% of total consumption, largely due to its
shortage in supply.
Energy policy: 1977 to the present . Over the last three years
official interest in the energy issue has fluctuated considerably,
depending largely on the state of the energy situation at any particu-
lar moment—as in the past, the more critical the immediate situation,
the more likely it has been that some type of official response would
be forthcoming. Consequently, the government has continued to move
haltingly, and almost imperceptibly, towards a more organized approach
to the energy situation. Most of the efforts of the President and
Congress has been expended in voicing largely divergent interpretations
of the character of the energy crisis and the best manner to- deal with
it. The result has been the perpetuation of a crisis-oriented, piece-
meal approach to the issue, which has produced an amalgam of energy
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related acts addressing very specific aspects of the issue. The
comprehensive energy policy which has been persistently called for
since the 1973 embargo still remains to be implemented, as once again,
in July of 1979, in the face of a new round of gasoline shortages and
massive oil price increases, President Carter presented the fifth major
energy address of his term to the country.
This flurry of inactivity has taken place in the context of a
domestic energy situation which has significantly worsened in the past
three years, as energy demands resumed their upward trends amidst a
continued fall-off in energy supplies and an increased dependence on
energy imports. Again, it was the oil situation in which the country's
energy difficulties were most manifest. Although domestic oil produc-
tion recouped from its 1976 low and by 1978 had achieved its highest
level since 1973—due largely to the coming on line of Alaskan produc-
tion— it was still not sufficient to satisfy the resurgent demand,
which renewed the necessity for increased imports after a recent period
of decline.
In 1977, for example, domestic oil production rose only 1%,
while the volume of imports soared by over 20%. This was followed in
1978 by the admittedly temporary surge in domestic production of 6%,
due to Alaskan production, which saw imports actually decline by about
7%. Once again, however, the prospects for 1979, according to some
forecasts, are for a 6.5% increase in imports, while domestic produc-
tion is expected to grow by less than one-half of one percent—total
demand for all liquid petroleum products is expected to rise by about
218
2.4%. If these forecasts prove correct, and based on current indica-
tions they would appear to be, oil imports will reach a record level of
about 47% of total demand during 1979.
^
3
Clearly, the most crucial aspect of the increasing dependence on
oil imports has been the economic costs which have rapidly escalated
in recent years. Oil import costs reached a record level of $41 billion
in 1977 and, after a slight decline in 1978, are expected to reach
$50 billion in 1979. They have been the primary cause of the massive
trade deficits which the U.S. has incurred in the past two years and
a leading contributor to the inflation rate, which has increased over
the past three years and, once again, is expected to exceed the double-
digit level in 1979 (see Table 21).
To make matters worse, these recent developments in energy demand
growth and import dependence have occurred in the context of a contin-
ued deterioration in the domestic energy resource picture. In the
past three years the U.S.'s proved crude oil reserves have continued
their eight year decline, falling by 4.7% in 1977 and 6% in 1978, to
a level of 27.8 billion barrels at the end of 1978, fully 25% below
their 1973 level. Natural gas reserves have likewise followed a
similar trend, falling to 209 trillion cubic feet by the end of 1977,
a 21% decline from their 1973 level. Moreover, these declines have
occurred despite a 70% increase in exploratory drilling since 1973;
a fact which has raised considerable doubt about the ultimate extent of
44
the U.S.'s remaining reserves of these two energy resources.
In the wake of these developments in the country's energy situa-
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tion, the current administration has continued to rely primarily on
manipulation of energy prices as its chief method to deal with energy
shortages, and achieve the dual goals of cutting consumption and
expanding supply. While initially it appeared that, under President
Carter, the government would try to rely more on conservation and cuts
in consumption to achieve its energy goals than had past administra-
tions, its most important measures have ultimately relied on increased
energy costs as a major determinant of their success.
Carter's first attempt to deal with the energy situation came
shortly after his inauguration when, in April of 1977, he sent his
first major energy address to Congress. He clearly indicated that he
viewed this issue with the highest priority when, in referring to the
energy problem, he declared that: "With the exception of preventing
war, this is the greatest challenge our country will face during our
45lifetimes." Carter then proceeded to outline a comprehensive energy
program which had two basic objectives: 1) to reduce the annual growth
rate of U.S. energy consumption from the current 4-5% to 2% by 1985,
primarily by reducing petroleum consumption 10% form current levels;
and 2) to encourage development of alternative energy resources to
reduce oil imports to 6 million barrels per day by 1985—the 1976 level
was 7 million barrels per day. The success of the program relied on
engineering an extensive shift from oil to coal and, to a lesser
extent, to other energy resources. Although the measure was a signifi-
cant departure from past administrations in emphasizing the role which
conservation of resources could play, it employed similar tactics by
221
relying largely on tax measures to raise energy prices and create the
incentive for decreases in consumption. 46
The Congressional response to the Carter plan was less than
enthusiastic, however, and it failed to act on the plan during 1977.
The only energy-related measures which did gain passage through
Congress in this year were the Emergency Natural Gas Act, which was a
response to a serious gas shortage in some parts of the country during
the Winter, and a bill which established a cabinet level Department of
Energy, thereby abolishing the Federal Energy Administration, the
Federal Power Commission, and the Energy Research and Development
Agency. The act centralized energy powers which had been housed in
five other agencies in one Department, a considerable achievement
given the failure of past efforts to accomplish this task, but it left
pricing decisions on oil, natural gas, and electricity up to the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and independent body which was
within DOE but whose members were subject to Senate approval. This
was a major disappointment for the Carter administration, which had
hoped to be able to exert more direct control over pricing decisions
than this independent commission would allow.
It was not until October of 1978 that Congress finally completed
action on Carter's 1977 energy program, and it produced an energy
bill which was drastically different from that which Carter had origi-
nally proposed. But although his proposals had been considerably
watered down
—
particularly most of their compulsory aspects—in signing
it into law Carter said: "We have declared to ourselves and the world
222
our intent to control our use of energy and thereby to control our
LP,
own destiny as a nation.
In its essential aspects, however, the bill appeared to be much
less. The bill contained major provisions on natural gas, which would
allow the price of newly discovered gas to rise 10% annually until
19S5, when all price controls would be lifted; on coal conversion,
which required new industrial and utility plants to use coal or an
alternative to oil or natural gas, while existing plants using oil or
gas would have to switch to other fuels by 1990; on utility rates, it
only required state utility agencies to consider energy-saving methods
of rate setting; on conservation, it required utilities to provide
consumers with energy conservation information; and on tax credits,
which would be given to homeowners and businesses for installing energy
49
saving devices in their establishments. Thus, much of the effective-
ness of the bill depended more on voluntary compliance than on compul-
sion— a compliance which, once again, was to be induced primarily by
financial incentives.
More importantly, the bill really said nothing of consequence
about oil or gasoline, whose recent accelerated consumption had led the
upsurge in energy demand, thus it promised to have little affect on
how the country produced and consumed increasing amounts of energy.
In addition, after only a few months it was clear that the bill's
major provisions concerning the de-regulation of natural gas was not
having the desired effect of increasing the incentives for expanded
exploration and production. Drilling for oil and natural gas
223
actually fell off 15% from the previous year's level in the first five
months after the bill's passage and approached a two year low. 50 At
the same time, by February of 1979, five states had challenged the
constitutionality of the federal government's expanded price control
powers under the Energy Act, a move which will indefinitely delay
its implementation and, ultimately, undercut the timely achievement of
i 51its goals.
The inadequacy of the government's responses to the energy issue
and the continued precariousness of the country's energy situation was
clearly illustrated by events in early 1979, when a cutoff of oil from
Iran and another round of OPEC price increases brought the U.S. to the
brink of crisis once again. The combined effects of the Iranian oil
shutdown—which represented 5% of U.S. supplies—and the OPEC price
increases of about 45% over the first three months of 1979 produced a
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situation which was at once compared to the oil embargo of 1973.
According to Energy Secretary Schlesinger, for example, these develop-
ments represented a situation "prospectively more serious than the
Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974", while a study by the Department of the
Treasury referred to these events as "a threat to national security
,,53
greater now than at any time in the past."
As in the past, the atmosphere of impending crisis produced an
immediate reaction. Carter's response represented another major energy
address to the nation in April in which he now labeled petroleum as the
fundamental cause of the energy crisis—a crisis which was, he suggested
as real today as it was two years ago. In his message Carter announced
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two major new energy proposals which focused on improving the domestic
oil situation, one of which was essentially administrative and another
which involved the cooperation of Congress. The first involved a
reversal of his position on the decontrol of domestic oil prices,
which would now undergo a phased decontrol, because, according to
Carter: "Federal government price controls now hold down our own
production and encourage waste and increasing dependence on foreign
M ,,54oil.
In adopting the "conservation-by-price" approach, Carter now
argued that the lifting of controls was the best way to both encourage
energy conservation and increase exploration and production. Further,
to allay fears that too much excess profits would accrue to the oil
companies under decontrol, he asked Congress to enact a windfall profits
tax which would go towards supporting an Energy Security Fund, whose
resources would be utilized for research in exploration and alternative
fuels. The ultimate effectiveness of these proposals has been serious-
ly undermined and questioned since, however, and by mid 1979 Congress
had not yet acted on the windfall tax proposal. By all indications,
when it does act, the tax it imposes promises to be much less burden-
some to the oil companies than Carter had hoped.
In the middle of 1979, then, most of the U.S. government's energy
policies were still in a state of disarray comparable to their state in
1973-1974 during the oil embargo. The progression of policy
responses which had been enacted at the federal level since 1973 were
most notable for their inability to effectively address the decaying
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domestic energy situation. The goal of increased energy independence
was more remote in mid 1979 than it had been at any time since 1973,
and the most recent responses to the current "energy crunch" hold
little promise for bringing the country closer to this goal in the
foreseeable future.
Population
Introduction . Although the United States is itself one of the four
most populous countries in the world, the population issue has gained
considerably more attention as a "world" rather than a "domestic*"
issue in the period under consideration in this chapter. The initial
awareness of population as an "issue" grew out of the U.S. government's
concerns with the international effects of increased world population
in the 1960s, particularly its consequences for the developmental
prospects of the so-called developing countries of the world. Since
the mid 1960s, the perception of population growth as an important
obstacle to the developing countries' developmental progress has
played a key role in the conduct of U.S. foreign aid programs, as the
U.S. has become the largest supporter of population-related programs
in the world.
In this same period, the government's awareness of population as
a domestic issue has undergone significant fluctuations. Beginning in
the late 1960s there was increased attention focused on the role of
the population factor in U.S. development, a period which peaked in
1970 when the federal government's role was formally institutionalized
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in the Family Planning and Population Research Act. Since that time,
however, interest in the population issue has receded considerably and
little additionally has been done.
There has been a marked contrast between the government's percep-
tion of the population issue at the national and international levels.
While the belief that world population needs to be controlled has
informed much of its international population-related activities, in
the domestic sphere population growth has not been a chief concern.
Indeed, the growing awareness of the domestic ramifications of popula-
tion occurred at a time when the U.S. population growth rate was in the
throes of a twenty-five year decline. From 1.7% in 1950-1955, the
growth rate fell to 1.25% in 1960-1970, and has been around 0.8% for
most of the 1970s. Over this same period, the crude birth rate fell
from 25 per thousand to 14.8 per thousand in 1976, the lowest rate in
5 6history. Given this context, domestic population-related policy
has been concerned with the equalization of conditions of reproduction
and of creating equal access to contraceptive materials and informa-
tion, and has thus concentrated on a target population of poor and
minorities who have been deprived of these rights.
Population policy prior to 1970 . Prior to the 1960s the federal
government had discounted any active role in the population area.
Perhaps the clearest articulation of this position may be found in
President Eisenhower's response to the findings of the Draper Report in
1959. This report had involved an extensive review of the effective-
ness of the U.S.'s Military Assistance Program and, in this regard,
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had been one of the first studies at this level to officially conclude
that population growth was a major obstacle to development in the
less-developed countries (LDCs) of the world. Consequently, in its
recommendations it had urged that the U.S. increase its activities in
the population area. Eisenhower specifically rebutted this claim,
however, when he said:
I cannot imagine anything more emphatically a subject
that is not a proper political or governmental acti-
vity. . . The government will not... . as long as I
am here, have a positive political doctrine in its
program that has to do with the problem of birth
control. That's not our business.
Subsequently, however, the government's position was altered by
the publication of two influential studies by the National Academy of
Sciences in the 1960s. The first, entitled The Growth of World Popula-
tion
,
investigated the world-wide dimensions of the issue and concluded
by calling for active government participation to curb population
growth. This led to an immediate response from Congress which amended
the 1963 Foreign Aid bill and, for the first time, allowed the govern-
ment to use foreign assistance funds for "research into the problem of
, . u -.58population growth.
A second study followed in 1965, entitled The Growth of US Popu-
lation, and, among its recommendations, urged that family planning be
made an integral part of domestic public medical programs. Once again
a quick response was forthcoming with the creation of a Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary for Science and Population, in the Department of Health,
59
Education, and Welfare.
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At the same time the first clear official indications of a grow-
ing governmental awareness appeared as well, although they were
focused primarily on the international aspects of the population issue.
In his 1965 State of the Union Message, for example, President Johnson
said "I will seek new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the
explosion in world population and the growing scarcity in world re-
sources."; and later in the year he gave increased urgency to the
issue when he declared ".
. .we must face forthrightly the multiply-
ing problems of our multiplying populations and seek the answers to
this most profound challenge to the future of all the world."
Over the next few years the U.S.'s international population
activities were institutionalized with the creation of a population
office within the Agency for International Development (AID) in 1966,
and the installation of a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
for Population Matters in 1967. By 1967, through amendments to the
Foreign Aid Bill, AID was able to fund programs directly relating to
population growth as well as research, and over the 1965-1969 period,
assistance to family planning programs grew from $2.1 million to
$45.4 million. As the 1960s came to a close, the United States was
the world's principle source of family planning funding and was assist-
•
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ing up to 31 countries in this area.
Along with the increased international population-related activ-
ities of the U.S. came a growing awareness of the national aspects of
this issue as well. Although no formal institutions yet existed, by
1966 both the Surgeon General and the Secretary of Health, Education,
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and Welfare had legitimized the role of public health services in
using resources for population related problems and the provision of
62family planning services. Further impetus was given to an expanded
role when, in a special message to Congress on health and education,
President Johnson singled out family planning as one of the four
critical health problems requiring serious attention:
We have a growing concern to foster the integrity of
the family, and the opportunity for each child. It
is essential that all families have access to inform-
ation and services that will allow freedom to choose
the number and spacing of children^ithin the
dictates of individual conscience.
These developments initiated a period in which there was to be an
increased effort on the part of the government which focused on expand-
ing access to family planning as the major thrust of its population-
related policies. The policy was to almost exclusively interpret
the issue as a question of equalization of rights and, as a part of
the Johnson administration's social programs, such as the War on
Poverty, the push for the extension of family planning gained wide-
spread support from a diversity of interest groups. As such, the
increased role of the federal government in the family planning area
gained support as a proper step in the preventive health field, as a
part of poverty and welfare programs, as an improvement in health
rights and women's rights, to extend sexual freedom, and to reduce
i •
64
overpopulation.
Thus in the mid 1960s federally supported family planning pro-
grams were initiated as a part of the War on Poverty and services were
made available through Title V of the Social Security Act and the
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Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)
. By 1967 family planning
received its first special legislative emphasis with the passage of
the Child Health Act, which required 6% of Maternal and Child Health
Funds under HEW to be earmarked for family planning.
In 1968 Johnson followed up on his administration's newly
expressed concern by forming a Commission on Population and Family
Planning. Among its major recommenadtions , this Commission urged the
rapid extension of federal family planning programs and research
support, and proposed the creation of another commission to more
thoroughly study the population issue. ^ Once again the government
quickly responded, and by the late 1960s the commitment in the popula-
tion area was formalized in a Center for Population Research, which was
established to coordinate research at the national level, and a
National Center for Family Planning Services, to coordinate funding of
family planning at the national level. Presiding over both of them
was a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population Affairs, in the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Over the last half of the 1960s government expenditures on
family planning support increased significantly as well. The funding,
which consisted largely of grants to state health agencies, had grown
from a level of $13.4 million in 1965 to $70 million in 1970; and by
1969, some type of organized family planning activity was offered in
roughly 47% of all U.S. counties, where approximately three quarters
of all low- income women deemed in need of family planning services
a a 66resided
.
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The culmination of the government's concern in the population
area in the 1960s came with President Nixon's 1969 Message on Popula-
tion to the Congress. His position—as it was presented in the
speech—gave the distinct impression that a national population
policy was in the offing, as he placed the population issue squarely
among the domestic and international priorities of his administration.
In referring to the population situation he declared:
If the present rate of growth continues, the third
hundred million persons will be added in roughly a
thirty year period. This means that by the year 200C,
or shortly thereafter, there will be more than 300
million Americans. . .
This growth will produce serious challenges for
our society. I believe that many of our present
social problems may be related to the fact that we
have had only fifty years in which to accomodate
the second hundred million Americans. . . One of the
most serious challenges to human destiny in the last
third of this, century will be the growth of
population. .
.
Nixon had made a clear departure from the past in focusing
greater concern on the population growth rate within the U.S., but
when it came to proposing specific programmatic responses, his sugges-
tions largely involved an expansion of existing programs.
It is my view that no American woman should be denied
access to family planning assistance because of her
economic condition. I believe, therefore, that we
should establish as a national goal the provision of
adequate family planning services within the next five
years^go all those who want them but can't afford
them.
Indeed, as future events would reveal, Nixon's position on an increased
federal role in the population area was not as it appeared to be at
all. For it would be his administration which would initiate a drastic
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pullback in the federal commitment in this area only two years later.
Population policy: 1970-1976
. Over the next five years population
drew progressively less attention as a national issue as a number of
factors combined to push it out of the public eye. Chief among these
was the continued decline in the population growth rate which removed
much of the public pressure for a national population policy. In
addition other issues, such as energy and inflation, as well as fallout
from the Vietnam War and Watergate, took a decided precedence over
population, which rapidly became a minor issue for the Nixon and Ford
administrations. In their efforts to deal with the more pressing
issues like inflation, by reducing federal expenditures and cutting
costs, the social policy areas were attractive targets for these
administrations, and programs such as federal support of family plan-
ning suffered considerable cutbacks in this period.
The Congress had reacted quickly to Nixon's call for action in
the population area and, according to many observers, went much fur-
ther in establishing a federal commitment in the population area than
Nixon had wished. The Congressional actions consisted of the creation
of a Commission on Population Growth and the American Future in 1970,
whose purpose was to study all of the important aspects of the popula-
tion issues. In particular, it was to focus on the impact of popula-
tion changes on government services, the economy, the country's
resources and environment, and to make recommendations on the federal
role in this area.
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This action was followed shortly by the passage of the Family
Planning and Population Research Act of 1970, which represented the
first coordinated government move into domestic population programs.
The Act's purpose was ".
. . to promote public health and welfare by
expanding, improving, and better coordinating the family planning
services and population research activities of the federal govern-
ment." In keeping with the past position, the rationale for the Act
was closely tied to the concept of equal opportunity and access to
family planning information. Family planning was now recognized as a
universal human right which was necessary to assure that each child
was a wanted child. As the Act expressed it:
... it is the policy of Congress to foster the
integrity of the family and the opportunity for
each child; to guarantee the right of the family
to freely determine the number and spacing of its
children within the dictates of its individual
conscience; to extend family planning services, on
^
a voluntary basis, to all who desire such services.
The impact of the Act was almost immediate as family planning
services increased drastically over the next two years. Between 1 969—
1972, for example, family planning programs grew at an annual rate of
32%, with the number of health agencies providing these services
increasing from 1,800 to 3,250, while the number of clients served
grew by over 200% to 2.6 million.
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Over this same period federal
appropiations for family planning clinics increased from $33 million to
$137 million, and according to a five year plan submitted by HEW to
Congress this trend was expected to continue, reaching an approximate
level of $392-434 million by 1975.
71
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At the height of the expansion in family planning services in
1972 the report of the Commission on Population Growth and the American
Future was released, and it was expected that it would give continued
impetus to the expanding federal role in the population area. The
findings of the Commission represented a clear departure from tradi-
tional American views of population growth when they suggested that
population growth should no longer be uncritically accepted as a bene-
fit, and further, that no substantial benefits would result from con-
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tinued population growth. The Report stopped short of recommending
a zero population growth policy, however, and instead focused on
eliminating the social and legal obstacles to free choice which would
enhance the freedom of individuals to have the number of children they
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wanted. While not directly alluded to, it was presumed that stabili-
zation of the population growth rate would be a welcome consequence of
74
maximizing individual choice in this manner.
The Nixon administration's response to the Population Commission's
Report was, however, less than enthusiastic, as its interest in the
population issue had substantially receded since the creation of the
Commission. Nixon, in his personal remarks on the Commission's Report,
ignored most of the important recommendations and focused on publicly
rebuking the Commission's support for liberalization of abortion and
expansion of teenage sex education. In indicating his disagreement
with the Report on these points Nixon stated that he preferred to rely
on ". . . the good sense of the American people who would make sound
judgments conducive both to public interest and personal family
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goals.
Nixon's response to the Commission's Report signaled a drastic
shift in the federal government's philosophy in the population area
and initiated an attempted pullback of federal support which was to
push the family planning program into eclipse for the next four years.
The administration's strategy derived from its "new federalism" policy
which it attempted to implement in 197 3. The primary goal of this
policy was to decentralize the administration of a number of federal
social welfare programs, including family planning, among the states
and, thereby, significantly cut federal administrative and program-
matic costs.
In the area of family planning, for example, the successful
implementation of this strategy would effectively eliminate the open-
ended funding of family planning projects by the federal government
which had been established under the 1970 Family Planning Act. The
administration made its position clear when it resisted renewal of the
Family Planning Act in 1973, and, in the Congressional testimony of its
representatives, indicated how the family planning program would be
administered in the future:
The individual state (Medicare) plans will
determine the goals and priorities for family
planning services within each of the states,
and the aggregate of these goals and prior^
ties will constitute the national program.
As a result of the administration's resistance, the Family Plan-
ning Act was renewed for only one year and project grants were frozen
at the 1972 level, a situation which was to obtain for the next four
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years. In addition, in July of 1973 the administration's reorganiza-
tion of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare dismantled the
National Center for Family Planning Services and Maternal and Child
Health Services, the two national administrative organs for family
planning services. These administrative moves effectively reversed
the national family planning program approach instituted under the
Family Planning Act of 1970. Future increases in family planning
funding would now occur largely through Title IV-A and Title XIX of the
Social Security Act— thus they would primarily be determined by the
magnitude of state administered social service programs.
^
The actions of the Nixon administration served to diminish the
federal resources available for family planning and clearly under-
mined the government's ability to provide support and overall direction
to what had been a national family planning effort. This strategy was
essentially continued under the Ford administration when its vetoes
of authorization and appropriation bills for HEW in both 1974 and 1975
kept federal funding for family planning under the 1970 Act frozen.
In these years the increased availability of funds for family
planning relied almost totally on the ability of states to devise and
implement policies in this area. Family planning had never been a
high priority among the states, however, and even during the years of
the huge federal initiatives the states had clearly failed to provide
any of their own impetus. In fiscal year 1972, for example, the
states had been the source of only 3% of all funds appropriated for
family planning, and by fiscal year 1976 this proportion was to rise
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to only 10% of the total. More importantly, the reduction of the
federal role was to open the family planning area to the variabilities
which other welfare programs had been subject to, where levels of
funding and eligibility requirements would differ significantly from
state to state, and equal access would become an unenforceable
standard.
The change in the national family planning strategy had the
expected results, as over the next four years the growth in family
planning programs regressed. The growth rate fell to 18% in 1973,
6% in 1974, and 16% in 1975, as the states failed to pick up the
slack and proved incapable of expanding services adequately. The
five year growth projections of the HEW were not nearly achieved as
federal funds actually expended on family planning fell by 14%
between 1973 and 1975. 79
By the middle of the 1970s, then, the expectations for a
national population policy, which had been occasioned by the 1969
Nixon speech and the creation of the Commission on Population Growth,
had not been fulfilled. The U.S. policy continued to be confined to
the provision of family planning services to a narrowly defined
client population, heavily representative of the poor in society. In
1975, for example, of the 3.8 million women being served by family
planning services in the U.S., fully 86% had low or marginal incomes
80
below 200% of the federal poverty index. Even by these narrow
standards, however, the family planning program was not a great success
as most informed opinion had estimated that nearly 12 million women
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were in need of family planning services in the U.S. in 1975.
The U.S. still had no domestic policy which related to popula-
tion growth, although some have suggested that the targeting of
specific client groups for family planning services implied unspoken
-.
81growth goals. By most accounts, however, the U.S. had no growth
goals; as one international study of population policies concluded:
Despite these activities.
. . the United States has
no explicit policy for curbing U.S. population
growth. The stated objective of its assistance for
family planning within the United States is to
enable pareng^ to achieve their own preferences in
family size.
It appeared that the little concern which had arisen over the
population growth rate had been defused by the declining birth rate
which, excluding immigration, had fallen by one-third between 1970-
1975 alone. The birth rate was the lowest in history in 1974, and,
at its level of 14.8 per thousand, would terminate the net increase of
population in seventy years. As a result, by the mid 1970s greater
attention was being directed at other aspects of the population issue
which would become more important in the future. Immigration has,
for example, become more important as a factor of yearly population
increase as the birth rate has progressively declined. According to
one study, between 1969-1975 immigration as a proportion of annual
population growth increased from 18.2% to 25.2% of total annual growth,
making it a major factor in population growth which has not been
adequately addressed.
In addition, population distribution has drawn increased atten-
tion as an important aspect of the population issue in the future.
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The role of distribution gained its strongest support in the report of
the National Commission for the Observance of World Population Year,
which was created in 1975 to instill a greater awareness and under-
standing of the problem of population growth in the U.S. In its final
report this Commission suggested that population distribution, not
size, would be the most important aspect of the population situation
in the U.S.'s future. They pointed to the fact that 71% of the popu-
lation resided in metropolitan areas in 1970, a level which would grow
to 85% by the year 2000, and called for the creation of a high level
national unit to coordinate efforts in the population area to deal
with these prospective developments.^
While the U.S. government's concern with the domestic population
situation was undergoing this period of fluctuating interest and
involvement, its population activities in the international sphere
were more stable and consistant with past policy. The most important
constant in this area was the maintenance of a perspective which saw
"excessive growth" as the primary aspect of the international popula-
tion situation. The U.S. position in this area, which was to be
frequently reaffirmed in international forums throughout the 1970s,
was concisely presented in a 1970 speech by the U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations when he stated: "The future pace of development will be
determined as much by the ability of countries to reduce the present
85
alarming rates of population growth as by any other factor."
In the earlv 1970s the funding of population-related programs
became a more prominant function of U.S. economic aid, with funding
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for this purpose increasing from $75 million to $125 million between
1970 and 1973. In addition, as part of an AID reorganization in 1972,
a Bureau of Population and Humanitarian Assistance was created with
the express purpose of giving "... problems of exploding population
R6growth and birth control the highest priority." Although funding
for population programs was cutback by around 15% in 1974-1975
—as
part of a general reduction in foreign aid— the U.S. continued to
lead the world in the funding of population activities, and. over the
1965-1975 period, the U.S. accounted for nearlv 69% of all international
. . . 87
assistance m this area.
Population policy: 1976 to the present . In recent years, although
public awareness of the population issue has continued to fade, the
U.S. government has renewed its financial commitment to the support
of family planning services at the national levels, under the pro-
visions of the 1970 Family Planning Act. In August of 1977 President
Carter signed a one year extension of major health programs which
included $208.5 million for the population area in fiscal year 1978.
This amount represented a 19% increase in project grant funding for
family planning over the 1976 and 1977 levels. A year later in
October of 1978, Congress passed a four year extension of the Family
Planning Act which authorized expenditures of $1.07 billion for family
planning services over the 1978-1981 period, with provisions for funds
for family planning to grow to $264.5 million in 1981, twice the 1977
88
level
.
In other recent action the House of Representatives created a
241
Select Committee on Population in September of 1977. Its purpose was
to study the causes of changing population conditions in the United
States and the world, and to study approaches to population planning
which emphasized the prevention of pregnancy. After a year and a half
of sporadic hearings, however, the Committee's life was quietly
terminated by Congress in April of 1979. The hearings had covered the
same ground which had been explored more thoroughly by previous popu-
lation commissions and its final recommendations reflected this fact.
In its final report the Committee expressed a deep concern with the
state of population awareness in the country and the relative neglect
of population research, two areas which had been the subject of
concern for all of the previous government-sponsored population
. . 89
commissions
.
Over the past three years the U.S. government's international
population activities have also been pursued with a renewed vigor.
After the cutbacks of 1974-1975, appropriations for population planning
in the Foreign Economic Aid Program have rebounded and progressively
increased, reaching a level of $225 million for fiscal year 1979, more
than double the 1975 level (see Table 22) . World population growth
remains a primary focus of the U.S.'s foreign aid programs, and, in the
eyes of the current administration, it clearly remains a critical world
problem. In his recent testimony before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, for example, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance left no doubt
that population growth still remained a world problem when he stated:
"Population continues to outpace food production in many nations. In
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the time that it has taken me to share these thoughts with you this
afternoon, world population has increased about 4,000.
.
."
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In summary, the most important aspect of the U.S. government's
policy response to the population issue has been the sharp contrast
between the domestic and international perception of the issue. It
does not appear that this perceptual conflict will substantially change
in the foreseeable future. Population growth, at the domestic level,
has never been an official concern of the government, and, while the
renewed activities in the family planning area indicate a reassertion
of the federal role in this area, there is little indication that
government supported activity will extend beyond the narrowly defined
concept of family planning services as an individual right which
91
must be dispensed equally.
Food
Background: agricultural policy in the 1960s . Like the population
issue, the food issue has been primarily perceived as an external
phenomenon by the United States' government. Food shortages or hunger,
while they have at times been the focus of some public concern, have
not been major domestic issues in the U.S. over the past decade.
Although hunger has been recognized to exist within the U.S., much more
effort and attention has been devoted to the world hunger problem and
the establishment of the U.S. as a primary supplier of basic foodstuffs
to the rest of the world.
The U.S. has long been one of the world's largest food producers
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and over the past decade food has become perhaps the country's most
important export commodity. The country's agricultural exports have
grown considerably as, in the face of increased energy import costs
and balance of trade difficulties, the government has encouraged export
expansion in this area. In this time the domestic agricultural sector
has responded more and more to the vagaries of the international
market, and, as a consequence, the domestic food situation has been
progressively influenced by the world food situation. Concomitantly,
in the 1970s the ability of domestic agricultural policy to exert a
determining influence over the behavior of the agricultural sector has
been seriously undermined, which has presented the government with a
domestic food situation that it has been increasingly unable to control.
Since World War II U.S. agricultural policy has had to deal with
an agricultural sector whose chronic problem has been one of excess
production. In this context the primary goal of the government's
agricultural policies in this period has been to sustain and improve
the farmer's income, a goal which has been persistently jeopardized by
the sector's ability to produce far more than existing demand. The
basic issue which has confronted agricultural policy then has been one
of abundance, not scarcity, and thus most policies have been directed
at holding production of certain basic commodities down as the primary
92
means of achieving income stability for the farmer.
These policies have been directed at an agricultural sector which
has undergone substantial change in the postwar period, the most
important being a drastic increase in the sector's productive capacity.
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The growth in productive capacity has been achieved despite a consid-
erable reduction in the size of the agricultural sector. The number of
farms fell by 50% between 1950 and 1971, while in roughly the same
period total output grew by 52%, output per acre increased 61%, output
per unit of labor increased 257%, and cropland harvested decreased
93
10%. These developments were the product of a massive commercial
transformation which saw nonfarm produced machinery, equipment, and
power increasingly substituted for human labor, a process resulting in
a decline in farm employment from 9.9 million to 4.5 million between
1950 and 1970.
This period also saw a significant change in the character of the
agricultural sector as well, as land ownership became more concentrated
and output and commercial sales became dominated by the large, commer-
cial farms. By the mid 1970s, for example, only 17% of all farms
accounted for 70% of all farm output and 63% of net realized income,
illustrating a trend which has accelerated over the past two decades.
In 1977, for instance, 70% of all farms had sales of less than $20,000,
a level considered to be the minimum to remain commercially solvent,
which accounted for only 11% of all sales, down from a 50% share in
1960. On the other hand, 6% of farms had sales of $100,000 or more,
94
accounting for 53% of all receipts, up from a 17% share in 1960.
In the face of these developments in the agricultural sector, in
the postwar period the government has employed a variety of means to
achieve what have, at times, been the contradictory goals of its
agricultural policy. As President Johnson once concisely stated, these
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have traditionally been to ".
. . maintain and improve farm income,
.
. .
and to use our food abundance to raise the standard of living at
95both home and around the world."
During the 1960s, the government employed a combination of
supply controls through production restrictions, direct income transfers
to farmers, and a government provided market of last resort (the Com-
modity Credit Corporation) to support farm commodity prices in imple-
menting its agricultural policies. In this period, for example, land
diversion was a frequent tool of policy utilized to hold down produc-
tion of certain commodities. Through the facilities of a Soil Bank,
coupled with financial incentives, an average of 50 million acres a
year was withheld from production in the 1961-1972 period, an amount
equivalent to about one-seventh of all cropland at that time. Overall,
with the increased capital intensity of agriculture, and the govern-
ment's land diversion programs, total land use declined by 40% in the
1955-1970 period. Despite this decline, however, the government's
programs to sustain farm income in the 1960s were among the most costly
that it administered. The increases in productive capacity persist-
ently exceeded the government's ability to control production at levels
which were adquate to sustain farmer's income. Thus, over the 1956-
1970 period, the government spent an average of $3.1 billion annually
for farm price support programs and related direct payments to
farmers
.
In the postwar period a number of food-related programs also
developed as an adjunct to farm programs, originating as supplementary
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methods for facilitating the aims of agricultural policy. Among the
domestically oriented programs were the Commodity Distribution Program,
the National School Lunch and other child nutrition programs, and the
Food Stamp Program. While it was clear that these programs served to
distribute foodstuffs to economically deprived individuals, it was
equally clear that they also provided additional outlets for agricul-
tural production under government subsidy, and thus strengthened the
agricultural economy.
The Food Stamp Program, which was initiated on an experimental
basis in 1961 and then expanded into a permanent program in 1964, was
the primary program directed at the incidence of hunger in the United
States during the 1960s. Its primary purpose, however, was not to
eliminate hunger, but rather was to improve the purchasing power of
needy families through distribution of stamps which allowed them to
increase their consumption of staple food products and, thereby,
reduce the surplus of staples which the agricultural sector chroni-
cally produced. As a hunger program, the Food Stamp Program was
clearly not a great success in the 1960s. Although federal expendi-
tures on the program increased from $13 million to $229 million during
1962-1969, the program reached only about 3.2 million people, while
the estimates of the number of poor in the U.S. at this time were
98
around 30 million.
In contrast to the domestic programs, the development of the U.S.
international food programs and activities was a much more signifi-
cant part of the government's overall agricultural policy objectives.
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The major component of the government's international policy was
Public Law 480 (PL 480) which was first inaugurated in 1954, and, over
its first decade of operation, had served largely to dispose of
agricultural surpluses via cash transactions and direct food aid.
According to the text of the bill, PL 480 was "An act to increase con-
sumption of United States agricultural commodities in foreign coun-
tries, to improve the foreign relations of the United States, and for
other purposes." Most prominent among these other purposes were
"•
• .to develop and expand export markets for U.S. products
. . .
and the disposition of agricultural surpluses." 100 This program
quickly became a major avenue for the disposal of U.S. agricultural
surpluses. In its first five years alone it dispersed over $5 billion
worth of American grain, and, over its first decade of existence,
agricultural shipments under PL 480 averaged 23% of total annual
agricultural exports.
By the mid 1960s, however, as world food conditions perceptibly
worsened, the Johnson administration initiated measures to alter the
purposes and conduct of the PL 480 program. These moves arose out of
a growing awareness on the part of some Johnson administration offi-
cials that the program could have important diplomatic as well as
economic goals— it could now not only serve as a means of maintaining
farmer's income, but could also become an important means to solve the
growing problem of world hunger. This new concern with the world
hunger problem was a direct outgrowth of the U.S. government's increased
attention to the world population situation, which was occurring at the
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same time. In his message to the Congress on world hunger in 1966, in
which he requested modifications in the PL 480 program, Johnson
clearly linked the two issues together:
A balance between agricultural productivity and
population is necessary to prevent the shadow of
hunger from becoming the nightmare of famine
. . .
The new legislation, amending PL 480, . . .
recognizes for the first time, as a matter of
U.S. policy, the world population explosion's
relationship to the world food crisis, providing
that the new food-for-freedom programs shall
make available resources to promote voluntary
activities in other countries dealing with the
problem of population growth and family planning.
Subsequently, PL 480 was renamed Food for Peace and amended to
shift the focus of the program from disposal of U.S. agricultural
surpluses to the furthering of economic development in the less-
developed nations. Over the remainder of the 1960s, however, this
shift in emphasis in the program did not produce any dramatic results.
The value of commodity donations under the program did not signifi-
cantly increase, and, with the decline in domestic agricultural sur-
pluses in the late 1960s, the expenditures on the program were progres-
103
sively reduced in the last half of the decade (see Table 23).
Even with these progressive cutbacks, however, the effort and
expenditures devoted to the world food problem in the 1960s had far
outdistanced comparable activities in the domestic sphere. During the
decade, the costs of the PL 480 program had exceeded $13.9 billion,
while the cost of the federal government's three domestic food programs
had totaled about $5.8 billion (see Table 23). The U.S. government's
activities in the food area had followed a pattern almost identical to
TABLE 23
U.S. GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
FOOD PROGRAMS, 1968-1977
Commodity
Food Stamps* Distribution^ Public Law 480*
1968
. 17 147 1.50
1969 .23 250 1.20
1970 1. 10 275 1.20
1971 1.70 261 1.20
1972 2.00 225 1.30
1973 2.20 152 1.10
1974 3.50 87 0.77
1975 4.60 11
1976 4.70 8 0.84
1977 5.40 1.20
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Food
Situation
,
June 1977; Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1977 ;
OECD, Review of Agricultural Policies, 1977 . Paris: OECD,
1978; and Willard W. Cochrane and Mary E. Ryan, American
Farm Policy, 1948-1973 . Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1976.
*in US billion dollars.
@in US million dollars.
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its activities in the population area in this period, and, although
there was clearly a growing awareness of a domestic hunger problem in
the U.S. in the late 1960s, governmental policy in this area continued
to see world hunger as the most pressing issue.
Agricultural and food-related policy: 1970-1976
. The 1970s were to
bring significant changes in the federal government's strategy for
achieving its agricultural goals. These changes were in direct
response to the fluctuations in the world food situation and would see
the fortunes of U.S. agriculture increasingly tied to developments in
the international market, as the role of agricultural exports was
vastly expanded to combat the country's growing trade difficulties.
In the first years of the 1970s domestic agricultural policy
remained essentially unchanged. Under the 1970 Agricultural Act
acreage set asides continued to be the primary production control
measure, with nearly 62 million acres diverted from use in 1972, while
government payments to producers reached an average of $3.8 billion
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annually in 1970-1972. This "traditional" approach underwent a
fundamental change in 1973, however, when the Nixon administration
began to push for increased agricultural exports as a means of cutting
the domestic budget costs of farm programs. This export emphasis was
in direct response to the changes in the world food situation, which
had seen the demand for food and the incidence of food scarcity
significantly increase. With these recent world developments, the
Nixon administration had recognized an opportunity to improve the
country's trade balance, reduce government expenditures on agricultural
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programs, and accomplish a significant increase in farm income. 105
The export performance of U.S. agriculture almost immediately
reflected the influence of this new strategy. Without its impetus
the value of U.S. agricultural commodity exports had grown from $7.8
billion to $12.9 billion in 1971-1973, by 1975, however, the value of
these exports had tripled to $23 billion, accounting for 20% of total
export earnings. During 1971-1976 the average annual export volume of
U.S. agricultural products was one and one-half times greater than the
annual average for the 1960s, with average annual export earnings
reflecting a nearly three-fold increase over the annual average a
decade earlier. 106 In this period the U.S.'s role in world food
markets greatly expanded and U.S. agriculture dominated the world
market in some of the basic foodstuffs. In 1973, for example, the U.S.
accounted for 44% of the world's wheat and flour exports, in corn it
supplied 70% of the total, and in soybeans 86%. 10 ^
The initial successes of the export strategy relied heavily on
the conditions of world scarcity in basic food crops in 1973-1974,
which had driven up the demand for U.S. agricultural exports. The 1973
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act, which was passed at the
height of the newest incidence of world food "crisis", exhibited the
new approach when it introduced the concepts of deficiency payments
and target prices for the major commodities, which would now be set at
or near world levels. The new Act separated income support from price
support for the first time, and alloted deficiency payments to pro-
ducers only if average market prices fell below target prices. But
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the "support" aspects of the Act were to be virtually non-operational
for the next three years, as high world demand kept prices at or
above target levels, thus eliminating the need for subsidies or
acreage set asides. Thus, over the 1973-1975 period, the cost-cutting
aspects of the new strategy were a clear success with expenditures
108falling by $3.3 billion in just two years.
The implementation of the export strategy also had a number of
important drawbacks as well, which were primarily reflected in the
deterioration of the domestic food situation in this same period. The
growth in exports had substantially increased the agricultural sec-
tor's dependence on the world market, particularly with regards to
basic food crops. In 1973, for example, exports accounted for nearly
three-quarters of all farm sales in wheat, almost one-half of the
total in soybeans, and about one-third of the sales in corn. By 1975,
grains and soybeans accounted for 73% of all agricultural exports,
with exports in this year providing the outlet for 100 million acres
—
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30% of all cropland harvested in the U.S. in that year.
As a consequence, the boom in world prices for these food pro-
ducts, which had fueled their export growth, also began to exercise a
more determinant influence over domestic food prices as well. Domestic
food prices rapidly accelerated in this period, peaking at a 20.1% rise
in 1973, and averaged an annual increase of 9.6% for the 1971-1975
period—nearly three times the rate of the previous five year period
(see Table 21). Increased food prices had become a major contributor
to the growing problem of inflation by the mid 1970s, a situation
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directly attributable to the growth of food exports. As one adminis-
tration analysis characterized it, by this time: "American farmers
are now increasingly dependent on volatile world markets, while both
producers and consumers are more vulnerable to wide price fluctuations
and renewed inflationary pressure." 11 ^
By most accounts, the frequent wide swings in prices of basic
commodities and the overall progressive increase in food prices had a
significant affect on the quality and quantity of the average Ameri-
can's diet in this period; as one noted authority expressed it:
Although the index of food consumption per
person on a price weighted basis has risen over
a long period of time, the amount of food energy
consumed per person (pre^^nted in terms of
calories) has declined.
There were a number of indications that such was the case. In 197 3,
for example, the per capita index of food consumption declined by 2%
from the previous year, the first year such a drop had occurred since
1965 and the largest decline since 1951. After recovering for a 1%
increase in 1974, this index fell again in 1975 to its lowest level
since 1968. A primary cause of this decline was a 4.3% drop in per
capita consumption of animal products in 1973, which contributed to
the largest drop in pounds of food consumed per capita in over a
A A 112decade.
These domestic food price developments most seriously undermined
the diet of the approximately 26 million poor in the country in these
years. A 1974 study for the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and
Human Needs found that rising food prices had produced a "statistically
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significant decline" in the population's per capita consumption of
protein and many essential vitamins and minerals, and further, that
chicken and beef were disappearing from poor people's diets.
This deterioration in the domestic food situation was reflected
in the rapid expansion in the number of participants and costs of the
government's two primary food programs. Although the Nixon admini-
stration had at one point called for the "end to hunger in America
itself for all time", in the early 1970s much of its effort in this
area was devoted to attempts to cutback the costs of food programs.
The Democrat controlled Congress refused to accede to Nixon's wishes,
however, and in 1970-1971 the Food Stamp Program was expanded and the
eligibility requirements liberalized. Under the new amendments to the
1964 Act, the goals of the program were expanded to include assuring
low income people a "minimally nutritious diet", while the maximum
authorized costs of the program were tripled to Si. 75 billion. Subse-
quently, participation in the program grew from 10.5 million to 15.5
million in the 1971-1975 period, and the costs of the program ballooned
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from about $1.4 billion to $5 billion. According to most assess-
ments, this was an expansion which was almost solely attributable to
the affects of the rising food costs in these years, and while sub-
stantial, it was still quite clear that the existing programs were not
reaching a large portion of the country's poor and hungry population.
11
The fate of the domestic food programs was, however, much better
than that which befell the government's primary international food
program under PL 480. The PL 480 program continued to experience a
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sustained period of contraction, which had begun in the late 1960s at
about the same time that the program had been renamed Food for Peace.
In the early 1970s the volume of food aid distributed under the pro-
gram continued to shrink, from 11 million tons in 1970 to only 3.3
million in 1973, as commercial markets absorbed the commodity surpluses
which had previously gone out under this program. One indication of
this trend was an increase in the value of U.S. commercial food
exports from $1.7 billion to $6.8 billion in 1972-1975—in the same
period aid-financed food exports remained at a level of $1.1 billion.
Overall, the funding for the PL 480 program fell persistently in the
first half of the 1970s, which, allowing for inflation, resulted in
major financial cutbacks in the program.
Agricultural and food related policy: 1977 to the present . In recent
years the developments in the world's food situation have continued to
exercise a predominant influence over the character of the U.S. food
and agricultural situation. As the world's food situation has progres-
sively improved over the last three years, domestic agricultural
policy has reverted to its pre-1973 form, when price supports and
subsidies constituted the bulk of policy activity. Meanwhile, per-
sistent food price increases and a continued expansion of agricultural
exports have remained as vestiges of the export promotion strategy.
The domestic agricultural sector has experienced very good crop
years recently, and both the 1977 and 1978 grain harvests reached
record levels. Concomitantly, the value of agricultural exports has
achieved record levels as well, reaching $27.3 billion in 1978 and
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forecast to approach $30 billion for 1979. Agricultural exports now
account for 21% of all U.S. exports and exports now account for one
out of every four dollars earned by U.S. farmers. 117
Despite the persistence of bountiful harvests and growing
exports, however, the chronic problem of "overproduction" has returned
to undercut farm income in tandem with continued food price increases,
which remain a major contributor to the accelerating domestic infla-
tion rate. The most recent agricultural policy measure enacted has
been the 1977 Food and Agricultural Act, which basically extended the
provisions of the 1973 legislation for another four years. Under
this Act, however, with the sequence of good crop years for both U.S.
and world agriculture, deficiency payments and income support payments
have returned to levels at or beyond the highest achieved in the early
1970s— they totaled $6.6 billion in 1978— as the fall-off in world
demand has had a direct affect on the U.S. situation. In addition,
after being virtually inactive in 197A—1977 , the set aside provisions
of the 1977 Act were employed by the Carter administration when it
called for significant reductions in acreage planted to wheat and feed
grains for the 1978 growing season, leading to an 18 million acre
119
reduction in plantings, the largest since 1973.
This return to the high cost agricultural programs of the early
1970s has also been accompanied by continued significant increases in
domestic food prices which, even in the face of record crops, exceeded
the overall growth in the consumer price index in 1977-1978 (see
Table 21). Food price increases, along with energy costs, have been
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major factors in the increased rate of inflation in recent years,
accelerating from a 0.6% rise in 1976 to 11.8% in 1978. The forecasts
for 1979 projected a continuation of this trend with estimates that
food prices would rise another 10%. This rate was quickly exceeded,
however, as retail food prices rose at an annual rate of 17.7% for
the first quarter of 1979.
.
In the wake of these developments, the federal government's
domestic food programs have continued to expand, while in the inter-
national sphere, the PI 480 program has rebounded somewhat after a
number of years of cutbacks. The Food Stamp Program is now the pri-
mary domestic food program and its expansion has continued in recent
years despite repeated efforts to control the program's expansion
and costs. The most recent effort in this area was contained in the
1977 Agricultural Act, which once again revised eligibility require-
ments and put a ceiling on the costs of the program—costs which had,
essentially, been open-ended. The revised eligibility requirements
lowered income levels for eligible recipients to at or below the
poverty level ($5,850 for a family of four), and were expected to
eliminate about 3 million persons from the program, whose enrollment
was now expected to reach 18.5 million persons. Although the program
was still clearly not reaching all who needed aid, the control of
program costs was a priority of the new modifications as, for the first
time, the 1977 Act placed a ceiling on the allowable expenditures for
c . 121
the program for the next four fiscal years.
In the international sphere, after a period of relative neglect,
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the government has taken some recent steps to revitalize the PL 480
program and deal more effectively with the problem of world hunger.
The 1977 Agricultural Act renewed the PL 480 program for another four
years and revised the provisions of the program to increase the amount
of aid which could be distributed under Title II, in an effort to
give greater emphasis to the aid aspects of the program. The program's
budget was $1.2 billion for 1977, up 45% from 1976. In addition,
the Act also gave specific encouragement to the President to negotiate
the creation of an international emergency food reserve, something
which the U.S. had previously been hesitant to participate in without
controlling. By 1979 the Carter administration had introduced legis-
lation which would authorize establishment and management of an inter-
national emergency wheat reserve, and, in his 1979 State of the Union
message, Carter announced the creation of a Presidential Commission on
World Hunger whose task was to recommend "realistic solutions" to this
problem to the U.S. and other countries. In his message, Carter
called the establishment of such a reserve an essential step in "the
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protection of our international food aid program."
But while these efforts do indicate a renewed interest in the
problem of world hunger by the current administration, they do not
involve any significant changes in the fundamental aspects of the
U.S.'s agricultural and food-related policies. As in the past, the
efforts directed at the alleviation of hunger in the U.S. and the
world remain subsidiary to the goal of maintaining the economic viabil
ity of the agricultural sector. These goals have conflicted in the
past and such would appear to be the case in the future. Indeed,
over the past five years the pursuit of the latter goal has led to
serious deterioration in the domestic food situation and made the
availability of a nutritionally adequate diet for all Americans mu
more of a hope than an actuality.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: THE STATUS OF "WORLD" ISSUES—
THE LIMITS OF THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
Introduction
We now turn to a comparison of the major findings which the
preceding country-by-country analysis has produced, and to an overall
evaluation of the suitability of the evidence provided by this
comparison for addressing the questions which were posed at the outset
of this study. These concluding remarks will focus on the central
topics and questions which were suggested in the initial chapter."^"
First the results of the comparative analysis will be presented and
evaluated in the light of our concern with what these results may tell
us about the acceptance and relevance of the "world crisis" perspective,
which was outlined in the first chapter. Then, based upon these
results, we will suggest some conclusions on what our analysis enables
us to say about the fundamental nature of our three "world" issues,
after comparing their ecological with their political perceptions. In
addition we will make some evaluation of the comparative policy
approach which was employed in this study, with particular regard to
its appropriateness in exploring the dimensions of the three issues
which were the subject of this study (see the Appendix).
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The Global Perspective at the Nation-State Level
In comparing the manner in which the four governments handled
the food, energy, and population issues we often observed clear and
important differences among their perceptions and definitions of the
issues, while, at the same time, noting that there were also striking
similarities in the character of their policy responses to the issues
—
although the goals of these policies were at times quite contradictory.
The issue which exhibited the most significant similarities was clearly
the energy issue. Despite the four countries developmental and ideolog-
ical differences, the energy issue was a crucial domestic issue for
them all. The energy issue had manifested itself in a similar guise,
albeit with differing impacts, in all of these countries, primarily in
the form of increased energy costs and shortages in energy supplies.
Our analysis indicates that its recognition as a crucial issue appeared
to be most attributable to its status as an issue which was closely
tied to the developmental chances and aspirations of each country.
Growth in energy consumption was universally perceived to be a sine qua
non for economic growth, particularly in Brazil, the United States,
and Yugoslavia, where the industrial growth model dominated. In these
cases, where the industrial sector was the leading edge in overall
economic growth and where its strategic sectors were crucially depend-
ent on petroleum and natural gas, a reduction in energy availability
and the drastic increases in energy costs had clear, immediate, and
unacceptable economic ramifications. Even in Tanzania, where a rural
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agricultural economy persists, the dependence of certain critical
sectors of the economy on petroleum and its products has magnified the
affects of recent world energy developments and made the energy issue
an important governmental concern. Only the current government's
conscious de-emphasis on economic growth as the leading developmental
priority has ameliorated the energy crisis' affects, by making energy
shortages less disasterous than in the other three cases.
Interestingly, these common experiences and perceptions of the
energy issue have produced differing policy responses which have,
however, had broadly similar goals: retention of an adequate energy
supply and provision for sufficient resources for presumed future
increases in consumption. While our analysis indicated that each
country's response to the energy issue has been tempered by the extent
of its own energy resources, its capacity to effectively deal with the
issue was also circumscribed by other priority issues, such as unemploy-
ment and inflation. In our view, however, it is most significant that
all of the policy responses have primarily emphasized the need to
increase or sustain the supply of so-called "essential" non-renewable
energy resources (e.g. oil, coal, and nuclear—as yet still non-
renewable), for it indicates that the energy issue is still being
2
treated essentially as a serious but no more than passing crisis.
Although in some instances (Brazil, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia) there is
also an emphasis on the utilization of renewable energy resources
(hydropower. wood, and alcohol), due both to the physical lack of
other energy resources and conscious decisions, this does not indicate
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a fundamentally different understanding of the nature of the energy
issue. This is because the motivation for these choices has largely
been to increase energy self-reliance and to secure greater control
over one's own energy situation, rather than for their essential
characteristics as renewable resources which take into account the
ecological consequences of energy resource utilization and fossil
fuel depletion.
Indeed, the energy policies observed in this study have largely
ignored the crux of the world crisis perspective which argues that the
energy and environmental crises are closely connected and, that
increases in current energy consumption levels are unrealistic, given
the state of the world's energy resources. The clearest evidence of
this tendency is that conservation, a tactic which at least begins to
acknowledge the possible limiting aspects of the world's energy
situation, remains only a minor aspect of the energy policies we
presented. This appears to be the case because such a strategy would
ultimately involve fundamental alterations in current energy usage
patterns, and offers the potential for requiring a great deal more
social sacrifice than is currently the case; for, in the end, it
could lead to serious challenges to the assumptions which underlay the
growth-oriented models of development adopted by these states. In the
energy policy area it appears that the marked similarities in policy
responses are attributable to the overridding growth imperatives of
these states' developmental models, which have assumed precedence over
ideological, cultural, and developmental factors. From their vantage
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point, the energy issue is seen as a "crisis" primarily because of its
presumed threat to what are held to be essentially uncompromisable
growth goals, rather than for its ecological consequences.
Thus the observations on the energy issue drawn from our compari-
son reveal that the current manifestations of world energy difficul-
ties are being treated largely as symptoms of a serious but temporary
shortage in supply which requires difficult adjustments. They have
clearly not illustrated that the energy "crisis" is being viewed as an
indication of the progressive and unalterable depletion of the world's
finite energy resources which should signal revaluation of assumptions
about growth and the values which support it. The beggar-thy-neighbor
energy policies of the four countries we discussed illustrate that
this is the case, as each state tries to retain or expand its share of
world energy consumption. Their actions indicate a refusal to acknow-
ledge the relevance of the "ecological limits" argument to their situa-
tions, while their policies have failed to face the issues raised by
this argument concerning appropriateness of energy usage, the environ-
mental costs of energy resource usage, and the potential exhaustion
of the world's fossil fuel resources. Dealing with these issues would
involve considerable revisions in the assumptions which underlie their
policies and question the faulty logic of their position that all states
can retain their share of world energy consumption, or even expand it.
More importantly, it could open to public debate the issue of whether
growth priorities should continue to supersede environmental values
in the energy area.
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In contrast to the energy issue where its domestic impact is
conspicuous, the food/hunger issue has been viewed primarilv as an
external phenomenon in the countries discussed here. The exception is
the case of Tanzania where, again due to its rural agricultural
context, the food issue has been an important domestic issue for
nearly two decades. Despite the continued incidence of hunger and
malnutrition in the other three countries, food/hunger issues have not
been officially recognized as crucial domestic issues in the 1970s.
Rather, when food/hunger issues have been the subject of attention
they have been perceived to have their primary impact on other areas of
the world. Indeed, our preceding analysis has revealed that in all
four cases the international food situation has exercised a significant
influence over domestic agricultural policies
—
policies which have, in
important respects, contributed to the deterioration of each individual
country's own domestic food situation.
Our observations indicate that the primary development which
influenced the domestic food situation in all of these countries in
this period was the increase in the commercialization of the agricul-
tural sector and the consequent emphasis on and expansion in the
cultivation of crops for export markets— a development which proved to
be to the detriment of domestic food-producing capabilities. In three
of our cases (Brazil, the United States, and Yugoslavia) these trends
were closely tied to the emphasis on industrial development as the
leading sector in the country's overall development and the resultant
neglect of the agricultural sector's development which this produced.
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But in all cases the commercialization of the agricultural sector was
observed and in all it had a detrimental affect on domestic food-
producing capabilities—manifested by increased food prices and
shortages of key food products for domestic consumption. The impacts
in Brazil and Yugoslavia, for example, included significant alterations
in nutritional levels, and in the United States as well it contributed
to drastic increases in food prices which severely hindered the
ability of citizens to acquire a nutritionally adequate diet.
Our observations of food-related policies in these countries also
revealed that the economic imperatives of dealing in the international
market to acquire commodities and foreign exchange served as the
primary motivations for the increased emphasis on the export of highly
valued agricultural commodities, many of which were food products. In
all cases this export orientation often served as the major factor
influencing domestic agricultural policy and the development of the
agricultural sector, thereby supplanting what was often publicly pro-
claimed as the priority of meeting domestic food requirements. This
was the case even in Tanzania where the government was fully conscious
of the domestic consequences of the export orientation, yet allowed it
to continue for lack of both the commitment and ability to control it.
Interestingly, in the cases of Brazil, the United States, and
Yugoslavia, the world food shortages of the early 1970s—which precipi-
tated much of the recent concern with a world food "crisis"—were
important in influencing these governments' decisions to more fully
exploit the export potential of their respective agricultural sectors.
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Their perception of the world food "crisis" as largely an external
phenomenon served as an important justification for the export thrust
in their agricultural policies, although it was quite clear that the
policy goals were aimed more at exploiting the economic opportunities
presented by world food scarcities, than they were at solving the
world's food problems. That such a strategy served to exacerbate the
domestic food situations of these countries was ironic, yet, from all
indications, it appeared to be an acceptable if generally officially
ignored consequence of these policies.
As we saw with the energy issue, the economic developmental
priorities of each government appeared to be the most important factor
influencing their approach to the food/hunger issue. The exigencies of
sustaining economic growth, which placed the agricultural sector in a
secondary position in all but Tanzania, and the necessity of forging a
role in the international economy which this task entailed, exercised
a dominant influence over the formulation of agricultural policies in
these countries. Even in the agricultural state of Tanzania during the
1970s, domestic agricultural policy was increasingly subject to the
vagaries of the international market. In blunt economic terms, it
was deemed to be more valuable for each state to respond to the oppor-
tunities offered by the deteriorating world food situation, where the
economic benefits to be reaped were considerable; for as long as the
"crisis" was perceived to be someone else's problem it could more
easily be approached in this manner.
Unlike the energy issue, in regards to the food/hunger issue
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there was a radical deviation between the domestic and international
perceptions of this issue's import. In seeking to understand why there
was such a significant difference between the two realms it appears to
be another example, like the energy area, where economic factors have
overruled the political in affecting issue perception. To admit that
a domestic food crisis exists, or even that a significant incidence of
hunger and malnutrition persists, is viewed as being tantamount to
acknowledging a fundamental failing in the ruling government's ability
to meet one of its citizen's basic human needs, especially if such
difficulties cannot be blamed on essentially uncontrollable inter-
national factors. This is especially the case in states such as Brazil,
the United States, and Yugoslavia, where there is a sufficient total
supply of foodstuffs generally available. In this context the food/
hunger issue may potentially become more of a political than an econo-
mic or technical issue. Such a process could open the door to the
questioning of certain fundamental aspects of the socioeconomic system.
If, for example, hunger and malnutrition are primarily viewed as
consequences of being economically deprived or underdeveloped, than
the presumption is that further economic development is the best means
to alleviate or eliminate its existence—this is the position under-
lying the United States', Brazil's, and Yugoslavia's international
posture. If, on the other hand, this problem is acknowledged to
persist in the so-called developed states where food is plentiful, then
it leads to more probing questions about its ultimate causes and
remedies, which may be more politicalin nature.
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The former position has clearly been the strategy of the three
industrialized and semi-industrialized states we have discussed. Their
responses to the world's food problems have not been directed at the
possible political causes of hunger because they have not faced these
possibilities in their own countries. Rather they have treated the
issue as essentially an economic and technical problem which primarily
requires an expansion in world food production, an approach which
rewards the food producers with increased economic benefits.
In addressing the question of what our analysis of policv has
revealed about the relevance of the world crisis perspective in the
food/hunger area, we once again encounter a situation where essentially
different systems of valuation have been employed to interpret the
same situation. The global perspective, for example, attempts to treat
food as a basic human need which is, or should not be, treated as just
another commodity, commensurable with other less essential goods or
values. Our comparison of policy has shown, however, that in all cases,
with the possible exception of Tanzania in some instances, the policy
responses have treated food as a commodity which is subject to and
ruled by the logic of supply and demand. Consequently, as a commodity
its demand and price are primarily dependent upon its scarcity, not
upon its abundance or life-sustaining qualities. The global crisis
perspective has also attempted to insert the consideration of natural
limits into its analysis of the food/hunger issue, as it does with the
energy issue, and thus attempts to cast this issue in a different con-
text. If limits are a relevant consideration than the potential for
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and consequences of producing more food must be more fully examined,
and the question of a more equitable distribution of the world's
current food supply becomes a more pressing issue. If, on the other
hand, the economic and technical definition of the issue continues to
predominate, as it has in the policies we surveyed, than the political
issues raised by the possible ecological limits to increased production
will not be addressed and challenges to the existing world food distri-
butional patterns will be deflected. The policy responses have been
informed by an understanding of the food/hunger issue which sees recent
world food scarcities as temporary occurrances which can be remedied
by the application of economic and technical solutions, while the global
perspective argues that such solutions will be circumscribed by the more
significant ecological limitations of the earth which are currently
being manifested.
Of the three issues discussed here the analysis of the population
issue perhaps best reveals the weaknesses of the global level perspec-
tive— in its own terms—when applied to specific country-level compara-
tive contexts. Although there were some striking differences in the
respective government's perception and understanding of the population
issue in the domestic sphere, the policy responses were all bound
together by their studied failure to recognize any relevance for the
population growth crisis to their own situations. Overall national
population growth figures and demographic characteristics were of
limited utility in understanding the fundamental nature of each country's
population situation and its policy. Excessive population growth was
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clearly not a major national concern in any of the cases discussed in
this study.
A country's level of economic development emerged as the most
important factor affecting each government's perception of their
population situation and what were judged to be the major parameters of
the population issue, at least in the manner in which it was defined by
each respective government. In Brazil and Tanzania, for example, the
overriding concern with an expanding economy and a healthy internal
market precipitated the government's initial interest in the population
area. Given these economic priorities, the population's age-structure
and its spatial distribution were the main focuses of the government's
population-related concerns, since they could have potentially serious
consequences for the country's future developmental chances. At the
same time, aside from these concerns, given their national context,
these governments also viewed additional population in an essentially
positive light. Increased population was viewed as having a number of
increased economic benefits for the country, which led to government
advocacy, either actively or passively, of increases in the population
growth rate. It is quite clear that such a policy cannot be fully
understood with reference only to the information which a national level
demographic analysis provides. When added population is valued pri-
marily as a positive economic force, the population issue is understood
utilizing a logic which is almost totally contradictory to that which
is employed by population analysts at the global level.
In addition, the official perceptions of the domestic population
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situations which obtained in the United States and Yugoslavia, and the
policy responses which ensued, also challenged the applicability of th
global level purview in another manner. For example, the internal
demographic variabilities which were observed in Yugoslavia were indis-
pensable to fully understanding its population situation, especially
when it was revealed that the demographic variations generally flowed
along ethnic lines, a factor which overshadowed all others. Thus the
ethnic factor was the determining factor shaping the Yugoslav govern-
ment's policy stance, something for which the global level analysis
has not taken account.
In the United States, which has one of the world's largest popu-
lations using a disproportionate share of the world's resources, there
is no official concern with the population growth rate. Rather, its
population-related policies, both domestic and international, are
informed by an understanding of the population issue which attributes
high reproduction rates primarily to an individual's poverty and
ignorance. Consequently, the United States government has carried out
a national policy in the population area which has chiefly been
directed at a narrow clientel of the poor and uneducated, or those per-
ceived to be most seriously in need of information on population and
reproductive matters. The United States' international population
activities are pervaded by a similar logic. As one country among the
four discussed here who has carried on significant international popu-
lation-related activities, it has aimed its efforts primarily at the
poor and uneducated of the world system as well.
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Given these wide differences in perception and understanding of
their individual population situations, it is most surprising that all
four governments have employed a similar logic in their policy approach
to the domestic population situation. Despite the unique ideological
and cultural aspects of each country, the population issue and the
debate on population policies has been largely confined to the arena
of individual rights. This is clearly why population "control" has
not become a publicly proclaimed purpose of any of the population-
related policies surveyed in this study. The flirtation with population
control, in all cases, appears to directly challenge one of the most
closely guarded of individual rights, the right to choose to freely
procreate or not. Therefore, family planning—the form which all of
the population-related policies has taken in these four cases—has been
publicly presented as essentially a health measure which, it is hoped,
will both improve the conditions of reproduction and, at least in the
case of the United States, lead to a reduction in the reproduction
ratios of the target population.
While it certainly must be acknowledged that the meaning and
parameters of the concept of individual "rights" varies considerably
among the four countries, this observation is significant because it
reveals their uniform refusal to accept the pertinence of the global
level population crisis perspective to their policy considerations.
This constitutes a direct refutation of the idea that world demogra-
phic conditions, not individual rights, should be the primary factor
influencing the formulation of individual state's population policies.
Once again our comparison of population-related policies reveals
that, in attempting to assess the relevancy of the global crisis
perspective to these individual cases, we are encountering a clash
between the different systems of valuation which are being applied to
the issue at the national and global level. The power of the global
level of analysis, for example, hinges on viewing population and food
as two closely interconnected issues, a position which has not been
taken by any of the four governments we observed. Based on its
acceptance of the ecological limits of the earth, the global perspec-
tive concludes that population control is one of the most effective
means to both combat world hunger and reduce the demands on the world's
resources. This position accepts the ecological "fact" that there are
physical limits to how much population the earth can support. Further-
more, based on the recent ecological signs, there are clear and serious
environmental consequences involved in producing greater amounts of
food under the existing dominant technological methods . Thus, this
challenges the view that the world has the capacity to produce -much
more food and support a greater population largely through technologi-
cal advances, arguing that this view ignores the environmental fallout
of an expansion in the technologically intensive methods of production
which would be required—the effects of which are already being felt
throughout the world (e.g. water shortages, soil depletion, pollution,
desertification, and energy shortages).
The significant point once again is the global level analysis'
attempt to insert the concept of natural limits as a legitimate and
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necessary consideration into the political debate on the population
issue. Indeed, the reputability of the world population "crisis"
argument hinges on the acceptance of the physical limits concept,
especially since its global level of analysis attempts to subsume many
of the world's important national demographic variations into its level
of analysis, or, at the most, differentiates between the developed and
underdeveloped states of the world only along gross economic dimensions.
From the global ecologically based perspective each added individual is
seen as increasing the demand on the world's already strained resources,
an essentially negative evaluation which suggets that individual
decisions on procreation must now begin to take account of their global
ecological consequences.
In our comparison, however, we have observed the common failure
of these individual governments to accept the concept of ecological
limits as a valid and relevant factor influencing their population-
related policies. The fact that the issue is still cast in terms of
individual rights indicates that the questions raised by the global
perspective are being largely ignored, for it relegates decisions on
population size to a level which, by definition, removes from the
debate questions of whether the "right to procreate" should be
tempered by its global consequences. In contrast, at the nation-state
level added population represented essentially different valuations
from those implicit in the global perspective. In these cases added
individuals represented needed labor power, economic potential, and
increased national security—all positive outcomes which leave the
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traditional benevolent assumptions about tbe consequences of individual
choices on reproduction unchallenged. Thus the questions posed by the
global population analysis, as those with energy and food, are not
addressed, since once again they involve dealing with political issues
which are apparently still viewed as too risky for most governments to
openly contemplate.
Summarv
Up to this juncture then our comparison and evaluation has
illustrated that what counts as relevant evidence from the global
purview loses much of its purchase when reduced to the nation-state
level. We have observed that essentially different, and often anti-
thetical, priorities have ruled action in these areas at the national
level, priorities which the global level perspective suggests ought to
be supplanted, or at least reduced in importance. These findings now
return us to the leading question of this study and to an assessment of
how successful we have been in achieving the goals which were proposed
at the outset.
May we now conclude that the energy, food, and population issues
have not generally been treated as "crisis" issues in the four countries
discussed here? Perhaps a qualified "yes" is the most appropriate
response, for these issues have certainly not received the degree of
attention which the proponents of the global crisis view have argued
they require. Our position is qualified by a further more important
question, however, which deals with the issue of whether the findings
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presented in this study have served to discredit the utility of assum-
ing a global perspective on these issues. This query requires a more
detailed response because it addresses the critical questions of why
the global crisis view has not had a greater affect on the policies
discussed here, and how the global purview may be adapted to more
directly inform political action.
The analysis presented thus far has revealed more about the
limitations and lack of acceptance of the global crisis viewpoint, than
it has about any fundamental questioning of its validity. To recapitu-
late, we have found that while all four states have experienced the
physical manifestations of these crises to varying degrees, their
perception, understanding, and response to them has been filtered
through a number of national and international factors. The major
factors have included their ideological, cultural, and, most importantly,
developmental value systems which have exercised varying degrees of
influence. In addition, policy responses in these three areas have
been conditioned by the extent of natural resources, the level of
industrialization, and each state's position in the international
economy.
Given the purposes of this study, it is not necessary to specu-
late here on which factor has been most crucial, for their significance
lies in the fact that all of these are factors which the global level
perspective tends to minimize or leave entirely out of its analysis.
As has been suggested earlier, the persuasiveness of the global
perspective relies heavily on accepting that these issues are beyond,
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or should be beyond parochial nation-state interests. On the occasions
when the global view acknowledges the impediments presented by nation-
state differences, it still argues that the character of individual
nation-state behavior in these areas must fundamentally change, in
view of the growing world-wide impact of their actions.
This study has presented considerable evidence to the contrary
that such is still not the case. But what has emerged could not be
called conclusive proof that these issues are therefore not world
"crises", rather it leads us to more probing questions concerning the
nature of these issues and the political stakes which are at issue in
the contest over which system of valuation will, or should, determine
their resolution.
Some Leading Questions and Issues
Ultimately, the ecologically based world crisis perspective is
suggesting that a new system of valuation, or, at the least, a funda-
mental revision of the current hierarchy of values, is necessary to
resolve these issues. In varying manners the key question raised by
the global crisis proponents is whether "growth"—and all of the
assumptions concerning humankind's relationship to the earth which
underlie this concept— should continue to be the paramount concern
when determining how to resolve these issues. They suggest that it is
perhaps time for the question of preserving continued growth to become
secondary in the face of current world ecological imperatives—of which
issues such as the three discussed here are serious manifestations.
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The stakes are high, for to address these issues primarily in terms of
their potential costs and benefits to continued growth ignores their
more serious threats to the future survival of all humankind, whereby
the irresponsibility of one endangers the future of all equally. As we
have seen, in the four cases presented here this question has not been
seriously addressed and, in the case of all but Tanzania, none of these
governments have chosen to begin to deal with the political questions
which would be posed by a no-growth or limited-growth scenario. Their
approach to these issues in general continues to be informed by the
retention of an essentially benevolent concept of growth and expansion,
a concept which has been the primary motor of the industrial-develop-
mental model which they have adopted.
This outcome suggests two alternative assessments of what our
study has revealed about the world crisis view. One conclusion could
be that the problem lies with the proponents of the global perspective
who, it may be argued, have not convincingly presented their arguments
on the ecological crisis. Thus, this argument may be discounted in
its own terms for a number of various reasons. The other conclusion,
however, suggests that we have shown that the global perspective lacks
purchase within the contemporary international context, largely because
it fails to address itself adequately to the political implications
of its position and to the political stakes which are or would be
involved in its practical application. From this vantage point, there
is a fundamental ommission in the ecological critique of the current
world situation which makes it largely irrelevant to the political
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context where, ultimately, it must be implemented. We believe that it
is evident that it is the latter assessment which is in order here.
The crux of the problem lies in the global perspective's over-
weening concern with the a priori question of the earth's and human-
kind's survival. In many instances this concern may quickly become
translated into survival at any costs, leading to any number of extreme
approaches to ensure the earth's survival. This imperative lies at
the base of the ecological perspective when it argues that we are
endangering all of humankind if we continue to act in the same unques-
tioned exploitative manner toward earth and its resources as we have
in the past. Presented with the current ecological conditions, one
individual's or state's irresponsibility in this area endangers all,
for it now requires that all begin to act in a more ecologically con-
scious manner. In other words, the terms by which individual and
state behavior was previously judged have been altered and now must
be evaluated in other terms.
The force of this position derives from the physical and biologi-
cal evidence (e.g. pollution, resource exhaustion, water shortages)
which overwhelmingly indicates that we have to change patterns of
behavior (e.g. growth without considering its ecological costs;.
Therefore, when this calculus is applied to the three issues which
were the subject of this study we find that they are considered to be
"world" issues primarily because they are manifestations of deteriora-
ting world ecological conditions—for they represent their most serious
threat in their ecological guise, not due to their political or social
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consequences
.
Since they are essentially different kinds of world issues, which
immediately involve the future of life on the planet, they require a
different type of valuation and approach, for they endanger our
survival if we continue to deal with them only insofar as they endanger
or contribute to continued growth. In ecological terms, the world
consequences of continued population growth must take precedence over
the individual right to reproduce at will; the environmental costs of
producing more food through technologically and energy intensive
methods must now be considered; as must the increased consequences of
growing production and consumption of fossil fuels. The limits of our
capacity to grow under the old patterns are called into question as the
ecological costs of growth may now outweigh its social and economic
benefits. Under these new circumstances, the old system of compromise
and trade-offs is sorely limited or no longer applicable, since in
ecological terms you cannot quantify the costs of energy resource
depletion or the environmental costs of increased food production.''
One cannot speak of isolated issues either, for within the holistic
purview of ecology these issues cannot be independently isolated and
resolved. They are all interdependent and an individual solution to one
may exacerbate another if all are not considered uniformly. Thus the
growth cum survival question must now take precedence over all other
8
considerations
.
But what is left out of the global perspective as it is presented
is crucial, for it becomes more than just a question of applying a
283
different language of evaluation to these issues. There must also be
an equally pressing concern with the possible political implications
and potential outcomes of this process. The paramount question should
not just be one of survival, for that can become a morally vacuous
debate, but of survival under what conditions. Unfortunately, this is
a question which has not received sufficient attention from proponents
of the global crisis view and, among those who have focused on this
concern, there has been a general tendency to foresee the necessity for
dire, non-democratic alternatives to current political systems.^*
Therefore, it is not the relative accuracy of the global crisis
position which is most importantly in question here, but rather its
possible political implications which should be the focus of concern.
Although there has been a relative dearth of materials in this area, in
the early 1970s Peter Bachrach and Elihu Bergman, in their study of the
political aspects of the United States' population policy, hinted at
some of the political issues which the global ecological perspective
had raised:
The ecologists could well be right in their predictions
of ecological catastrophe for mankind in the foresee-
able future unless fundamental socioeconomic and political
changes are forthcoming. Certainly their predictions and
supporting analysis cannot be discounted. They demand
thorough and deep scrutiny. But in the course of the
scrutinizing, fundamental and complex political issues
—
issues which they ignore or gloss over—must also be
analyzed and evaluated. This is of utmost importance for
it is not inconceivable that the political costs in terms
of individual freedom required to reach a 'state of global
equilibrium' is too high— even if ecological catastrophe
is the alternative. 10
Indeed, it may be argued that in their rush to propose a new
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logic for conceiving of these "world" issues the global ecological
perspective has largely overlooked the social and political costs of
its application. They have concentrated on only one dimension of these
multi-dimensional problems, and in suggesting that the ecological
dimension be paramount, they have based their position primarily on
the evidence presented in this realm. In doing so, however, they have
undermined the efficacy of their position in two important respects. In
the first place, by confining the debate to the ecological realm it has
been relegated to an area where, despite its scientific aura, no defini-
tive proof on the accuracy of its position is available concerning the
actual boundaries of the earth's carrying capacity. The current argu-
ment is based largely upon the projection of existing trends of
resource exploitation and utilization into the future; in truth,
resource exhaustion is still more of a promise than a fact and thus it
cannot be convincingly argued or proved. Moreover, by the time such
"hard" evidence is available, it will, in many cases be too late to
remedy the situation.
More importantly, by confining itself essentially to the ecologi-
cal dimension, the global crisis perspective oftens appears to present
itself in an apolitical position, or in one which takes a generally
static view of the political realm. Presented in this fashion, this
perspective fails to take sufficient account of the political and
social factors which underlie the world ecological crisis. It does
>t, for example, explicitly address the ideological sources of the
'unlimited growth" syndrome, nor the social institutions and practices
nol
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which sustain it.
Recently, a number of authors have argued that what is required
in this area is a fuller consideration of the social and class nature
of world issues such as those discussed here, both at the national and
international level. 11 Some have suggested, for example, that the
leading question here is whether the ecological crisis should be seen
more crucially as a symptom of the bankruptcy of the Western capitalist
industrial growth model of development, upon which the current world
market system is based. From this viewpoint, these "crises" most
importantly reveal the limits of individualistic values, especially
when they are underlain by the central belief that humankind's
relationship to earth is essentially one of exploitation and domina-
12
tion, thus viewing earth as only a support system for human beings.
Given the centrality of these beliefs, it follows that the most
important source of the ecological crisis is the consequent manner in
which populations of the advanced industrial societies have sought an
individualistically oriented, materially based, self-actualization,
primarily through the acquisition of commodities. In these terms,
growth is only necessary in these high-consumption societies because
commodities are viewed as the primary means of need satisfaction, and
the dominant social structure is set up to satisfy needs in this
manner. This analysis thus leads to the conclusion that the world
ecological crisis is closely tied to the capitalist mode of production
and social organization which is prevalent in advanced industrial
societies who have, not surprisingly, contributed disproportionately to
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the world's ecological problems (e.g. pollution, energy resource
utilization, food consumption).
In opening the way to a fuller consideration of the social and
class nature of these "world" issues, this approach has also begun to
explore some of the difficult political issues which the global
crisis perspective has raised, but not sufficiently addressed. Such an
approach, we would argue, must include a critical analysis of the
benevolent connotations which are often attached to the language of the
ecologists and environmentalists, especially when juxtaposed against
their adversaries of the growth/industrialization position. More
surely must be said concerning the inherent conservative and elitest
bias of the global ecological perspective when concepts such as "limits
to growth", "equilibrium", and "conservation" are unselfconsciously
applied to national and international systems which are characterized
by gross inequalities in wealth, resources, and resource utilization.
At both the national and international level, more attention needs to
be devoted to what is involved in turning the ecologists' "must" into
"can be".
14
At the international level, for example, based only upon the
findings of the comparative analysis carried out above, it is clear that
the implications of ecological concepts like "equilibrium" and "conserv-
ation" would be drastically different for those at the top and bottom
of the world's wealth and resource ladders. Being satisfied with what
one has will understandably be quite harder to accept if one is at the
bottom of the ladder, especially if the existing distribution system
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is considered to be inequitable in important respects. It should also
be remembered that "conservation" may only mean the planned, efficient
use of resources, rather than a change in the manner and system bv
which resources are utilized—thus it has real meaning only for those
who currently have access to or already utilize that which is being
conserved. At the international level, depending on who enforces it,
"conservation" could serve only to perpetuate the existing inter-
national market system in which proportionately few benefit most. Thus
it becomes irrelevant or dangerously threatening for many if its pro-
ponents do not explicitly address the political issues which it raises
concerning the future distribution and sharing of scarce resources.^
This approach, which emphasizes the political aspects of these world
issues, serves to underline their class nature in world terms, and
suggests that since the responsibility for the world's "crises" is not
shared equally, one should not expect that all will willingly sacrifice
equally
.
At the national level as well, a more politically conscious
approach raises questions about the possible political costs of imple-
menting what are regularly viewed as technical solutions to our
ecological problems. Once again, when blanket concepts like "conserv-
ation" are applied to national systems which exhibit serious social and
political inequalities, they will surely involve different costs and
benefits to individuals, depending largely upon their socioeconomic
position. When we speak of limiting some rights as a necessary means
for successfully dealing with the ecological crisis, in this kind of
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socio-political context we must be clear about what "rights" will be
limited, whether they are, or have been, equally shared, and if one
should so willingly relinquish them in a political structure where,
perhaps, they have never flourished. 16
Therefore, from this viewpoint changes in social arrangements
and modes of production become essential steps in successfully dealing
with ecological issues, for they must deal directly with questions
concerning the distribution of power and social amenities in any
society, and with changes in the social and economic institutions which
are as much the source of these problems as have been the behavior
patterns of individuals.
In summary, we have suggested that what is sorely needed are
concerted attempts to infuse ecological concepts and the global per-
spective which they comprise with political and social meaning. Their
social and political implications must be more fully examined, so that
the choices which they present are not viewed as limited technological
ones, but ones which represent clear moral and political choices as
well. Ultimately, we have argued that the chief weakness of the
global crisis perspective has been its presentation as an essentially
limiting framework which imposes strict limits on what have previously
purportedly been free choices. Integral to this perspective has been
a largely static view of the international political system and a
similar view of human nature which sees the necessary changes in
behavior patterns being imposed, rather than freely arrived at—two of
the chief reasons why the authoritarian persuasion is the most popular
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political alternatives envisioned for the future.
We would argue that the adoption of a global perspective on these
and other "world" issues does not inevitably lead in this direction,
where the concentration of ever greater decision-making power in
fewer hands is necessary to make the regrettable but essential decisions
to ensure our survival. While it may very well signal the limits of
individualistic, self-oriented behavior in an increasingly finite
world, the ecological perspective may also open the way to opportunities
for more collectively oriented behavior as well, since one of the
salient features of this perspective is the central focus which is
directed at the interdependence of all parts. Therefore, although
this may establish limits on humankind's future relationship with its
environment, it does not necessarily follow that it must also impose
limits on humankind's relationship with itself. There appears to be no
compelling reason why it cannot open the door to a greater degree of
bottom-up participation and decision-making, and thus to a more demo-
cratic and participatory alternative than has thus far been foreseen.
The concept of ecological "limits" has the potential to become
a liberating rather than a confining political and social concept, for
it may force us to at last deal directly with some of the seminal
political issues which societies have historically faced. As one author
has recently suggested in this vein, the ecological crisis has the
potential to return politics to classical dimensions, by returning
issues which have in the recent past been viewed essentially as techni-
cal and economic issues to the political realm where they belong.
17
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If the ecological perspective can be utilized to debunk the myths of
the unquestioned benefits of unlimited growth and reveal its pathology,
than its democratic potential may be realized. Indeed, there may be an
opportunity in the oncoming conditions of scarcity to improve the
conditions of life, if it enables us to more directly confront the
enduring issues of liberty and equality in the political terms which
their resolution requires. If the prospect of an expanding material
pie in the future can no longer be employed to defray action on these
issues, then this process can become one which involves the conscious
participation of citizens who recognize the clear moral and political
choices which the resolution of these issues will involve.
No one would suggest that it will make the resolution of these
issues any easier, for it offers no indication of the direction in
which the process will travel. But in presenting us with the question
of societal and world survival, we are strongly suggesting that the
ecological perspective does not have to address these issues in a
manner which precludes or minimizes the political consequences of the
choices involved. Rather, we have suggested that these issues must
be addressed in a manner which places the conditions of humankind's
survival on an equal footing with the question of survival itself.
FOOTNOTES
Chapter I
This is still an aspect of even the most recent works in these
areas. For example, see the newest "bestseller" in the energy area,
Robert Stogaugh and Daniel Yergin, eds., Energy Future-Report of the
Energy Project of the Harvard Business School (New York: Random
House, 1979), especially Chapter 1.
2
Of course not all of the works in these areas fit under this
general categorization, but it is not unfair to say that a large pro-
portion do
—
particularly those works which have gained some measure of
public notoriety and which have had a marked affect on the public
consciousness and perception of these issues. Examples of these
include Stobaugh and Yergin, Ibid.; New York Times Staff, Give Us This
Day: A Report on the World Food Crisis (New York: Arno Press, 1975);
Lester Brown, By Bread Alone (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975);
also his Redefining National Security (Washington, D. C. : Worldwatch
Institute, 1977); Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York:
Ballentine, 1968); and the first two of the Club of Rome's publications
Donella Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth (New York: New American
Library, 1972); and M. Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel, Mankind at the
Turning Point (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1974).
3
We would suggest that most authors do not carefully make the
distinction between the terms international and global whereas, for the
purposes of this work, such a distinction is crucial. We do not wish
to be bound by an artificial conceptual assimilation of these two con-
cepts such as seems to occur in much of the analyses. We believe that
it is more useful to employ international when referring to the exist-
ing world "political" system, and global when referring to the world's
"ecological" system. In the concluding chapter we attempt to illus-
trate the critical importance of this distinction in understanding the
ideological presuppositions which many of the adherents to the "global"
perspective make.
^Borgstrom has produced a number of major studies on the world's
food and population situations. This statement is taken from The Food
and People Dilemma (Duxbury, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1973), p. 59.
The Population Bomb, p. 176.
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By Bread Alone
, pp. 248-249. In a later work Brown has ex-panded on this argument and suggested that the ecological threats mani-fested by the food, population, and energy situations are now great er
than any military threats to national security, see Redefining
National Security
.
A similar position is presented by the authors of
Mankind at the Turning Point when they declare "... the scale and
global character of the present crises differ from the nature and scale
of most past crises", p. 9.
7
See Lester B. Pearson, Partners in Development
. Report of the
Commission on International Development. (New York: Praeeer Publishers
1969).
His comments were reported in the Boston Globe
,
29 April 1977.
Interestingly, the article described him as a "leading Western
analyst of the problems of developing nations".
9
The New York Times
,
19 April 1977.
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,Cooper s comments were reported in the Boston Globe
, 1 November
1979.
"^In addition, this does not even address the questionable valid-
ity of these ecological arguments when taken on their own terms. There
are critically important disagreements among the "experts" in these
fields over the validity and accuracy of many of the basic concepts
which they employ in their analyses. See, for instance, Georg Borg-
strom' s discussion of how fuzzy the meaning of "overpopulation" becomes
when it goes beyond the consideration of a simple person/land ratio, to
include aspects such as quality of nutrition and quality of life. The
Food and People Dilemma
, pp. 24-25. In the energy area the major study
of the Ford Foundation's Energy Policy Project, A Time to Choose (New
York: Lippencott, 1974), devotes an extensive section to how signifi-
cantly different "energy resource" estimates can be arrived at, depend-
ing on the definitions and nomenclature used and the source of the
estimate. See Appendix D of the study. For a good general overview
of this issue see Nick Eberstadt, "Myths of the Food Crisis," New York
Review of Books
,
February 19, 1976, pp. 33-37, which is an overall
critique of the inexactness of the terms used by many food and popula-
tion "experts".
1
2
Clear instances of works which resort to these kinds of appeals
include, Georg Borgstrom, Focal Points (New York: Macmillan, 1973),
part III; Herbert Marx, ed., The World Food Crisis (New York: H.W.
Wilson, 1975), section VII; Brown, By Bread Alone , part V; and Mankind
at the Turning Point, chapter 9.
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13
To cite just one instance, the sweeping generalizations made
by Lester Brown in a study on food and population, done under the
auspices of the Overseas Development Council, are typical of those made
by the advocates of the "global Crisis" perspective:
"We know that most good land in the world is already under cultiva-
tion. We know that, with few exceptions, the most desirable irriga-
tion sites have already been developed. We know that energy, and
therefore fertilizer, will be more costly in the future than in the
past. We know that in the more advanced countries, where yields are
already high, further increases in production will be far more
costly than those of the past." (By Bread Alone , p. 11)
There is very little attention, however, to what we don't know ecolog-
ically and, in particular, to what has been left out of this analysis
in political terms— such as why "cost" (read profitability) is the
determinant factor in his future projections.
14
Popular examples of "pessimistic" appraisals include Robert
Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (New York: W.W. Norton,
1976); the two Club of Rome works which have been previously cited;
Ehrlich, The Population Bomb ; Ehrlich and Denis Pirages, Ark II :
Social Responses to Environmental Imperatives (New York: Viking,
1974). The "optimist's" school is best represented by the works of
Herman Kahn and the Hudson Institute, particularly The Next 200 Years
(New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1975). For an earlier
example see Richard Meier, Science and Economic Development (Cambridge:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1966). For an example
which deals specifically with the food situation see D. Gale Johnson,
World Food Problems and Prospects (Washington, D.C.: American Enter-
prise Institute, 1975).
15
For examples of this tendency see Heilbroner, Ibid.; William
Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity (San Francisco: W.H.
Freeman, 1977); and Garrett Hardin, Exploring New Ethics for Survival
(New York: Viking, 1972).
l60ne has only to peruse the "new" bookshelf of any library
currently to see how popular these "crises" topics have become in
recent years. For a most recent example of the tendency to assign a
central role to these issues in the world's future developmental pros-
pects see, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (hence-
forth OECD) , Interfutures: Facing the Future-Mastering the Probable
and Managing the Unpredictable (Final Report of the Interfutures Pro-
ject) (Paris: OECD, September 1979).
17
A good outline of the argument which ties economic growth to
increased energy consumption may be found in Gerald Foley, The Energy
Question (London: Penguin Books, 1976), chapter 6. On the population
question, an excellent critical analysis of this type of argument is
presented in Susan George, How the Other Half Dies (Montclair, New
Jersey, 1977), pp. 31-45.
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The classic study, which laid the theoretical groundwork for
the use of ideological and institutional differences to classify nations
along a "developmental" scale is Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell,
Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1966). For an application of this approach to the compar-
ative public policy area see Peter Merkl, Modern Comparative Politics
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Company, 1970), chapters 7-8.
19
It is quite possible that the "process" aspect of a policy's
formulation will assume a more important role in some parts of the
analysis than has been indicated for it here. While it is in fact
quite difficult, and often wrongheaded , to try to separate the
"process" aspect from the "content" aspect in any policy analysis, we
only wish to make clear that our concern in this study is specifically
with the policy "content", not with how it came to have that content
—
whether through interest group politics, one-party politics, or mili-
tary edict. Our definition of "content" is borrowed from Austin
Ranney and includes "... the set of objects the policy is intended to
affect, the particular course of events desired, the particular line of
action chosen, the particular declaration made, and the particular
actions taken. . . " Austin Ranney, ed., Political Science and Public
Policy (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1968), p. 8. We believe that the
process /content issue has more relevance to the methodological implica-
tions of the policy analysis approach itself. See the Appendix: A
Methodological Postscript.
20
An illustrative example is the clear difference between the
United States' national and international policy on the population
issue, which was recently described in the following manner:
"."
. . the U.S., a leader in advocating world population growth stabil-
ization and the largest funder of international family planning pro-
grams, still has no national population policy, and has no comprehen-
sive plan for limiting its resource consumption." From a report by
Zero Population Growth, reported in the Springfield Daily News 27
June 1977.
Chapter II
^The Party has recently united with Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi
Party and been renamed Chama Cha Mapinduzi.
2
There are presently 17 administrative regions, each of which
may be divided into two or more districts.
Contained in four volumes: Freedom and Unity (London: Oxford
University Press, 1967); Freedom and Socialism (Dar es Salaam: Oxford
University Press, 1968); Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism (London: Oxford
University Press, 1968); and Freedom and Development (Dar es Salaam:
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Oxford University Press, 1973).
4
One of the better accounts of the early phase in Tanzania's
development strategy from one who was very close to the situation may
be found in Cranford Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), especially chapters 4-8.
Indeed, under the precepts of African Socialism economic poli-
cies were tailored to meet social needs and goals. See David Feldman,
"The Economics of Ideology: Some Problems of Achieving Rural Socialism
in Tanzania," in Politics and Change in Developing Countries
,
ed. Colin
Leys (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 247-275.
^From the Second Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Develop-
ment (1st July 1969-30th June 1974) , volume 1 (Dar es Salaam: Govern-
ment Printer, 1969), p. 26. For a fuller exposition see Nyerere,
"Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism," in Freedom and Unity
, pp.
162-171.
^
Second Five Year Plan
,
Ibid., p. 1.
g
The Sunday News (Dar es Salaam), 2 February 1967. The most
complete presentation of the government's position is contained in
Nyerere, Principles and Development: A Memorandum by the President of
the United Republic of Tanzania and President of TANU , June 1966 (Dar
es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967).
9
The Wall Street Journal , 5 August 1977.
"^Source is Africa Reports 22 (November-December 1977).
11
According to World Bank Tables, 1977 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1977), Tanzania ranks 121st out of 145 countries in the world in
per capita Gross National Product. It was also considered to be among
the thirty-two nations "most seriously affected" by the world's oil and
food situations in the judgment of the United Nations in August 1974.
See United Nations, Food and Agricultural Organization, The State of
Food and Agriculture, 1975 (Rome: UNFAO, 1976).
From Ministry of Tourism and Information, Tanzania Today-A Por-
trait of the United Republic (Nairobi: University Press of Africa,
1968), p. 113.
13Tanzania's food policies also relate to a number of other food
products such as livestock, fish, and dairy products, but these remain
subsidiary in most of the populations diets to these major grains. For
example, according to the United Nations, Yearbook of International
Trade Statistics, 1976 (Rome: 1977), between 1971-1975 only livestock
production increased in Tanzania, by 12%; fish production remained the
same while the production of milk and meat both declined, by 8% and 6%
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respectively, p. 137. Thus the discussion of "food policy" will
deal with policies directed at the staple crops, which have been of
most concern to the government.
14
Reproduced in Freedom and Unity
,
p. 183. This was truly a
massive undertaking, for before independence Tanzania's rural area
consisted primarily of small scattered settlements where the main
method of cultivation was the slash and burn shifting cultivation,
most suitable to subsistance farming. Villages were an exceptional
occurrance. For a more detailed discussion of these points see
Helge Kjekshus, "The Tanzanian Villagization Policy: Implementation
Lessons and Ecological Dimensions," Canadian Journal of African
Studies 11(1977) :269-282.
"^
Freedom and Unity
,
p. 236.
16
Tanganyika Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Develop-
ment (1 July 1964-30 June 1969), volume 1 (Dar es Salaam: Govern-
ment Printer, 1964), p. 21. For an account of the early problems
with the settlement program see Hugh W. Stephans, The Political Trans-
formation of Tanganyika: 1920-1967 (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1968)
.
"^Currently, the agricultural sector is made up of private
estates who produce primarily export crops, state farms, co-operatives,
and small-scale peasant farmers who are mostly in villages. 'When
referring to the government's food policy, most often we will be
speaking of efforts directed at the small-scale farmer, unless other-
wise indicated. For a fuller discussion see John Connell, "The
Evolution of Tanzanian Rural Development," Journal of Tropical
Geography 38(June 1974): 7-18.
1 ft
See the Development Plan for Tanganyika, 1961-1962 to 1963-
1964 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1961); and Tanganyika Five
Year Plan . Expenditures on industry grew from 4% to 14%.
1 q
See Pratt, The Critical Phase , who was an advisor to Nyerere
during this period. He notes a clear failure of the government to
effectively implement the first five year plan's agricultural policies
and states "... the most important single factor which explains it
(production increases) is the increasing effort put into agricultural
production by thousands of individual peasants."., p. 176. See also
Colin Leys, "The Analysis of Planning," in Politics and Change , ed.
Colin Leys. He notes in regard to the first five year plan that
"... within a year of the Plan's publication it was commonly felt
that it was no longer relevant", p. 271.
297
20
See, for example, Knud Erik Svendsen, ed.
, Self-Reliant
Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1969). He
points out that while total agricultural marketed output increased by
7.4% annually between 1960/1962 and 1966, export crop production was
significantly better. In this period production of cotton increased
by 18% annually
,
coffee by 15%, cashew-nuts by 12%, and tobacco by 19%,
p. 298. For the Figures see Tanzania Today
,
Appendix Six, p. 275.
21
See Michael Lofchie, "Political and Economic Origins of
African Hunger," Journal of Modern African Studies 13 (December 1975):
551-568. He argues that during the 1965-1970 period, when food pro-
duction was falling, export production grew about 4% annually for all
Africa. A Similar assessment is contained in Ingrid Palmer, Food and
the New Agricultural Techniques (Geneva: United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development, 1972).
22
Lofchie, Ibid. Also see Bank of Tanzania, Economic Bulletin
(March 1972). The report on the 1971-1972 crop year states that all
food crops suffered declines while all export crop production grew
—
the one exception was sisal, then in the throes of a ten year decline
in world demand due to its replacement by synthetics.
23
Based on data in United Nations, Yearbook of International
Trade Statistics, 1976 (New York: United Nations, 1977).
24
Second Five Year Plan
,
p. 133.
See, for example, Kjekshus, "Tanzanian Villagization Policy,"
and Clyde R. Ingle, From Village to State in Tanzania (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1972). Both note that land shortages for food crop
production, due to their replacement by cash crops, was recognized as
a problem in Tanzania as early as 1947.
^
Tanzania Today
,
p. 113.
27
Leonard Berry and Robert Kates, "Views on Environmental Pro-
blems in East Africa'," Africa Review 2 (March 1973) : 299-314
.
28
Ibid., p. 309. It is also noteworthy that irrigation, although
it has been recognized by the government as a "necessity" for stable
crop production since the mid-sixties, is not a viable alternative at
this time due to its cost. According to one source in 1977, only 1%
of the total land area under cultivation was irrigated in any crop
year. S. Nieuwolt, "The Influence of Rainfall on Rural Population
Distribution in Tanzania," Journal of Tropical Geography 44 (June
1977) :43-56.
29
For the text of the Declaration see Nyerere, Freedom and Social-
ism, pp. 231-250.
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30
Second Five Year Plan
, p. 29.
31
From a speech by Nyerere to the TANU Annual Conference,
May 28, 1969. Reproduced in Freedom and Development
, p. 91, p. 93.
32
In "Socialism and Rural Development," for example, Nyerere
elaborates on the Ujamaa scheme and emphasizes that food crop growing
is the first priority of the new villages. Found in Svendsen, Self-
Reliant Tanzania
, pp. 246-271.
33
Second Five Year Plan, p. xv.
34
Tanzania Ten Years After Independence
.
Report by the Presi-
dent of TANU (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Information and Broad-
casting, 1972), p. 30.
35
The study is by S.M. Mbilinyi, R, Mabele, and M.L. Kyomo,
"The Economic Struggle of the TANU Government," in Towards Ujamaa
(Twenty Years of TANU Leadership)
,
ed. Gabriel Ruhumbika (Dar es
Salaam: East African Literature Bureau, 1974), pp. 59-107. Similar
arguments may be found in Lofchie, "Origins of African Hunger"; Pratt,
The Critical Phase
,
chapter 8; and R.L. Raikes, "Ujamaa and Rural
Socialism," Review of African Political Economy (May-October 1974).
36
Mbilinyi, Ibid., based on their interpretation of the data,
p. 93.
37
Bank of Tanzania, Economic Bulletin (December 1973); and The
Sunday News
,
17 November 1974.
38
For a fuller discussion see Kjekshus, "Tanzanian Villagiza-
tion Policy".
39
See the Economic Survey, 1975-1976 (Dar es Salaam: Govern-
ment Printer, 1976), which emphasizes the increased use of pricing as
an aspect of food policy.
^%.S. Department of Agriculture, "Tanzania Boosts Food Output,
Cuts Imports," Foreign Agriculture Reports , January 16, 1978, pp. 10-11.
lofchie, "Origins of African Hunger", and Kjekshus, "Tanzanian
Villagization Policy", consider this problem to be a prominent factor
in the deterioration of the food situation, as do a number of other
observers. See note 56 below.
42
Data is from Gerhard Tschannerl, "The Political Economy of
Rural Water Supply," African Environment l(0ctober 1975): 51-76. He
points out that the provision of water is one of the most expensive
services for the government to provide. For a similar assessment see
United Nations, Economic and Social Commission, Services for Children
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and Special Assistance, Recommendation for Executive Director on Pro-ject Proposed by United Republic of Tanzania, 20 April 1977 fftW v^-ri-
1977). ~
43
For example see Bank of Tanzania, Economic Bulletin (December
1972 and June 1974); and the Economic Survey 1971/1972 and the Economic
Survey 1973/1974 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1972 and 1974).
44
Economic Bulletin
,
September 1976, p. 7.
45
This is the assessment of the Bank of Tanzania in its Economic
Bulletin
,
March 1976. It is interesting to note that the major por-
tion of the decrease was in food grains which were down bv 79% in
1976 (see Table 3).
46
,The major contributors will be the World Food Program, the
United States, Britain, and Canada. See the report in the Quarterly
Economic Review of Tanzania and Mauritius (London: Economic Intelli-
gence Unit, Limited, first quarter 1978).
47
Increased acreage no longer appears to be a significant short-
term alternative to better husbandry. Africa
,
February 1978.
48
Recommendation for Executive Director on Project Proposed by
United Republic of Tanzania .
49
The crop loss estimates are based on government studies con-
ducted in 1977. Discussed in African Research Bulletin 15 (January-
February 1978):4580.
^^An outline of the Plan is presented in Quarterly Economic
Review, first quarter 1978, and Foreign Agriculture Reports , January
16, 1978.
51
The government admits this, see Foreign Agricultural Reports ,
Ibid.; Quarterly Economic Review , fourth quarter 1977; and Amon
Nsekela, the High Commissioner of Tanzania in the Court of St. James,
"Nationalism and Social Engineering in Tanzania," Africa , May 1978,
pp. 70-72.
52
Compare the views of the Minister of Agriculture, cited in
Quarterly Economic Review , first quarter 1978, with those of the Bank
of Tanzania, Economic Bulletin , September 1977.
53
"The Arusha Declaration Ten Years After," (excerpts), Inter-
national Development Review 19 (January 1977): 3-4.
Ibid.
55 T , .,Ibid.
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5 6
For example see Lofchie, "Origins of African Hunger," Tschan-
nerl, "Rural Water Supply"; L.V. Kiva, "Tropical Africa: Certain
Problems of Revolutionary-Democratic Reform in the Countryside (Ujamaa
in Tanzania)," International Journal of Politics (Winter 1976/1977):
87-105; Dean McHenry, "Peasant Participation in Communal Farming:
The Tanzanian Experience," African Studies Review 20 (December 1977):
43-64; and James DeVries, "Agricultural Extension and Development:
Ujamaa Villages and the Problem of Institutional Change," Community
Development Journa l 13 (January 1978): 11-20.
"^Similar assessments are found in Connell, "Tanzanian Rural
Development"; DeVries, Ibid.; Kiva, Ibid.; and McHenry, Ibid.
58
Nsekela, "Nationalism and Social Engineering in Tanzania",
p. 70.
59
It is necessary here to make some reservations about the accu-
racy of the demographic statistics which are currently available from
most regions of Africa. Most are notoriously unreliable and should
only be interpreted as indications of general trends, subject to sub-
stantial error. The problem is succinctly discussed in J.G.C. Blacker
"Demography," in East Africa: Its People and Resources
,
ed. W.T.W.
Morgan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 41-57. The
Tanzanian situation is discussed more fully in R. Henin and E. Egero,
The 1967 Population Census of Tanzania: A Demographic Analysis (Dar
es Salaam: University College, Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land
Use Planning, October 1972).
^Data in this paragraph is drawn from World Bank Tables, 1976 ;
Population Refernce Bureau, 1978 Population Data Shee t (New York: Popu-
lation Reference Bureau, 1978); and Africa Reports 23 (February 1978).
^There are a number of studies which emphasize the crucial
importance of the internal variabilities to understanding the Tanzanian
population situation; including Ian Thomas, ed., Population Density in
Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: University College, Bureau of Resource
Assessment and Land Use Planning, 1967); and W.A. Hance, "The Crudeness
of Crude Densities," in Population Growth and Economic Development in
Africa , eds. S.H. Ominde and C.N. Ejiogu (London: Heineman, 1972).
^Tanzania has had only one official census since independence
which took place in 1967. The government undertook a second official
population census in 1978.
63
Henin and Egero, Population Growth in Africa , p. 52.
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64
One of the first instances was in the Second Five Year Plan
section on Commerce and Trade. A fuller discussion of these problemsfor Tanzania is undertaken in L.B. Monyake, "Spatial Redistribution
Other Policies and Programmes ," in Population in African Developer
ea. Pierre Cantrelle, volume 2 (Dolhain, Belgium: International Union
135
Scientlfic Study of Population, Ordina Editions, 1974), pp.
65
F^or a recent example see "Low Birth Rate in Central Africa
Causes Concern," New York Times 22 January 1978, which makes specific
reference to Tanzania.
66
F^or a current example of the public resistance to the govern-
ment's periodic attempts to implement this policy see the report in
Africa Reports
,
March-April 1978, p. 31.
67„
Cited in T.E. Smith, "Trends in Population Policy-Making in
English Speaking Sub-Saharan Africa," in The Population Factor in
African Studies
,
eds. R.P. Moss and R.J.A.R. Rathbone (London:
University of London Press, 1975), pp. 157-162.
68
Second Five Year Plan
,
p. xii.
69
Noted in Population Reference Bureau, World Population Growth
and Response 1965-1975 (New York: Population Reference Bureau,
1976)
,
p. 57. Also see the African Population Newsletter 25(June
1977)
,
pp. 16-18.
^The major contributors in the 1973-1975 period included the
United States, $4.7 million; Sweden, $4.6 million; Denmark, $1.3
million; Finland, $1.5 million; and Norway, $1.2 million. World Popu-
lation Growth and Response
,
p. 58.
""^A typical example of this perspective being proposed by an
influential international agency is the World Bank, Population Plan-
ning (Sector Working Paper) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, March
1972). In it population growth is clearly identified as a cause of
underdevelopment, and family planning is primarily defined as popula-
tion control, pp. 1-10. Another noted example of this view is John
C. Caldwell, ed.
,
Population Growth and Socioeconomic Change in West
Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975). This work was
hailed as a seminal work in African demography.
72
Svendsen, Self-Reliant Tanzania , who was a former professor
at University College, pp. 24-25.
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73
For a discussion of the African position in general at Bucha-
rest see "Africa and Its Population Growth," Population Bulletin 30
(January 1975), entire edition. Tanzania is specifically discussed
in Nancy Birdsall, "Health Planning and Population Policy in Africa,"
African Studies Review 19(September 1976):19-33.
74
The most notable presentation of the argument that population
growth may spur agricultural development in the African case is found
in Ester Boserup, The Conditions of Agricultural Growth (The Economics
of Agrarian Change Under Population Pressure) (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1965). Other examples of those who refute the proposition
that population is a "problem" for Africa include: Aderanti Adepoju,
"Population Policies in Africa: Problems and Prospects," African
Affairs
,
October 1975; and Samir Amin and Frances Okediji, "Land Use,
Agriculture and Food Supply, and Industrialization," in Population in
African Development
,
ed. Cantrelle, pp. 409-420.
^Adepoju, Ibid., p. 469.
7 6
By recent estimates, 99% of Tanzania's population uses fuel-
wood and 96% of the yearly consumption of timber is as fuelwood,
amounting to 1.8 tons per capita annual consumption. Data is drawn
from Erik P. Eckholm, Losing Ground: Environmental Stress and World
Food Prospects (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), pp. 96-98.
^An example of a succinct presentation of this assessment is
CM. Nyirabu, then Governor in the Bank of Tanzania, in the Bank's
Economic Bulletin
,
September 1974, pp. 23-24. A more detailed analy-
sis which supports his conclusions is available in David French,
"Energy for Africa's Future," Africa Report , May-June 1978, pp. 9-14.
78
Africa Report
,
July-August 1976, p. 26.
79
For example, see the Economic Survey 1975/1976 , the section
on Water and Power, p. 91. Also see the Quarterly Economic Review ,
2nd quarter 1978. A more detailed analysis is available in S.M.
Wangwe, "Factors Influencing Capacity Utilisation in Tanzanian Manu-
facturing," International Labour Review 115 (January-February 1977):
65-77.
80
C.D. Msuya, "Foreign Aid and Tanzanian Development," Rasili-
mali, January 1974, p. 4.
81Nyirabu, Economic Bulletin , pp. 23-24.
82
This conclusion is suggested by the account given in Leonard
Berrv, ed., Tanzania in Maps: Graphic Perspective of a Devel oping
Country (New York: Africa Publishing Corporation, 1973), especially
the section on "Energy Supplies", pp. 96-97. The argument
is made more
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forcefully in French, "Energy for Africa's Future". French was aformer consultant to USAID in Africa.
83
In 1962 only 4% of the fuelwood consumed was marketed and the
situation does not appear to have changed significantly. Tanzania in
Maps
,
Ibid., p. 96.
84
Second Five Year Plan
,
the section on the Industrial Sector
outlines these goals.
85
„Wangwe, Tanzanian Manufacturing", discusses the significance
of this project to the manufacturing sector.
86
Reported in US Department of Commerce, Overseas Business
Reports
,
March 1977, p. 6.
~
87
One of the more informed evaluations is presented by Reginald
H. Green, "Aspects of the World Monetary and Resource Transfer System
in 1974: A View From the Extreme Periphery," in A World Divided
,
ed.
G.K. Helleiner (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 251-
273. Green is a former economic advisor to the Treasury of the
United Republic of Tanzania.
Chapter III
These Presidents have included: Humberto Castelo Branco (1964-
1967); Arthur da Costa e Silva (1967-1969); after which the term of
office became five years with Emilio Garrastazu Medici (1969-1974);
Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979); and Joao Baptista Figuiredo, who assumed
office in March 1979.
2
The situation appears to be loosening somewhat as under Geisel
some political liberalization occurred and in January 1979 Institu-
tional Act No. 5 was revoked. This was the Act which gave the Presi-
dent the authority to close Congress at will and deprive citizens of
most political rights. The effects of these developments on the
military's dominance still remains to be seen. See The New York Times
,
7 January 1979, and the North American Congress on Latin America,
Report on the Americas 12 (November-December 1978) : 49-51
.
3
The income distribution question has now become a major issue m
Brazil. The government's own figures showed that between 1960-1970,
while the total income of all sector's rose, that the benefits gained
by the top 5% of income earners were grossly disproportionate. In this
period the top 5% share of the national income increased from 27% to
36%, while the next 15% of income earners retained their share at 27%—
thus the top quintile accounted for 63% of the national income. Mean-
while the lower 40% of income earners' share declined from 11% to 9%.
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For a recent account of this issue see the Latin Americ an Economic
Report, May 12, 1978, p. 144. (henceforth LAER) "
4
Recent indications are that multi-party participation in the
political system has become a real possibility. This development
will not, however, be a serious consideration here since during the
period under discussion in this chapter only two parties were allowed
to exist.
^Needless to say this is a somewhat oversimplified characteri-
zation. For one of the better accounts of the foundations of the
military regime's developmental strategy see Thomas Skidmore,
"Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil, 1937-
71," in Authoritarian Brazil
, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1973), pp. 3-46.
^From "The Brazilian Economy in 1975," in Brazil on the March
11 (London: Brazilian Embassy, September 1976), p. 45.
^The basic administrative divisions of Brazil are 5 Regions,
26 States, and 3974 Municipios.
8^ ,The percentages are drawn from Brazil s Energy and Heavy Indus-
tries (London: Brazilian Embassy, July 1977), p. 39. Two of the best
analyses of the "states" expanded role in the economy are: Werner
Baer, Richard Newfarmer, and Thomas Trebat, "On State Capitalism in
Brazil: Some New Issues and Questions," Inter-American Economic
Affairs 30(Winter 1976), pp. 69-91. One of their findings reveals
that between 1964-1974 the state's share of the nation's 300 largest
industrial assets increased from 17% to 32%, while its share of
comparable manufacturing assets increased from 8% to 16%— in both
cases the Brazilian private sector's share decreased the same percen-
tages. A more recnt discussion of these trends is presented in Jose
Roberto Mendonca de Barros and Douglas Graham, "The Brazilian Economic
Miracle Revisited: Private and Public Sector Initiatives in a Market
Economy," Latin American Research Review (13), pp. 5-38.
9 - i
For example, between 1967-1974 the value of Brazil s exports
increased from $1.6 billion to $8 billion. Foreign investment, which
stood at $1.7 billion in 1969, was at $5.5 billion in 1974 and had more
than doubled again to $12 billion in 1977. The foreign debt was at
$3.8 billion in 1968 and at $17 billion by 1974, reaching $40 billion
by 1978. Data is drawn from International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C.: IMF, monthly).
10
Brazil has, for instance, run a trade deficit (with the excep-
tion of 1977) since 1970 as well as had a negative balance of payments
in all years of the 1970s. Debt service has now reached massive pro-
portions, totaling $8 billion in 1978— fully 66% of the value of all
exports. Recent accounts of these issues and their constraining affects
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on the governments developmental priorities may be found in the LAER
October 27, 1978, and Bank of London and South America Review
, (here-
after BLSAR)
,
(London: Lloyds Bank International, Ltd.), October 1978.
11
For example, one recent account points out that in 1973 the
three states of Guanabara, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo—which
covered only 3.5% of Brazil's total land area and held 28.5% of the
population—accounted for 54% of the Gross Domestic Product, 71.4%
of total industrial output, and 26.3% of total agricultural output.
BLSAR
,
February 1978.
12aAccording to government figures, primary energy consumption
increased by two- thirds from 1966-1973. In the same period consumption
of petroleum more than doubled, as did electricity consumption. See
Anuario Estatistico do Brasil 1977 (Rio de Janeiro: Fundacao Institu-
te) Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, Secretaria de Planejamento da
Presidencia da Republica, 1978), p. 482. (hereafter IBGE, Annual Sta-
tistics)
.
13
Brazil's Energy and Heavy Industries
,
p. 6.
14
The structure of Brazil's energy consumption breaks down into
the following: oil and gas account for 48% of consumption, charcoal
and vegetable matter for 25%, electric power for 24%, and coal for 3%.
Data from Brazilian Bulletin (New York: Brazilian Government Trade
Bureau), October 1974. It is interesting to note that natural gas is
the least significant type of energy consumed, accounting for less
than 0.5% of total consumption from 1965-1975, and that the government
projects a reduction in its usage by 1985. Brazil's Energy and Heavy
Industries
,
p. 25.
Surprisingly, as late as 1976 imported coal still cost less per
ton to Brazil than did domestic coal, due to the poor development of the
coal industry. Brazil's Energy and Heavy Industries , p. 15.
16
Thomas Weil et al, Area Handbook for Brazil (XJashington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 25.
^One government source sees this problem becoming increasingly
important to the viability of the steel industry. See the discussion
in Brazil's Energy and Heavy7 Industries , pp. 30-31. The latest reli-
able estimate by the Brazilian National Space Research Institute is
that as much as one-tenth of the Amazon forest has already been razed
with no reliable knowledge about the future effects. See the Boston
Globe
,
16 January 1979.
18
From "Current Aspects of Brazil's Economy," Brazilian Bulletin ,
October 1974, p. 1. Brazil uses very little oil for heating or elec-
trical generation, its use is confined almost exclusively to these
strategic areas.
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19
From 1967-1974 production increased by 20%, but over the sameperiod domestic production fell from 38% of total consumption to only20/.. See Stefan Robock, Brazil: A Study in Development Progress(Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1975), p. 98. From 196 7-1973~aTonethe volume of oil imports tripled, while their cost increased fivetimes.
20 T . .It is interesting to point out that in 1969, when the govern-
ment announced its commitment to off-shore exploration, the greatest
oil potential lay in Brazil's shale depositis. Brazil had approxi-
mately 40% of the world's shale deposits then with a reliably estima-
ted oil-bearing potential of 800 billion barrels. The costs of
exploiting these deposits were deemed prohibitive then and they are
still generally neglected for this reason. For a fuller discussion
see Peter Seaborn Smith, Oil and Politics in Modern Brazil ^Toronto-
MacMillan, 1976). ~ ~
21
Peter Seaborn Smith, Ibid., is one who makes this argument,
pointing out that by 1970 oil reserves in Brazil had increased by only
one-third over the 1960 figure, not nearly sufficient given the
comparable increases in consumption. Also, between 1969-1972 the costs
of petroleum imports had grown from 10% to 12% of total import costs.
22
Brazil's Energy and Heavy Industries
,
p. 5.
23
These aspects of the electrical energy sector are. discussed
in Janet D. Henshall and R.P. Momsen, Jr., A Geography of Brazilian
Development (London: G.Bell and Sons, 1974), pp. 188-190; and in
U.S. Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports
,
December
1973. See also IBGE, Annual Statistics for statistical evidence of
the urban bias of the distribution of electric power among domiciles,
p. 268. It is also interesting to note that wood is still the third
largest source of energy behind oil and electricity, although its use
has declined steeply in the past decade. Its use for a fuel in house-
holds is most important in rural areas, but reliable statistics on
consumption and usage are scarce. See Brazil's Energy and Heavy
Industries
,
p. 25.
24
Brazil's Energy and Heavy Industries
,
p. 5.
25
See Projeto Do II Piano Nacional De Desenvolvimento PND (1975-
1979 (Brasilia: Republica Federativa Do Brasil, Setembxo de 1974),
chapter VIII, "Politica De Energia".
Statement is by Paulo Nogueira Batista, reported in Veja
,
23 July 1975.
27
Statement of Shigeaki Ueki, reported in Manchete , October 18,
1975, pp. 32-34.
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28_
i(
tor a concise summary of this agreement see Norman Gall
Arms for Brazil, Dangers for All," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
33(June 1976) :5-9. The primary attraction for West Germany was Brazil's
uranium resources. In 1976 Brazil's "proven reserves" were put at
16,500 tons, but preliminary explorations in the Amazon had produced
government estimates of potentially half a million tons, Jomal do
Brasil 10 April 1976. The commitment to nuclear also indicated how
grave the energy situation had become, for it jeopardized Brazil's
relations with the United States, whose government strongly objected
to the agreement with West Germany. But in the Brazilian government's
eyes it was apparently a risk worth taking.
29
Ueki's statements are reported in 0 Estado de S. Paulo
,
25 March 1976; Jornal do Brasil
, 9 July 1976; and Brazilian Bulletin
,
September 1975. In 1970 Brazil's total petroleum reserves were put at
857 million barrels; by the end of 1976 PETROBRAS put "proven reserves"
at 800 million barrels, plus another 180 billion on the continental
shelf. See Brazil's Energy and Heavy Industries
, p. 21.
30
From 1974-1976 off-shore production increased from 13% to
19% of total production, while 1976 production was 5% below the 1974
level. IBGE, Annual Statistics
,
p. 488.
31
See the discussion in Peter Seaborn Smith, "Brazilian Oil:
From Myth to Reality," Inter-American Economic Affairs 30 (Spring
1977) :45-6l.
32
The initial successes of the program and its major facets are
discussed in Peter Seaborn Smith, Ibid., and in United Nations, Food
and Agricultural Organization's Review on Agriculture and Development,
Ceres
,
March-April 1977, p. 4.
33
The exact figures on production and consumption levels differ
considerably depending on the source. The important point, however, is
that the trends remain the same and that Brazil's oil situation has
significantly worsened in the past two years. My assessment is drawn
from BLSAR
,
July 1978; LAER, August 4, 1978 and September 1, 1978; and
Quarterly Review of Oil in Latin America and the Caribbean (London:
Economist Intelligence Unit, quarterly), first-fourth quarter 1978.
3A
The New York Times , 7 October 1979.
35
Reported in LAER , June 30, 1978, p. 196. At that, even the
lowest estimate of production requires more than doubling the 1978
average rate of 168,000 barrels per day by 1985. See Quarterly Review
of Oil, thrid quarter 1978.
LAER
,
June 30, 1978, p. 196.
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37
The government figures are reported in BLSAR
,
February 1978
and July 1978. These may be compared with the lower estimates of the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, reported in the
BLSAR
,
April 1978, and an independent estimate which appeared in The
New York Times
,
11 November 1978.
38
The critical nature of the oil situation has also led
PETROBRAS to use questionable methods of field exploitation to speed
off-shore deposits into service. As one recent account has observed,
"Industry sources say the provisional production methods may hamper the
long-term development of the Campos field, but they are justified by
PETROBRAS in view of Brazil's oil needs." LAER
,
June 30, 1978, p. 196.
39
These measures are reported in BLSAR
,
February 1977 and January
1978; and Quarterly Economic Review of Brazil (London: Economist
Intelligence Unit, quarterly), second quarter 1978. The recent push
to use coal in other areas has apparently exacerbated the import situa-
tion; 20 million tons of coking coal are now imported annually and
local production now accounts for only 20% of consumption. See LAER
,
March 10, 1978.
^Velloso's remarks are reported in LAER
,
February 10, 1978.
The most recent data indicate that alcohol use now accounts for 9% of
the fuel used in automobiles in Brazil, LAER , December 1, 1978. One
of the obvious attractions for Brazil in this program, which minimizes
its economic drawbacks, is that it involes a renewable energy resource
over which they have total control, in marked contrast to oil.
^The full text of the statement may be found in Brazil's Energy
and Heavy Industries
,
pp. 17-20. This citation is from p. 17.
42
Ibid.
,
p. 17.
^ 3
For recent reports see LAER , February 10, 1978 and November 17,
1978.
For a summary of these problems see LAER , August 4, 1978.
These problems came to a head in October of 1979 when, due to these
difficulties with the program, the government decided to cut by one-
half— to four—the number of plants which it wished to purchase from
West Germany. With the West German government strongly protesting
such a decision, the status of the agreement is now quite up in the
air. See the Boston Globe , 14 October 1979.
45
Again, outside estimates of Brazil's uranium resources are less
optimistic. For example, a 1977 OECD report put "reasonably assured
resources" at 4,200 tons with additional resources of 8,200 tons. The
dispute revolves around how many of the deposits are "measured and indi-
cated" versus just "inferred" deposits. See BLSAR , April 1978. It did
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not help the credibility of the government in this area when it
recently announced that it had entered into a ten year agreement with
the Dutch to supply Brazil with enriched uranium for fueling its
nuclear power plants. The government's justification was that this was
necessary to get the first plants on line on schedule. See LAER, Febru-
ary 24, 1978.
46
See Quarterlv Economic Review of Brazil, second quarter 1978 -
p. 13.
47
The current problems on Itaipu are reported in LAER
,
September
29, 1978, p. 299.
48^ .
The breakdown of electrical consumption for 1977 was reported
in BLSAR
,
April 1978. The inequalities in distribution among regions
has in fact worsened with the South and Southeast cosuming 84% of total
output in 1976. See Brazil's Energy and Heavy Industries
,
p. 15. The
effects of the drought on the energy supply are discussed in The New
York Times
,
5 May 1978.
49
The position of the IBGE is discussed in the Area Handbook for
Brazil
,
p. 33. The state of the basic data on Brazil's population is
discussed by Sheldon Segal of the Population Council in Population
Growth and Human Productivity
,
ed. Manuel J. Carvajal (Gainesville,
Fla: University of Florida, Center for Latin American Studies, 1976),
pp. 215-228; and by Thomas G. Sanders, "Brazil" in Population: Per-
spective, 1971 , eds. Harrison Brown and Alan Sweezy (San Francisco:
Freeman, Cooper, and Company, 1972), pp. 83-111.
The data in this paragraph is drawn from IBGE, Annual Statistics
1977
, pp. 69-82, and the World Bank Tables, 1976 .
"'"'"Data is drawn from IBGE, Annual Statistics , various editions
1974-1977; Brazil: Resources and Possibilities (Brasilia: Minesterio
das Relacoes Exteriores, 1977); World Bank Tables, 1976 ; and Overseas
Business Reports , December 1973.
5 9
The calculations are by Sheldon Segal in Population Growth and
Human Productivity .
53
The main currents of Brazil's historical perspective on popula-
tion are described in Weil, Area Handbook for Brazil ; and Sanders,
"Brazil,", and South American Attitudes Toward Population Limitation
(American Universities Field Staff Reports, East Coast South America
Series), volume 18, number 3, 1974.
54
This is the opinion of two noted Brazilian authors: Mario
Henrique Simonsen, Brazil 2000 (Rio de Janeiro: APEC Editora, 1972),
especially chapter 4; and demographer Joao Lyra Madeira, in Migracoes
internas no Brasil, ed. Manuel A. Costa (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de
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Planejamento Economico e Social, 1971), p. 42. Both argue that
fertility was a taboo subject for economic research in this period in
Brazil. This is also the judgment of Thomas W. Merrick, "Population,
Development, and Planning in Brazil," Population and Development
Review 2 (June 1976) : 181-199
.
55
Reported in Jornal do Comerico
,
13 August 1968.
5
^Cited in Thomas G. Sanders, The Politics of Population in
Brazil (American Universities Field Staff Reports, East Coast South
America Series), volume 15, number 1, 1971, p. 3. A number of
studeis suggest that the connection of the population issue with un-
warranted external intervention by the industrial states into Brazil's
affairs was also an important reason why the issue was "too hot to
handle" in the 1960s. See, for example, Vivian Xenia Epstein's comments
in Population Policies and Growth in Latin America (Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1971)..
"^This is still a hotly debated topic. For two opposing views
see Merrick, "Population and Planning in Brazil," who concludes that
lower population growth in Brazil between 1950-1970 would not have
affected aggregate economic growth in this period; and Herman Daly,
"The Population Question in Northeast Brazil: Its Economic and Ideo-
logical Dimensions," Economic Development and Cultural Change 18 (July
1970) : 536-574 , who concludes that ". . . population is the main
factor holding back greater economic growth.", p. 542.
5 8
The former statement was by Planning Minister Joao Paulo
dos Reis Velloso, cited in Henshall and Momsen, A Geography of Brazil-
ian Development
, p. 7; the latter is by then Finance Minister Delfim
Neto, reported in Latin America
,
July 3, 1970, p. 214.
^'Medici's comments were reported in Ve j
a
,
June 10, 1970, and
are also cited in Sanders, 'Brazil", p. 91.
^Medici, Ibid.
61
This is the judgment of both Sanders, "Brazil", and Epstein,
among others.
62
For a detailed description of the goals and purposes of this
effort, which was part of the Program for National Integration
launched in 1970, and since abandoned for lack of success, see
Amazonia (London: Brazilian Embassy, February 1976).
63
See Peter McDonough and Amaury De Souza, "Brazilian Elites and
Population Policy," Population and Development Review 3 (December 1977):
377-401.
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64
cSee Statement of the Brazilian Representative, III World
Population Conference, General Debate, Plenary Session, 26 August 1974(New York: United Nations, 1975).
65
Cited in Sanders, South American Attitudes Toward Population
Limitiation
, p. 10. ~
66
See II Piano Nacional De Desenvolvimento PND
,
chapter V, and
also the summary found in Merrick, "Population and Planning in Brazil,"
^ 7
II Piano Nacional De Desenvolvimento PND
, p. 51.
68., ..
Ibid.
69
Merrick, "Population and Planning in Brazil," makes this
argument. For another view see McDonough and De Souza, "Brazilian
Elites and Population Policy," who suggest that the recent economic
decline will revitalize concern with excessive population growth
because its effects will be more immediately evident.
See the statement by Walter Rodrigues, M.D., "Family Planning
Programs: A World Review 1974," Studies in Family Planning 6 (August
1978), p. 266.
71 T , . ,Ibia
.
72
The most recent upsurge in family planning activities at these
levels is discussed in Merrick, "Population and Planning in Brazil,"
and in the section on Brazil in Population Refeierce Bureau, World Pop -
ulation Growth and Response 1965-1975 . Merrick and McDonough and De
Souza, "Brazilian Elites and Population Policy," are two studies which
foresee an increased commitment to population policy at the national
level.
~^The principal staples are rice, maize, manioc, dry beans,
wheat, and potatoes. Some accounts also include milk, fruits, and
meat but, in general, their consumption still appears to be largely
confined to the affluent areas of the South and Southeast. The recent
expansion in livestock and fruit production appears to be more a
response to export markets than an increase in their domestic consump-
tion (e.g., from 1965-1975, while the export of meats rose signifi-
cantly in all but the last two years, saw the per capita consumption of
livestock products in Brazil actually decline). See Weil, Area Hand-
book for Brazil , and Minesterio das Relacoes Exteriores, Brazil:
Resources and Possibilities .
In 1965-1967 imports of wheat accounted for 85% of total con-
sumption in Brazil and, because of poor conditions at that time, it
would have cost more to expand domestic production of wheat than to
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just import more. Imports have fallen in recent vears to about 557
of consumption during 1973-1976; but with changing world food conditions
the cost of wheat on the world market has more than doubled in that
time. For the actual figures see IBGE, Annual Statistics 1977
. and the
United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics
, various
years. " ~~
The best summary of agricultural policy in this period is
Gordon W. Smith, "Brazilian Agricultural Policy, 1950-1967," in The
Economy of Brazil
,
ed. Howard Ellis (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1969) : 211-265
.
Two studies which focus more on agricultural
policy under the military are Donald E. Syvrud, Foundations of Brazil-
ian Economic Growth (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute,
1974), and John H, Sanders and Frederick L. Bein, "Agricultural
Development of the Brazilian Frontier: Southern Mato Grosso," Economic
Development and Cultural Change 24 (April 1976) : 593-610.
^The last full agricultural census in 1970 found that farms
under 10 hectares in size comprised 51% of all farms but occupied only
3.1% of the total farmland; while farms larger than 1,000 hectares,
comprising only 0.8% of all farms, occupied 39% of all farmland. The
preliminary results of the 1975 census indicate that farms under 10
hectares now comprise 52% of all farms, but occupy only 2.8% of all
farmland, while farms larger than 1,000 hectares, still comprising
only 0.8% of all farms, now occupy 43% of all farmland. See IBGE,
Annual Statistics 1977
, p. 304, for full results. For a fuller discus-
sion of these trends see Henshall and Momsen, A Geography of Brazilian
Development ; and C. Daniel Dillman, "Absentee Landlords and Farm
Management in Brazil During the 1960s," American Journal of Economics
and Sociology 37 (January 1978): 1-8; and T. Lynn Smith, The Race Between
Population and Food Supply in Latin America (Albuquerque: University
of New Mexico Press, 1976). Smith argues that by the mid-1970s three
out of four rural laborers in Brazil were landless.
77
For example, in 1970 farms of less than 100 hectares, which com-
prised 90% of all farms but occupied only 23% of total farmland, account-
ed for 58% of total production; while farms of 10,000 hectares or more,
comprising 0.1% of all farms and occupying 12% of farmland, contributed
only 2% of total production. This example is drawn from Paulo F.C. de
Araujo and Richard Meyers, "Agricultural Credit Policy in Brazil:
Objectives and Results," American Journal of Agricultural Economics
59 (December 1977) : 957-961. The relationship between farm size and pro-
ductivity is more fully discussed in D.E. Goodman, "Rural Structure,
Surplus Mobilisation, and Modes of Production in a Peripheral Region:
The Brazilian Northeast," Journal of Peasant Studies 5 (October 1977):
3-32; and also Shepard Forman, The Brazilian Peasantry (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1975).
78
The Race Between Population and Food Supply, p. 19.
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79
virtually all serious studies of Brazilian agriculture agree
on these points; for examples see Henshall and Momsen, A Geography of
Brazilian Development
; Syvrud, Foundations of Brazilian Economic
Growth
; and William H. Nicholls, "The Brazilian Food Supply: Problems
and Prospects," Economic Development and Cultural Change 19 (April
1971) :378-390.
This is also a generally acknowledged fact, see Syvrud, Ibid.;
especially pp. 25-27; Nicholls, Ibid.; and for the Brazilian govern-
ment's view which generally agrees see Social Aspects of Brazilian
Economic Development (London: Brazilian Embassy, 1974), pp. 29-33.
81
The potential for further expansion still appears, theoreti-
cally, to be unlimited. As one government publication pointed out, in
1974 only 12% of the land completely favorable to agriculture was then
being used. Brazilian Bulletin
,
March 1975, p. 6. At that, less than
20% of "farmland" was under crops, the rest was idle or being used as
pastureland. See Nicholls, Ibid.; Forman, The Brazilian Peasantry
;
and Robock, A Study in Development Progress
,
all of whom cite the
generally favorable conditions for the future expansion of cultivation.
82
A fuller description is available in Weil, Area Handbook for
Brazil
,
p. 418. It is also interesting to note that "land reform" was
a part of the government's program from 1964 onward. The program was
not even implemented until 1967, however, and its effects after that
were less than spectacular. For a discussion of the program in this
period see C. Daniel Dillman, "Land and Labor Patterns in Brazil
During the 1960s," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 35
(January 1976) : 49-70.
Q O
Weil, Ibid., p. 418.
OA
Nicholls, "Brazilian Food Supply,", p. 383. Similar evalua-
tions may be found in Syvrud, Foundations of Brazilian Economic Growth;
and Gordon W. Smith, "Brazilian Agricultural Policy,"
Q C
At this time, for example, 85% of the fertilizer consumed was
used in the advanced east regions, Henshall and Momsen, A Geography
of Brazilian Development
,
p. 102. A study of the effects of the govern-
ment's credit policy also revealed that by 1970, 90% of the farms were
still untouched by credit programs. Of that which was distributed,
approximately 75% went to the more commercialized regions, while only
5% of credit went to farms smaller than 10 hectares, which constituted
51% of all farms, Araujo and Meyers, "Agricultural Credit Policy in
Brazil."
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86 T . .In his detailed study Stefan Robock points out that between
1967-1972, among the major crops, the average annual increases in pro-
duction were significantly higher for the export-oriented crops. For
example, soybean production rose 34.8% annually in this period,
oranges 7.9%, cotton 6.7%, cocoa 5%; while for maize the figure was
3.4%, rice 2.3%, dry beans 1.6%, manioc 1.4%, and potatoes 0.3%.
A Study in Development Progress
,
p. 102. Others who point to the
stagnation of food crop production and productivity are D.E. Goodman,
"The Brazilian Northeast," and Syvrud, Foundations of Brazilian
Economic Growth
.
8 7
Weil, Area Handbook for Brazil
,
p. 418.
88
Among those who note this trend in various parts of Brazil
are Forman, The Brazilian Peasantry ; and Sanders and Bein, "Southern
Mato Grosso."
89
Two additional factors which increased the impact of these
developments were the decline in the lower income groups' share of the
national income over the 1960-1970 period (see footnote no. 3 above)
and the significant decline in the "real" purchasing power of the
minimum wage— at which 45% of the economically active population were
at or below, according to the 1970 census. See LAER, May 12, 1978.
On the nutritional decline see Weil, Area Handbook for Brazil (1975
edition), pp. 156-157.
90
The regional plans are outlined in II Piano I^acional De Desen -
volvimento PND
,
pp. 52-60.
Amazonia
,
p. 11.
92
This is from a study by the Getulio Vargas Foundation, cited
in the Brazilian Bulletin
,
February 1975, p. 3. Another report in
the following issue of the Bulletin , March 1975, also declared that
"Brazil was preparing itself to become the world's largest food
producer", p. 6.
93
From a speech reported in the Brazilian Bulletin , February
1976, p. 5.
9Z,
From an article by Secretary of State for Labor Relations,
Alberto G. Chiarelli, "Social Security for Rural Workers in Brazil,"
International Labour Review 11 3 (March-April 1976) :159.
95
Brazilian Bulletin , February 1975, p. 4. More than 40% of the
soybean crop was exported as beans and oil in 1976, while an additional
portion was used in the processing of other foodstuffs.
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96
T^he overall effects of the export push on the domestic food
economy in this period are more fully discussed in Shelton H. Davis,
Victims of the Miracle (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977)
pp. 132-138. The specific case of the bean crop is discussed in
Michael Harrington, The Vast Majority: A Journev to the World's Poor(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), pp. 149-151. "
97
An OECD report in 1976 concluded that 60% of the Brazilian
population existed at levels below the UNPAD' s caloric minimum, Harring-
ton, Ibid. Davis, Ibid., also cites a Brazilian government survey
which found a similar proportion of incidences of malnutrition among
the adult population.
98,,For reports on these recent developments see LAER, April 21,
1978 and October 20, 1978; BLSAR, June and November 1978; and the New
York Time s, 7 May 1978.
99
Among others, a report by the Banco do Brasil, released in
1978, pointed to the persistence of these trends. Reported in LAER,
April 14, 1978 and the New York Times
,
14 April 1978.
1(
^This survey is cited in LAER
,
Ibid. Reports on the cutbacks
in food crops may be found in BLSAR
, November 1978, and U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture
,
March 6, 1978.
^
^"On the current problems with ranching, see Peyton Johnson,
"Fighting the Frontier Fever," Ceres 11 (July-August 1978), p. 2.
The questions concerning the actual resource potential of the Amazon
are discussed more fully in Martin Katzman, Cities and Frontiers in
Brazil: Regional Dimensions of Economic Development (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1977). According to one recent report it is
now estimated that only about 2% of the Amazon region is suitable for
agriculture, Boston Globe
,
16 January 1979.
1 0?
Reported in LAER
,
January 20, 1978 and September 8, 1978.
103
The IBGE Survey is discussed in LAER
,
September 22, 1978, and
that of the Vargas Foundation in LAER , October 6, 1978. According to
another account, the real value of the minimum wage had declined by
80% between 1969-1977, LAER, May 12, 1978.
Chapter IV
The Republics are Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Monte-
negro, Serbia, and Slovenia. The two Autonomous Provinces, located in
Serbia, are Kosovo and Vojvodina.
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It is difficult to present all the dimensions of this issue
without a full historical analysis which space does not allow. Thus
this issue will be discussed specifically only in relation to its
affects on the specific policies under consideration in this chapter
(see especially the discussion of Population below). For a fuller
discussion of this issue see Frits W. Hondius, The Yugoslav Community
of Nations (Paris: Mouton, 1968).
3
The Yugoslav electoral system cannot be fully explained here,
but it is important to note that voters participate directly in the
election of delegations only at the level of "organizations of associ-
ated labor", the process then works upward as "delegations" elect mem-
bers at upper levels. The electoral process is described more
completely in Zlatija Dukic-Vel j ovic , "The Assembly of the SFRY," The
Yugoslav Survey 18 (February 1977): 3-22. See also Denison Rusinow, The
Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1977).
The Communist Party was renamed the League of Communists in
1952 after the break with Stalinist Russia and other Eastern Bloc
countries. The League of Communists (LCY) is the dominant political
institution and the only Party in the country, with amembership of
just over one million in 1971—about 5% of the population. The role of
the LCY has fluctuated considerably in the post-war period. In 1952
it was decided that the LCY's role was not to command and direct through
control of the machinery of the state, but it was to play the leading
role by discussion, education, and propaganda in development of the new
system. A debate within the LCY over decentralization versus self-
managment has been carried on throughout the post-war period and has
variously affected the LCY's influence in certain periods. For the
major dimensions of the LCY strategy in the period under consideration
in this chapter see The Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists
(Belgrade: Edition Jugoslavije, 1958).
The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY)
is a national organization which is organized at the commune, Republic,
and federal level. Its primary function is to allow individuals who
agree with socialist aims to participate in electoral politics. SAWPY'
s
membership was approximately 8 million in the early 1970s, see Yugoslav
Life
,
January 18, 1973.
^The BOAL has replaced the "enterprise" as the central economic
unit in the system. They are defined as "workunits which are formed
for each unit of a work organization (enterprise) that makes up a
working whole" (i.e., a plant, or a technological unit within a plant),
thus there may be a number of BOALs in one factory. It is the primary
means for workers to realize their self-management and socio-economic
rights. Again it is not possible to fully discuss all the institu-
tional organizations. The relevant organizations will be discussed as
they relate to the specific policy issues discussed below. For a
complete description of the institutional structure see, "The
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Constitutional System of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia," Yugoslav Survey 15 (August 1974), entire issue.
5_
The figures are drawn from Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, Economic Survey of Yugoslavia (Paris: OECD, annual).
For a more detailed discussion of the economic structure see, World
Bank, Yugoslavia: Development With Decentralization (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins, 1975); and Gordon C. McDonald, ed., Area Handbook for Yugo-
slavia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973).
^For a concise review of the different periods of Yugoslavia's
post-war development see the World Bank, Ibid., chapter 1.
7
World Bank, Ibid., pp. 29-30. For a more detailed description
of this strategy see V. Racic, "Fundamental Characteristics of the
Yugoslav Economic System," in Economists on Problems of a Socialist
Economy
,
ed.R. Stojanovic (New York: International Arts and Science
Press, 1964). Since 1974 the BOAL has increasingly replaced the enter-
prise as the basic unit for planning implementation (see the discussion
of planning below). Communes number approximately 501 in Yugoslavia.
They are the basic administrative unit and are similar to countries
in the United States in that they consist of both rural and urban areas.
g
The Reform will be discussed in more detail in relation to its
affects on the areas of energy and agricultural policy below. For a
more complete discussion of the overall impact of the Reform see
Economic Reform in Yugoslavia (London: Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, Political and Economic Planning, July 1968); and
Pavle Sicherl, "Recent Developments in Yugoslavia's Economic System,"
East European Quarterly 5 (1971) : 376-392
.
9
This aspect of the Reform sought to make the Yugoslav economy
and its products more competitive in the international market and was
a major priority under the Social Plan for 1966-1970. In the area of
projected production gains increases in productivity were to account
for 70% of production growth, whereas in all of the 1950s increases in
labor productivity accounted for only 10% of production gains.
"^Federal expenditures have progressively decreased as a propor-
tion of total governmental expenditures over the last decade as decen-
tralization has been carried out. For example, by 1973-1975 71% of all
government expenditures were incurred below the federal level. OECD,
Economic Survey for Yugoslavia, 1977 .
"^Under this planning procedure the BOALs, as the basic decision-
making unit, may negotiate matters from wages and prices to schooling
and pension funds. As defined by the Constitution, self-management
agreements and social compacts are "arrived at at the level of BOALs
among self-managing organs to coordinate and regulate socio-economic
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and other relations"; they are binding only on those who have agreedto or acceded to them. See the "Constitutional System." For a de-tailed discussion of planning in Yugoslavia, see Rikard Stajner "TheSystem of Planning," Yugoslav Survey 12 (February 1971): 15-30.
'
12_,
.
The best running commentary on the political crisis in thisperiod is provided by Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, especially
chapters 7-8.
13
T7tor a concise review of Yugoslavia's policy toward the under-developed regions in the postwar period see, Mary B. Gregorv, "Regional
Economic Development in Yugoslavia," Soviet Studies 25(October 1973):
211-228. The group of Republics/Provinces classified as "Underdevel-
oped" has varied at times, but recently it has included Bosnia-Herce-
govina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo—who together account for
40% of the territory and 36% of the population.
14
The World Bank study points out that in 1953 the average per
capita income of the underdeveloped areas was two-thirds that of the
developed areas; but by 1971 it had fallen to less than one-half,
Development With Decentralization
, p. 106. Other studies have indicated
that the regional disparities in income accelerated under the early
years of the Reform as well. See Nicholas R. Lang, "The Dialectics of
Decentralization: Economic Reform and Regional Inequality in Yugosla-
via," World Politics 27(April 1975) : 309-335
.
^Both Lang, Ibid., and Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment
,
point
to the decline in Federal power as a major cause of the continued
regional economic inequality.
"^For an official view of the current LCY strategy see Ivan
Laca, "The League of Communists of Yugoslavia," Yugoslav Survey 18
(May 1977). There are numerous commentaries on the rejuvenated role
for the LCY; among the best are Rusinow, Ibid., and Sharon Zukin,
Beyond Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), especially chapter 8.
17
See "The Latest Changes in the Constitution of the SFRY,"
Yugoslav Survey 12 (November 1971), and "The Constitutional System".
The 1975 document is the "Draft Outline of a Common Policy for the
Long-Term Development of Yugoslavia," Yugoslav Survey 16 (November
1975) :19-90.
I o
"Draft Outline," Ibid., pp. 19 and 21.
19
For a detailed discussion of Yugoslavia's intensive industrial-
ization policy in the post-war period see, among others, Joze Moravec,
25 Years of the Yugoslav Economy (Belgrade: Interpres, 1970); and
F.E. Ian Hamilton, Yugoslavia: Patterns of Economic Activity (London:
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G/. B 1el i ?nd Sons > 1968), and the discussion of agricultural policvwhich follows. J
20
The figures are derived from the World Bank, Development With
Decentralization
,
Table 2:7, p. 391. They are based on Yugoslavia's
Gross Material Product which is based upon a concept of the Social
Product. The Social Product does not include government wages and
salaries and certain parts of private farmers production. It is esti-
mated to be approximately 14% less than the measure of Gross National
Product. For a further discussion see U.S. Department of Commerce,
Overseas Business Reports
,
April 1978.
21
The study was done by Stevo Vojnovic, a member of the Insti-
tute of Economics in Zagreb, "Natural Resources of Yugoslavia,"
Yugoslav Survey 16(May 1975):23-50.
22
His comments are cited in Rudolph Bicancic, Turning Points in
Economic Development (The Hague: Mouton and Company, 1972), p. 248.
The basic outlines of the government's policy in this period may be
found in Pavle Knezevic, "The Electricity Supply Industry, 1955-
1973," Yugoslav Survey l6(May 1975):63-78. It is also necessary to
note the import of "basic laws" which are passed by the Federal
Assembly. They are officially described as "a federal statute con-
taining principles and major rules of law in a field of legislation,
leaving it to Republican, sometimes even to commune, legislatures to
add more specific rules". The principles and rules of the basic law
take effect without Republican implementation, however. See Stajner,
"Planning".
23
According to one source, in 1967 there were approximately 79
independent firms in this area. Joel Dirlam and James Plummer, An
Introduction to the Yugoslav Economy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill
Publishing, 1973), p. 127.
Under the Plan total electric output was expected to double as
was the consumption of oil. See Vladimir Pejovski, Yugoslav Invest-
ment Policy 1966-1970
,
(Beograd: Medunarodna Stampa-Interpres , 1967),
p. 33.
25
This excerpt is taken from Dirlam and Plummer, The Yugoslav
Economy
,
p. 127. For a similar evaluation of the electrical energy
situation see the World Bank, Development With Decentralization , p.
181. This study also notes the crucial importance of transmission
facilities to Yugoslavia's power, because its plants have been located
where the power resources are located, not close to areas of major
consumption.
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26
These developments are discussed in Knezevic, "Electricitv
Industry," and the World Bank, Development With Decentralization /
pp. 182-183 and Table 9:9. For a more specific analysis of the
problems of coordination in the electrical industry see Dragutin
Obradovic, a member of the Federal Secretariat of Economic Affairs,
"Electricity Supply," Yugoslav Survey 11 (May 1970):80-89.
27
On this point see Dirlam and Plummer, The Yugoslav Economy
,
pp. 132-133, and World Bank, Development With Decentralization, p.
150.
28
The citation is from "Industrial Development," in 25 Years
of the Yugoslav Economy
,
p. 189. For similar assessments see U.S.
Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports
,
November 1970,
and Hamilton, Yugoslavia
,
who points out that the shortages were more
frequent in the more developed Republics of Slovenia and Croatia.
29
World Bank, Development With Decentralization
,
p. 11.
30
See Knezevic, "Electricity Industry." who also notes that the
rate of investment among Republics/Provinces fluctuated as well. For
example, in 1972 the underdeveloped Republics of Bosnia-Hercegovina,
Macedonia, and Montenegro received only 28% of the total investment
for the generation and transmission of electricity, Table 14, p. 7A.
31
For a review of the investment picture in this period see
Milivoje Vojacic, who is a Counselor for Economic Affairs, "Investment
1966-1975," Yugoslav Survey 18(May l977):49-70.
32
'"The severity of the drought may be seen in that total output
of hydropower actually declined between 1972-1973 (see Table 13).
33
For a more detailed discussion of these measures see OECD,
Economic Survey. 1974 , and Vojnovic, "Natural Resources". On the
pricing policy see Stevo Govedarica, "Prices 1971-1974," Yugoslav
Survey 16 (August 1975): 69-84.
34
OECD, Ibid., pp. 39-40.
35
These councils are the politico-executive bodies of the
respective Assemblies, which negotiate and formulate legislation for
presentation to the Assemblies. See "Constitutional System."
Knezevic, "Electricity Industry,", p. 75.
37
Ibid. The exchange rate at the time was approximately 17
dinars to the U.S. dollar.
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38
Ibid. Yugoslavia purportedly has enough uranium to fuel
nuclear power plants, but the extent of its resources has never
"officially" been estimated. Andrew Borowiec, Yugoslavia After Tito(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 59. According to the OECD,
as of January 1975, Yugoslavia had "reasonable assured" resources of'
6.5 thousand tons, with 15.2 thousand tons of estimated additional
"resources". Uranium
,
(Paris: OECD, 1975), pp. 22-23.
39
For the full text see Yugoslav Survey 16(November 1975)
-.19-90.
40
Ibid., also see Vojnovic, "Natural Resources".
41
"Draft Outline," Ibid., p. 50.
42
Ibid. Hydropower was also not being ignored as its exploita-
tion was to increase from 37% to 85% of total potential between 1975-
1985.
A3
Ibid., p. 49.
44
See, for example, the reports of the OECD in Economic. Surveys
for 1975 and 1976, which minimize the extent of effective government
policy in the energy area.
45
A number of works continue to cite these problems, including
World Bank, Development With Decentralization
;
OECD, Economic Surveys
for 1975-1977; and Vojacic, "Investment".
46
The general outlines of the current Social Plan are discussed
in OECD, Economic Survey, 1977
,
and Overseas Business Reports
,
April
1978.
47
For a report of these recent events see Radio Free Europe
Research (weekly) vol. 3, no. 51, December 1978. Yugoslavia's hydro-
power facilities are primarily located in the central mountainous region
where they are built on lakes, which are heavily dependent on rainfall
to replenish their water supply.
^According to the OECD, Economic Survey, 1978 , in 1977 fully one-
half of the rise in industrial prices was attributable to the increase
in the price of electric power.
AO
OECD, Economic Survey , 1977 and 1978.
50
For one of the most recent reviews of the energy situation
based on Yugoslav sources, see Radio Free Europe Research , December
1978.
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51
The comments are taken from a newspaper interview reported in
Radio Free Europe Research, January 1979.
52„
The major staple crops in Yugoslavia have traditionally been
cereals, especially wheat and maize, which are the basis of the rural
diet. Animal products (meat and dairy products) have grown in
importance in recent years but are generally more important to urban
diets, and overall, meat consumption is relatively low. The following
discussion of "food Policy" will pertain to policies which affect the
production of these staples unless otherwise indicated.
53
For a concise discussion of the Yugoslav government's
agricultural policy since World War II see Dusan Miljkovic, "Yugoslav
Socio-Economic Development, 1947-1972," Yugoslav Survey 15(Februarv
1974): 1-36.
54
For a discussion of the government's collectivization policy
and an explanation of why it was abandoned see Svetolok Popovic,
Agricultural Policy in Yugoslavia (Beograd: Medunarodna Politika,
1964) .
There were approximately 2.6 million private holdings in
Yugoslavia in 1971. See Table 15 for their composition by size.
In 1969 they accounted for 80% of the maize crop, 70% of wheat, and
90% of livestock, Dirlam and Pluramer, The Yugoslav Economy
,
p. 115.
"^The number of socialized holdings is miniscule: in 1969, for
example, out of 2,602,155 holdings, only 2,155 were socialized. Since
then the trend has been to a further reduction in the number of social-
ized holdings while their average size has increased. See Table 16
and the World Bank, Development With Decentralization .
"^It is interesting to note that in the 1960s the trend was
toward a reduction in total amount of arable land. The sown arable
area fell by 5% between 1961-1971; at the same time the area planted
to cereals fell by 10%, while the area planted to industrial and fodder
crops increased by 9%. Commercial crops are comparatively more
important to the socialized sector (19% of acreage to 6% for private
farmers), while food crops are more important to the private sector
(70% of acreage to 59% for the socialized sector). Miljkovic, "Yugo-
slav Development".
CO
The central role of weather and the continued lack of irriga-
tion facilities is discussed by Dzemal Drace, of the Federal Committee
on Agriculture, in "Development of Agriculture," Yugoslav Survey 17
(February 1976):45-66. According to McDonald, Area Handbook for
Yugoslavia , 45% of all agricultural land was susceptible to some degree
of flooding or erosion in the late 1960s, pp. 345-346.
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59
On the major dimensions of government agricultural policy to
1965 see Popovic, Agricultural Policy in Yugoslavia ; World Bank,
Development With Decentralization ; and Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, The Economic Reform . According to some sources the
extensive fragmentation of private holdings remains the most serious
impediment to the modernization of the agricultural sector. See
Hamilton, Yugoslavia
, pp. 170-172.
60
Development With Decentralization
,
p. 152.
61
Hamilton, Yugoslavia
,
gives a comparison of productivity
levels at this time, pp. 370-371.
6 2
For a more detailed discussion of the effects of the Reform
on agriculture see Dzemal Drace, "Agriculture 1961-1971," Yugoslav
Survey 13 (May 1972), and also Drace, "Development of Agriculture".
6 3
In 1966, for example, the production levels achieved by
grains were at levels which had been projected for 1970 under the
Plan. These initial favorable results produced a number of optimistic
projections for the future, such as that of Dzemal Drace, then a mem-
ber of the Federal Social Planning Office, who predicted that, as of
1968, imports of wheat and sugar would practically be discontinued.
Between 1961-1967 imports of wheat had averaged 930,000 tons and
imports of sugar 124,000 tons. See his "Agricultural Development,"
in Moravec, 25 Years of the Yugoslav Economy
,
pp. 235-271.
^For more detailed discussions of these developments in the
socialized farms see Drace, "Agriculture 1961-1971,", and World Bank,
Development With Decentralization . For the affect of these trends on
agriculture as a whole see Alica Wertheimer-Baletic , "Agricultural
Population," Yugoslav Survey 19(May 1978):55-70.
^ 5
For the data on the decline in cooperation see World Bank,
Ibid., Table 7:11. The total number of cooperators declined by over
25% in the 1966-1970 period to a level of approximately 925,000.
Cooperation takes the form of trade in inputs and outputs, provision
of services by the social sector such as fertilizer, harvesting,
marketing and credit, and the contracting of joint production.
66
For data on the livestock heerds see World Bank-Table 7:12,
Ibid., p. 441.
67
Drace, "Agriculture 1961-1971," and OECD, Economic Survey
1973 .
68
For discussion of the Plan's agricultural goals see Vladimir
Cvetkovic, "Exports and Imports of Major Food Articles," Yugoslav
Survey 15(May 1974):89-96, and World Bank, Development With Decentrali-
zation.
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69 T . .It is important to note that each private or social agricul-tural organization functions as an independent economic entity which
freely selects its own production lines and plans its own development;
accordingly, the tasks of Plans and policy has been to harmonize the
interests of the social community as a whole with these individual
interests. The main instuments employed have been price controls
subsidies, premiums, credits and investment funds, and attempts to
establish reserves of certain crops. Drace, "Development of Agricul-
ture" .
^ Development With Decentralization
,
p. 153.
71
The compact is outlined in OECD, Economic Survey 1974
, and
Drace, "Development of Agriculture".
72
For example, between 1973-1975, compensation and premiums to
agriculture increased by over 400%.
73
For a discussion of this aspect of the compact see World Bank,
Development With Decentralization
, pp. 159-160, which notes that in
1972 only 12% of total agricultural production was accounted for through
cooperation.
74
Both beef and pork shortages were experienced in a number of
urban areas in these years. See Jovan Belie, "Stock-Breeding,"
Yugoslav Survey 15 (May 1974): 55-68, and the OECD, Economic Survey 1974
.
On the growing export market influence on production see Cvetkovic,
"Exports and Imports of Food Articles".
These measures are discussed in the OECD, Economic Survey
,
1975 and 1976. See also Stevo Govedarica, "The Economy in 1975,"
Yugoslav Survey 17 (May 1976):43-54.
^Among these studies are Vojacic, "Investment,"; Miljkovic,
"Yugoslav Development,"; and Wertheimer-Baletic , "Agricultural
Population," from whom the citation is taken, p. 70.
^For the data on these trends in land usage see, Sociajalisticka
Federativa Republika Jugoslaviji Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, Statls-
ticki Godisnjak Jugoslavje, 1977 (Beograd: July 1977), table 108,
p. 160.
78
See "Draft Outline," especially pp. 52-55.
79
Ibid., p. 52.
80
The outline of the Plan is discussed in OECD, Economic Survey
1977.
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These recent developments in the food situation are reported
in OECD, Economic Survey
, 1977 and 1978; and Foreign Agriculture
Reports
,
January 29, 1979, ~~ "
82
For data on these recent trends see Statisticki Godisnjak
Jugoslavje, 1977
, pp. 175-177, and United Nations, Food and Agricul-
ture Organization, Production Yearbook, 1977 (Rome: UNFAO, 1978).
These sources also indicate that the area under irrigation in Yugo-
slavia has declined absolutely in the 1970s.
83
The complete address is reproduced in "The LCY in the Strug-
gle for the Future Development of Yugoslavia," Yugoslav Survey 19
(August 1978), p. 21. Another example which continues to emphasize
the export-orientation of agriculture and food production is
Vladimir Cvetkovic, "Yugoslavia in World Food Production," Yugoslav
Survey 19 (November 1978): 39-50.
84
These recent estimates are drawn from Statisticki Godisnjak
Jugoslavje, 1977
,
and Population Reference Bureau, World Population
Data Sheet, 1978 .
85
For the history on this point see Hondius, The Yugoslav Commun-
ity of Nations . In 1971 the dominant ethnic groups by Republic/Province
were: Croatia-79% Croats; Macedonia-69% Macedonians; Montenegro-67%
Montenegrins; Slovenia-94% Slovenes; Serbia proper-89% Serbs; Kosovo-
74% Albanians; Voj vodina-56% Serbs. Bosnia-Hercegovina at this time
had 40% Moslems and 37% Serbs. Statisticki Godisnjak Jugoslavje, 1977 .
86
Over the ten year period 1961-1971, between the national census,
for example, the number of persons who identified themselves as
"Yugoslavs" declined from 1.7% of the population in 1961 to 1.3% in
1971; all others defined themselves by their ethnic origins. Statis-
ticki Godisnjak Jugoslavje, 1977 .
8 7
McDonald, Area Handbook for Yugoslavia
,
pp. 63 and 71.
88
For a more detailed discussion of these measures see Suzana
Duric and Gordana Dragicevic, Women in Yugoslav Society and Economy
(Beograd: Medunarodna Politika, 1965), and McDonald, Ibid., pp. 69-71.
Perhaps the best review of these policies' affects on popula-
tion is Denison Rusinow, Population Review 1970: Yugoslavia (American
Universities Field Staff Reports, Southeast Europe Series), volume 17,
number 1, 1970. See also Miljkovic, "Yugoslav Development," who notes
that between 1953-1971 the urban population grew from 22% to. 35%.
Additionally, over 1961-1970, the number of persons in rural households
fell from a 5.4 to 4.4 average.
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90Dune and Dragicevic, Women in Yugoslav Society
, p. 27. The
Conference was initially formed as a special forum of the SAWPY.
91^_ _ JOn this point see Rusinow, Population Review
, pp. 8-9; Duric
and Dragicevic, Ibid.; and Milos Macura, "Population Policies'in
Socialist Countries of Europe," Population Studies 28(November 1975):
369-379. Macura emphasizes that demographic objectives had nothing to
do with the Yugoslav government's initial commitment to family planning
support
.
92
.For the full text of the Resolution see "Federal Assembly Reso-
lution on Family Planning," Yugoslav Survey 10(August 1969) : 103-106
.
93
Ibid., p. 103.
94
Ibid., p. 105. Total legal abortions numbered about 276,000
in 1967 and live births 390,000. The regional impact of abortion varied
widely; in 1966 abortions totaled 113% of live births in Serbia. The
large majority of abortions were voluntary as well, in 1967 only about
23,000 abortions were performed for "health-care" reasons. Statisticki
Godisnjak Jugoslavje, 1977 .
95
On the increasing economic costs of abortion see Ljubica Basta,
"Maternity Care and Health Services for Women," Yugoslav Survey 11
(November 1970): 87-92, and Dusan Breznik, "Demographic Trends in Yugo-
slavia," Yugoslav Survey 11 (May 1970): 1-14.
96
"Resolution on Family Planning," p. 105.
97
Ibid.
,
p. 103.
98
On the problems with implementation at this time see Rusinow,
Population Review
,
and Population Reference Bureau, World Population
Growth and Response 1965-1975 .
99
See the two studies by Ljubica Basta, Head of the Maternity
and Child Care Services, "The Health and Health Care of Children and
Young People," Yugoslav Survey 15 (February 1974): 67-80, and "Health
Care for Women 1968-1976," Yugoslav Survey 19 (November 1978) : 99-108.
^"^Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment , chapter 8.
101
"Draft Outline," p. 73,
This is the opinion of Ljubica Basta in "Health Services for
Women"
.
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103_
For more detailed discussion of the causes for migration seeGeorge W. Hoffman and Ronald Hatchett, "The Impact of Regional Develop-
ment Policy on Population Distribution in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria," in
Population and Migration Trends in Eastern Europe
, ed. Huey Louis'
Kostanik (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977) : 99-124
, and Rusi-
now, Population Review .
104
. „Economic Survey, 1973 .
For a more detailed description of these specific measures
see Ivo Baucic, "Regional Differences in Yugoslav External Migration,"
in Kostanik, Population and Migration Trends in Eastern Europe
, pp.
217-243, and OECD, Economic Survey
,
Ibid.
106
Figures are from Bernard Kayser, "European Migration: The New
Pattern," International Migration Review ll(Summer 1977) : 232-240.
1(
^See Gordana Todorovic, "Projection of the Yugoslav Population
for 1970-2000," Yugoslav Survey l6(May 1975) : 11-20
.
Ibid., p. 12.
109
"Draft Outline," especially pp. 73-74. Todorovic, Ibid., also
proposes a migration policy as an essential need, pp. 18-19.
'^'"According to one source, the results of the 1971 Census
revealed that 83% of those who had migrated between 1947-1971 relocated
either in the same commune or Republic; only 16% of those migrating
resettled in another Republic. Hoffman and Hatchett, "Population
Distribution in Yugoslavia".
^"^The status of the "ethnic" situation is subject to much dis-
pute among students of Yugoslavia. For examples of two recent studies
which arrive at almost diametrically opposed conclusions on the matter,
see John F. Besemeres, "The Demographic Factor in Inter-Ethnic Relations
in Yugoslavia," Southeastern Europe 4(1977) : 1-31, who argues that the
ethnic issue will be an incendiary factor in the future. Compare his
conclusions with George Klein, "Worker's Self-Management and the Poli-
tics of Ethnic Nationalism in Yugoslavia," Nationalities Papers 5(1977):
1-21, who suggests that Yugoslav national institutions have overridden
much of the inter-ethnic conflicts—with the resolution of the 1971
Croatian crisis being a case in point.
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Chapter V
''"There are a multitude of works which discuss the policy-making
process in the" U.S. and the varying roles which the Federal government
plays. Three of the most notable are: Charles 0. Jones, An Intro-
duction to the Study of Public Policy (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth
Publishing, 1970); Charles Lindblom, The Policy-making Process
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1968); and L.L. Wade,
The Elements of Public Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill
Publishing Company, 1972).
2
See the Ford Foundation, A Time to Choose-America 1 s Energy
Future (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1974), chapter 4. On the
increased role of oil see Richard N. Gardner, ed., The World Food and-
Energy Crisis (Institute on Man and Science, 1974). The relative
cheapness of energy was a major factor in increased utilization, as,
in real terms, energy prices actually declined between 1950 and 1973.
3
Ford Foundation, A Time to Choose , was one of the first to
challenge this position, see chapter 6. More recently, the Presi-
dent's Council on Environmental Quality has reported that growth in
energy consumption could be cut to zero without affecting economic
growth, Boston Globe , 21 February 1979.
^See Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the Presi -
dent, 1978 . Consumption of oil has grown at a higher rate since 1965:
at 5% between 1965-1970, and at 5.6% between 1970-1973. These are
among the findings of the Federal Energy Administration, Project Inde-
pendence Report , 1974.
^Interestingly, this was not an unexpected occurrance as a number
of studies in the early 1960s had forecast that U.S. oil production
would peak in the late 1960s or early 1970s. Perhaps the most notable
of these studies is that of M. King Hubbert, Energy Resources (Washing-
ton, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council,
Publication 1000-D, 1962).
6
0n the domestic natural gas situation in the early 1970s see
Federal Power Commission, A Realistic View of US Natural Gas Supply
(Staff Report, Bureau of Natural Gas, December 1974). This generally
bleak assessment of the gas situation has not improved in recent years.
According to one Department of Energy official, the supply of natural
gas will not measurably increase by 1990, Boston Globe , 18 April 1979.
7
By most accounts the natural gas shortage was the primary
factor
behind increased oil demand. For a concise account see Richard
B
Mancke, Squeaking By (US Energy Policy Since the Embargo) (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1976). According to his data,
the demand
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for crude oil grew 6% annually between 1970-1973, nearly twice the
pre-1970 level, p. 7.
g
One fact which the energy crisis has revealed is how little
knowledge the federal government has of the extent of the country's
energy resources, even those which it has jurisdiction over. By most
accounts over one-half of the country's remaining oil and gas reserves,
40% of coal and uranium reserves, 80% of oil shale, and 60% of geo-
thermal resources are located on federally held lands. The government's
knowledge of the extent of these resources is inadequate, however,
particularly if it is to manage the exploitation of these resources in
the future. See, for example, the assessments of Mancke, Ibid., p. 57
and the Ford Foundation, A Time to Choose
,
p. 271.
9
Coal is now used primarily by utilities and the steel industry
which account for approximately 90% of demand. Oil is used primarily
for transportation (54%) and heating (18%) ; another 18% goes to
industrial uses and 10% to utilities. The serious limits of coal's
substitutability are discussed in President's Office of Emergency
Preparedness, The Potential for Energy Conservation: Fuel Substitu-
tion
,
1973. For a more recent account, see the Boston Globe , "The
Return of Coal: Greatly Exaggerated," 5 July 1979.
"^See A Time to Choose , which observes that: "Estimating poten-
tial energy resources is far from an exact science and is very much
subject to the views and judgments of specialists interpreting geolo-
gical, technological, and economic data." Appendix D, p. 477.
11
Data is drawn from World Oil , February 15, 1979.
l2
Boston Globe , 5 July 1979.
13
According to data supplied by Edison Electric Institute,
Boston Globe, Ibid. Some informed observers in this field argue that
we have already reached the realistic limits of hydropower expansion.
See Bernard i/spinrad, "The Case for Nuclear Energy," in Perspectives
on Energy , eds. Lon C. Ruedisili and Morris W. Firebaugh (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 183-195.
14
Data is drawn from Energy Policy (Washington, D.C.: Congres-
sional Quarterly Incorporated, April 1979), pp. 106-107. On the
current state of the nuclear industry see the New York Times , 8 April
1979, p. IF, and the Boston Globe , 8July 1979.
15
For an authoritative history of U.S. domestic oil policy see
John M. Blair, The Control of Oil (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976),
especially chapters 7-8; for its policy in relation to natural
gas see
Continuing Energy Crisis in America (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Incorporated, 1975), pp. 69-75.
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mi n Cited m U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance Wm-"MOxl Developments and U.S. Oil Import Policies . 93rd Co™ lst^^SMDecember 12, 1973, p. 70. ~ ' sess ''
17_
For a more detailed discussion of the origins and operation
of the MOIP, see World Oil Developments
, Ibid., pp. 51-70 and Blair
The Control of Oil . ' '
18^. .
This increase m imports was also spurred by a Department of
Interior announcement in 1972 which stated that the U.S.'s surplus
crude oil producing capacity, which had existed since World War II due
to prorationing, had been exhausted. This indicated that increased
domestic production would now have to come from new discoveries See
Blair, Ibid., pp. 165-169.
19
For a more detailed discussion of these programs, which insti-
tuted direct government control over oil prices, see Project indepen-
dence Report
, pp. 11-15.
20
New York Times
,
5 June 1971, this constituted the first major
address by a President on energy and gave all of its meaningful empha-
sis to increases in energy supplies.
21
Based on data supplied in U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1978
, Table 1036, p.
621. On the history of federally funded energy research and develop-
ment up to this time., see John E. Tilton, U.S. Energy Research and
Development Policy (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1974).
Also see Ford Foundation, A Time to Choose
,
chapter 12.
22
For the text of the message see Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents
,
April 23, 1973, pp. 389-406.
23
According to one source, only about 7% of total petroleum
requirements originated in the Middle East at this time. Robert Engler,
The Brotherhood of Oil (Chicago: The University of Chicage Press,
1977), p. 3. The magnitude of the oil cutoff at this time is still
hotly debated, as is the role of the international oil companies in
effecting the embargo. For one of the better analyses on these points
see Blair, The Control of Oil
,
pp. 261-268.
24
New York Times , 8 November 1973.
25
His comments are reported in the U.S. Department of State
Bulletin
,
February 4, 1974, p. 111.
See his energy message to Congress, January 23, 1974, in Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents, January 28, 1974, p. 73.
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27
P^roject Independence Report
, pp. 11-15.
28
Ibid. This project entailed a truly massive expansion in
nuclear power. Nuclear accounted for only 1% of total energy consump-
tion in 1973, a level that would increase ten-fold by 1980 to 9%.
In addition, nuclear accounted for only 7% of total electric generating
capacity in 1974 and 4% of all electricity generated; under this Plan
by 1985 its share would more than triple to 22% of generating capacity.
29
For the text of these bills see, Congressional Quarterly,
Energy Policy
, pp. 10-a. Under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
the administration employed a price strategy which it would persistently
follow in the future. By allowing the price of both "old" and "new"
domestic oil to rise, it hoped it would create sufficient financial in-
centive for increased production.
30„Congressional Quarterly, Continuing Energy Crisis in Americ a,
pp. 21-33. Overall the decline in total energy demand was only slight,
falling at 0.1% annually in 1973-1976.
31
Ibid., see the report of William Simon's comments, p. 13.
32
Ibid., p. 6. For an example of Ford's comments see "The Presi-
dent's Remarks on Signing the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,"
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
,
October 14, 1974, p. 1271.
33
The composite price approach had been introduced as a means to
control the average—weighted
—
price which U.S. refiners paid for each
barrel of oil, whether it was of domestic or foreign origin. Since
foreign oil was significantly more costly, the system effectively subsi-
dized increased imports at less than their actual costs. For a fuller
explanation see Blair, The Control of Oil
,
p. 360.
Public Law 94-163, reprinted in Congressional Quarterly, Energy
Policy
,
pp. 42-a to 45-a.
35
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , December 25,
1975, pp. 1391-1392.
36_, .,
Ibid.
3 7
For a more detailed discussion of these actions see Congres-
sional Quarterly, Energy Policy , pp. 61-a to 71-a. Since its inception
the FPC had regulatory jurisdiction only over the price of interstate
gas, gas distributed in the intrastate market was unregulated. In
1973, interstate sales were 53.5% of national production and the share
of sales in the interstate market was declining as more was alloted to
the unregulated intrastate area where prices were considerably higher.
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For examples see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-ment Operations, Staff Study of the Oversight and Efficiency of
Executive Agencies With Respect to the Petroleum Industry, Especially
as it Relates to Recent Fuel Shortages
, 93rd Cong.. 1st Spsb w»„omJ
ber 8, 1973, pp. 22-23, which notes how pricing policies in the early
1970s contributed to fuel shortages; also Project Independence Report
,
which argues that price controls had discouraged oil exploration and
production, pp. 11-19; and the Economic Report of the President, 1978
.
which argues that government policies continued to stimulate demand
even after the oil embargo, p. 7. For an outside critique see the
OECD, World Energy Outlook (Paris: OECD, 1977), which reflects the
European view that the most important obstacle to energy conserva-
tion and reductions in consumption in the U.S. is the artificially low
energy prices.
39
See Table 20; also Congressional Quarterly, Energy Policy
,
p. 5-a. Proved reserves of oil fell by about 7.5% during 1973-1975.
40
New York Times
,
19 February 1978.
41
The upsurge in demand has been characterized by an increased
dependence on oil to meet total energy needs. About one-half of all
energy was provided by oil in 1978, up from 47% in 1972. Overall,
oil and gas supplied 67% of the country's energy needs in 1978, down
from 71% in 1973. World Oil
,
February 15, 1979, and Congressional
Quarterly, Energy Policy
,
p. 1.
42
For example, in the first quarter of 1979 gasoline consumption
was up 5.4%, oil consumption was up 4.1% for January-February, and
imports of crude oil were up 8.7% for the first quarter. Drawn from
the Boston Globe , 17 March 1979 and 3 May 1979; and the New York Times
,
1 April 1979.
See World Oil
,
February 15, 1979. These estimates are based
on continued bleak prospects for domestic production increases. The
1979 forecast, for example, is based on a 9.9% growth in output from
Alaska and a 1.2% fall in output from the lower 48 states, continuing
a long term downward trend.
44
Data is drawn from World Oil , Ibid., the Boston Globe , 30 April
1979, and the New York Times, 17 June 1979. The slow pace and poor
results of exploration on the outer continental shelf is one reason for
these growing doubts. Off-shore oil production actually declined in
1976-1978 by 13% and, by the end of 1978, only 13 of the 93 leased
tracts on the OCS had been drilled on—with poor results. According
to World Oil , the "Results of the first year of drilling on the US
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National Energy Program," Weekly Compilation of PresidPnfi.i
Documents, April 25, 1977, pp. 563-572.
Ibid.
For provisions of the bill see Congressional Quarterly Enerev
Policy, pp. 45-48. "
48
Energy Policy
,
Ibid., p. 5.
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Ibid., pp. 45-48.
According to industry sources, the primary cause of the
decline was the ambiguity of the new natural gas law. New York Times
6 April 1979, and Petroleum Independent
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the act would extend federal controls over gas prices to
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Policy, p. 55. Indeed, the vulnerability to OPEC had grown drastically
since 1973. According to Frank Breese, editor of the National Petrole-
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(New York: UN, 1979) .
57
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and Thomas B. Littlewood, The Politics of Popula-
tion Control (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press
,
1977)
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of some Nixon administration officials—such as that of Dr. Louis
Hellman, the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Office of Popula-
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.
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U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Report to
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Department of State Bulletin
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See Cochrane and Ryan, American Farm Policy
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^Cochrane and Ryan, American Farm Policy
,
pp. 62-81.
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Economic Report of the President, 1979
,
p. 296.
''"^Committee for Economic Development, A New U.S. Farm Policy
for Changing World Food Needs (New York: Committee for Economic
Development, 1974), p. 23.
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acres in 1975. See Luther G. Tweeten, "Agricultural Policy: A Review
of Legislation, Programs, and Policy," in Food and Agricultural Policy ,
American Enterprise Institute, p. 45.
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See D. Gale Johnson, "Food Production and Marketing: A Review
of Economic Developments in Agriculture," in Food and Agricultural
Policy
,
Ibid., p. 17.
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Advisors in Economic Report of the President, 1978, p. 196.
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Expenditures," in Food and Agricultural Policy
, p. 122.
112 T,Ibid.
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Human Needs, Food Price Changes 1973-1974 and Nutritional Status, Part
I, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1974, pp. 12-14.
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from U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Food Situation (monthly
publication), June 1977, p. 11.
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,
A Report of the
Citizen's Board of Inquiry into Hunger and Malnutrition in the United
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federal food program. See also Ahalt, "Trends in Food Consumption,";
USDA, Farm Index
,
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,
February issues
for 1974-1976.
^^On expenditures in the PL 480 program in this period see
Department of State Bulletin , March 2, 1970, February 21, 1972, and
February 19, 1973. Also American Enterprise Institute, Food and Agricul-
tural Policy .
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The value of U.S. agricultural exports has reached record
levels for the past three years. On recent agricultural performance
seeUSDA, Agricultural Situation , various issues 1978-1979, and USDA,
Agricultural Outlook (monthly publication), March 1979.
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The Act is expected to cost $12-$13 billion yearly, with
roughly half the costs attributable to the Food Stamp Program. For a
detailed review of its provisions see OECD, Review of Agricultural
Policies, 1977 (Paris: OECD, 1978).
119
The situation for 1979 appears to be relatively unchanged as,
by April, more than 11.2 million acres had been removed from production
under these provisions. New York Times , 22 April 1979.
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See USDA, Agricultural Outlook , May 1979; Farm Index , May
1979; and the Boston Globe , 29 May 1979.
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The enforcement of cost ceilings has proven difficult, how-
ever; for fiscal 1979 it was expected that nearly 3.5 million clients
would be added to the program, requiring an increase in funding
well
beyond the limit imposed by the 1977 Act. In addition, Carter
s 1980
budget estimates program costs at $6.9 billion, a 12% increase
over the
Act's original ceiling. See Agricultural Outlook, Ibid.,
and the
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Congressional Quarterly Almanac
,
April 14, 1979, p. 2.
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Although the program increasingly emphasized aid for needy
countries in the following years, its funding did not continue to
increase. Appropriations fell to $805 million by fiscal 1979. Con-
gressional Quarterly Almanac, 1978
, p. 146.
123,,
Department of State Bulletin
, March 1979, p. 25. The
Commission issued its final report in September of 1979, but it is
still unavailable as of this writing.
Chapter VI
"'"For a more extended discussion of these themes, see Chapter 1.
2
We believe that such is still generally the case in these four
countries, but it is perhaps most true of the United States. For
example, in their recent heralded study of the U.S.'s energy situation,
Energy Future
,
Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin still find it
necessary to devote considerable attention to the point that the energy
issue is not just a passing crisis, see especially chapter 1.
3
One does not have to look too far to conclude that there is
still a dearth of international cooperation in relation to these so-
called "world" issues. At the recent fifth quadrennial meeting of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, for example, the
question of whether or not there was truly a "world, energy crisis" was
a major topic of debate on which no agreement could be reached. See
the report in the New York Times , 4 June 1979; for a fuller discussion
see the report on the Conference in the Interdependent
,
published by
the United Nations Association of the United States, July-August 1979.
^There have been two primary lines of criticism of the "global
limits" in this area: those who have attacked the logic of its argu-
ment, such as H.S.D. Cole, ed., Models of Doom: A Critique of the
Limits to Growth (New York: Universe Books, 1973), and John Maddox,
The Doomsday Syndrome (London: MacMillan, 1972); and those which combat
its argument with buoyant messages about technological salvation, such
Herman Kahn's works in this area or Richard Meier, Science and Economic
Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts of Technology Press,
1966).
5
Among the most popular works of this ilk are those of Garrett
Hardin, Exploring New Ethics for Survival . Others include those of
Jay Forrester, "Hunger: The Clock Ticks On," Boston Globe , 24 November
1974, and William Paddock, "A Modest Proposal," Forbes Magazine ,
December 1, 1975. All have advocated applying the military concept of
"triage" to decisions on who will recive food aid, thus relegating
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those people and countries who would "least" benefit from food aid
to starvation.
For two of the most recent examples of this position see Erik
P. Eckhom, Losing Ground (Environmental Stress and World Food Pros-
pects), and Reid Bryson and Thomas Murray, Climates of Hunger (Madison-
University of Wisconsin Press, 1977).
7
For an example of this position, which holds that environmental
and ecological "costs" are not subject to cost/benefit analvsis due to
their unique character see, Eric Ashby, Reconciling Man With the
Environment (Stanford: Satnford University Press, 1978).
This view of our ecological problems received perhaps its most
widespread circulation in Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle (New
York: Alfred Knopf, 1971).
9
The tendency to see authoritarian solutions to our world
"crisis" achieved its greatest notoriety in Heilbroner, An Inquiry
into the Human Prospect
. Similar forecasts may also be found in
Hardin, Exploring New Ethics for Survival
,
and William Ophuls,
Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman,
1977).
^Power and Choice
,
p. 26.
"^Two of the better works which have explored these questions
are: Barry Weisberg, Beyond Repair: The Ecology of Capitalism
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), and William Leiss, The Limits to
Satisfaction: An Essay on the Problem of Needs and Commodities
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976).
12
This theme has been most fully, and capably, explored in
William Leiss, The Domination of Nature (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974).
13
The question of who is more responsible for the current world
"crises" has indeed been a major obstruction to greater international
agreement and cooperation on these issues. This question is explored
in Leiss, The Limits to Satisfaction .
"^Examples of works in this area which neglect the implementa-
tion aspect of their "solutions" include some of the most popular,
such as Rene Dubos, So Human an Animal (New York: Scribner's, 1968);
E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful (New York: Harper and Row,
1973); Paul and Anne Ehrlich, Population, Resources, Environment
(San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1972). One who has begun to explore
this neglected dimension of the ecological perspective is Ashby, Recon-
ciling Man With the Environment .
3A2
The unwillingness or inability to deal with these "political"
problems presented by the current crises is, perhaps, an important
reason why the tendency in many of these works is to foresee an
increase in authoritarianism or, at the least, significant increases
in state power 'as the most likely path in the future. More impor-
tantly, it indicates a trust in the benevolence of the use of state
power which requires more thorough investigation. Hardin, Exploring
New Ethics for Survival
,
is perhaps the clearest example of this
tendency.
"^In the United States, for example, it has been shown that all
do not have equal access to or an equal share of energy utilized,
Ford Foundation, A Time to Choose . Their study found that energy
usage in the U.S. fluctuates considerably according to one's socio-
economic position. Such a finding raises clear questions of "equity"
in the implementation of any energy policy which attempts to control
usage.
"^See, Ophuls, The Politics of Scarcity
,
especially chapter 8.
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APPENDIX
A METHODOLOGICAL POSTSCRIPT
At the close of any extended work such as this it is always
useful to reflect upon the initial expectations that one held
concerning the approach employed to analyze and explore the chosen
topic. Our choice to employ a comparative policy approach was premised
on the belief that an assessment of the global crisis perspective at
this level could add to a fuller understanding of its strengths and
limitations, especially if it is to serve, as many of its proponents
suggest, as both a framework of analysis and an initiator and director
of activities aimed at resolving global issues. In retrospect, we
think that this study has met with significant success in this regard.
We must also make mention of some of the serious limitations
which we have been subject to in adopting the comparative policy
approach, however. The field of comparative public policy, if one
may even call it that, has been beset by a continual debate concerning
the proper focus and purpose of policy analysis when undertaken in a
comparative setting. While all generally agree that "policy" should
be the focus, there is a considerable lack of agreement on what
activities constitute "policy" and which aspect of policy-making
(process, content, impact) should be the central focus, or whether
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all aspects must be considered equally.* There are as well impor-
tant disputes concerning the purpose of comparative policy studies,
with suggestions running the gamut from the "quest for broad
systematic theory" to proposals that such studies may only be
broadly suggestive.**
In carrying out this study we have made conscious choices on
both of these points. This work sought to focus primarily on the
goals and contents of policies, because, given our purposes, it was
thought that this was a sufficiently wide focus to adequately assess
these issues. In the process, however, we found that it was necessary
in most cases to include policy outcomes (both intended and unin-
tended) to present an accurate depiction of the relationship between
the government's understanding of an issue and the formulation of
the policy response. On this basis, if one is concerned with
comparing issue perceptions it is quite clear that cross-national
policy studies such as these need to consider policies over time,
since it is the only proper way to convey the full flavor of the
policy context, which is crucial to understanding why states react
*For a concise survey of these issues see Richard Rose, "Compar-
ing Public Policy (An Overview) , " European Journal of Political
Research 1 (1973) : 67-94 ; and Elliot Feldman, "Comparative Public
Policy: Field or Method," Comparative Politics ll(October 1978:
287-305.
**For an argument for the former position see the two Introduc-
tions by Stuart S. Nagel and Douglas E. Ashford in Comparing Public
Policies, ed. Douglas E. Ashford (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications),
pp. 7-16. An example of a study which holds to the latter position is
Arnold Heidenheimer
,
Hugh Heclo, Carolyn Teich Adams, Comparative
Public Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975).
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differently to similar world issues.
On the subject of purpose, ours was much less ambitious than
would-be theory builders. We have tried, in the manner of other
previous comparative policy studies, to present each country's
policies as "experiences to be understood rather than events to be
counted".* Thus the kind of understanding we sought was not
intended to derive from any scientific basis which would, thereby,
enable one to explain and predict future policy behavior in these
respective countries in the future. Rather, we have sought to
present a contextual and experiential knowledge which is addressed
to a wider audience and is likely to be more suggestive than
definitive.
In large part this is due to our intention to address this
study to an audience which consists of more than just the policy
maker and the political scientist. In our view, one of the most
serious limitations of policy studies as they have generally been
carried out thus far— and one could expand this to most of social
science in general— is their narrow limited focus on elite behavior
which the focus on "policy" all too often begets. One of the most
crucial problems with this approach is that in addressing primarily
the policy maker, one may very well be addressing the political
actor who is most restricted by the existing structural constraints.
This is particularly critical in cases where the resolution of the
dilemmas posed by the issues involved, as appears to be the case in
*Heidenheimer
,
Heclo, and Adams, Ibid., Preface.
the issues discussed in this study, requires alternatives to the
standard political practices.
Therefore, this study has tried to assess the action potential
of the global crisis perspective both to reveal its critical weaknes-
ses in the political realm and to suggest that it needs to address a
larger audience than the policy maker, if it is to become a source
of mass-based political action. We have suggested that the crucial
point in this regard was the type of understanding of these issues
and their ecological context which was being presented. Martin Rein,
among others, has more extensively addressed this point in one of
his works on policy analysis in which he argued that certain types
of knowledge may be either confining or liberating, depending on
which system of valuation is considered most important to the
observer.* In a similar manner, we have suggested that the global
perspective presents an understanding of the world crises—or why
things are as they are—which ultimately may inhibit the capacity to
act, even though it is inspired by the desire for action. Such an
outcome is in large part due to its narrow concern with considera-
tions of survival and its failure to deal frankly with the political
and normative issues which its analysis portends.
*Social Science and Public Policy (New York: Penguin Books,
1976), especially chapter 7.


